almighty power, unlimited knowledge, and perfect wisdom, we can neither conceive that infinite goodness should extend to the utmost bounds of that which has no bounds, nor yet that it should stop until it can proceed no further. Since, then, we find our understanding incapable of comprehending infinite goodness joined with infinite power, we need not be surprised at finding our thoughts perplexed concerning them; for no other can be expected in matters above our reach; and we may presume the obscurity rises from something wrong in our ideas, not from any inconsistencies in the subjects themselves." In short, here as elsewhere, whenever we apply a purely metaphysical idea to matters of fact, we end in a contradiction or an absurdity.

You will not understand me, by these remarks, as holding forth the opinion, that the problem respecting the origin of evil is insoluble, or as evading the difficulty of solving it. On the contrary, I believe, and I shall attempt to show, that all events are ordered for the best, and that the supposed evils which we suffer are parts of a great system conducted by almighty power, under the direction of unlimited wisdom and goodness. I adopt the opinion maintained in all ages by the best and wisest philosophers, that the creation of beings endowed with free-will, and consequently liable to moral delinquency, and the government of the world by general laws, from which occasional supposed evils must result, furnish no solid objection to the perfection of the universe. This, I admit, is a system of optimism; but it is not the optimism of Leibnitz, grounded upon a denial of man's free agency, and as such justly ridiculed by Voltaire. And the general doctrine of the benevolence of God is in no wise accountable for or dependent upon the sufficiency of the argument in defence of this metaphysical system. That doctrine rests upon its own proofs, which are abundant, undisputed, and irrefragable. This question respecting the presence of any evil in the world is a collateral affair, which must be considered, indeed, before we can complete a scheme of theology, and about which theologians and metaphysicians may differ. But the religious man has no concern with it, and his faith, whether derived from the teach

ings of nature, or from express revelation, is not burdened with its doubts and intricacies. It is enough for him, that he can trace everywhere the footprints of a wise, just, and benevolent Ruler of the universe.

こ

୯

M

LECTURE VIII.

THE ORIGIN OF EVIL.

THE argument in my last Lecture for the benevolence of God was not founded upon metaphysical reasoning, or upon any consideration a priori of the Divine nature, but upon observation and the results of experience. It is because human life, on the whole, is a happy one, because its pleasures far exceed its pains, and because these pleasures were evidently designed, while the pains are only incidental or secondary to some great object, that we are enabled to pronounce with confidence, that the Deity wishes the happiness of his creatures. The sufferings which are the immediate consequence and punishment of vice, it was remarked, are properly left out of the account, since these evince the goodness of God no less than the happiness resulting from virtue, the object in both cases being to advance man's highest interests by the improvement of his moral character; just so the affectionate parent rewards the obedience and punishes the faults of his child, love equally constraining him to adopt either course. Now these sufferings constitute so large a portion of the misery that is in the world, that, when they are deducted, the balance inclines altogether on the side of happiness. Our enjoyments, also, proceed from steady and permanent causes; the performance of all the ordinary functions of life, when the body is in its normal state, being a source of pleasure. Sickness is an accident and an exception; health is the intended and usual condition.

The pleasures of taste arise from an adaptation of external nature to the mind of man, which must have had for its sole purpose the increase of our happiness; and these pleasures are so various, recur so frequently, and occupy so many hours of our existence, as to give a smiling aspect to the whole. Happiness, it was also observed, is accommodated to all beings and conditions; there is no absolute standard of it, which would necessarily limit its distribution. The pleasures of the child, the savage, and the brute are as real and hearty, as complete in their way, as those of the mature and cultivated mind. All have the means of enjoyment provided for them, suited to their peculiar sphere, adapted to their organizations and their tastes. Lastly, the endowment of the mind with the benevolent affections is a most effectual security for our happiness, by making us all the guardians of the happiness of each other. It is not only the duty, but one of the primitive impulses, of man, acting spontaneously, and for the time irrationally, to aid, protect, and sympathize with his neighbour. These affections profit not only the objects of them, but him who cherishes them; the luxury of their indulgence being so great, that when real occasions to call them forth are wanting, we seek fictitious ones, and spend them upon imaginary beings.

These facts, I observed, show a vast predominance of happiness in our condition, and so, notwithstanding the occasional presence of evil, amply vindicate the benevolence of the Creator. What remains is a point of curiosity and theory, rather than of substantive importance, for the religious inquirer. Insist as we may upon the existence of sin and suffering in the world, these, in the amount in which they are visible to us, do not disprove, do not even cast a doubt upon, the goodness of God; they affect only the doctrine of the infinity of his benevolence, a subject with which we, his finite creatures, with our limited intelligence, have little or no concern. It is probable, it is even certain, that the whole difficulty consists, not in the nature of the facts themselves, but in the imperfect comprehension of our minds, which cannot unite the conceptions of infinite power and infinite

goodness without stumbling upon a contradiction and an absurdity. After this explanation, we approach the deep and dark problem of the origin of evil without anxiety.

The question in its simplest form is, How can there be any evil in the world, if it was created and is governed by an allpowerful and all-gracious God? The difficulty disappears, and the problem is solved, if we can prove that the existence of any amount, however small, of sin and suffering is compatible with a belief in the omnipotence and infinite benevolence of the Deity; for, in the first place, it was shown in the last Lecture, that the amount is actually small, when compared with the happiness and virtue for which provision is made, and which are really experienced or exercised; and, secondly, if any evil, however slight, can be satisfactorily accounted for without bringing the infinite power and goodness of God into doubt, the question respecting the magnitude of this necessary evil can be determined by infinite wisdom alone. It is not competent for us to settle this question; nor is it desirable, for the answer to it does not at all affect our belief in the moral attributes of the Supreme Being, and is obviously beyond the reach of the human faculties. We might as well assume to determine how many stars there ought to be in the sky, as to say how much or how little of any quality or thing ought to be permitted under God's government, when we have once clearly seen that its presence in some degree is essential. Only an Alphonso of Castile could be guilty of such folly. He alone who knows the whole, and governs the whole, of the universe of which we form but an infinitesimal part, our time in it being but a moment, and our space a dot,—can tell how much is essential, when we know that some is essential. Our ideas of quantity and magnitude are wholly relative; however great the sum may appear to us, no one can affirm, that, in the eye of Infinite Wisdom, it is not a minimum. Nay, after the proofs already advanced of the Divine benevolence, the presumption is inevitable, that it is a minimum.

I place stress upon this point, because, both by the friends and the opponents of religion, the problem respecting the origin