LECTURE VII.

THE FALL OF MAN.

THE Bible is a rich treasury of historic truth. In the first chapter of Genesis, we read an account of our own origin, and of the birth of creation. But scarcely have we time to pause and contemplate the beauty and grandeur of the handiwork of the Supreme Architect, till we are led by the inspired record to look upon one of the most melancholy scenes ever presented to the view of man. In the third chapter of Genesis, we are furnished with the history of the fall of man, the apostasy of the first pair from original purity and happiness. The Mosaic account of this event is substantially this: that man was placed in the garden of Eden to dress and to keep it. In this garden were two peculiar trees, the one called the "tree of life," and the other "the tree of knowledge of good and evil." Of the fruit of the latter Adam was commanded not to eat, and the command was enforced by the announcement of the penalty,-"In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." Through the temptation of the serpent, Eve, and, through her, Adam, were induced to disobey the command, by eating the fruit of that tree, in consequence of which they were expelled from the garden, and the sentence of death, together with other maledictions, was denounced against them.

I. In turning our attention to this scriptural account of the fall, we inquire, first, is this a literal account of events that really took place, or is it merely an allegorical representation? Infidels, who reject the Bible, of course look upon it as nothing but a fictitious story; but that professed Christians should view this solemn record as a painted allegory, is a matter of no little surprise; and yet, some, at the same time that they express a reverence for the Bible, make thus free with its

contents.

That this history should be interpreted literally, we infer, first, from the fact that it is regularly connected with a continuous and plain narrative detail of facts. Now, to select from a regularly conducted narrative, a particular portion, as allegorical, when all the other parts in the connection are admitted to be plain narrative, is contrary to all the rules of interpretation. If we may make thus free with the third chapter of

Genesis, why not the first; and deny the reality of the creation? Why not make a similar disposition of the history of Noah, of Moses, or even of Christ? Indeed, if we are authorized to treat the plain historic record of the Bible thus unceremoniously, we can place little confidence in anything it contains.

But there is a second argument for the literal interpretation of the account under consideration. If we view it as an allegory, we must set aside the authority of the New Testament; for, in several places it alludes to the history of the fall as a real transaction. Matt. xix. 4, 5, our Saviour says, "Have ye not read, that he which made them at the beginning, made them male and female; and said, For this cause shall a man leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife; and they twain shall be one flesh." Here, although our Lord does not quote immediately from the history of the fall, yet he quotes a portion of the same continuous narrative; consequently, he must have viewed it as real history. In 2 Cor. xi. 3, St. Paul says, "But I fear lest by any means, as the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtilty, so your minds should be corrupted from the simplicity that is in Christ." Here the allusion is so plain that we cannot resist the conviction that the apostle intended to refer to a real transaction.

But there is another passage so positive and definite as to settle the question with all who will acknowledge the inspiration of St. Paul:1 Tim. ii. 13, 14. "For Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression." Thus do we perceive that we are compelled to admit the literal history of the fatal illapse of man, as recorded in the third chapter of Genesis, or discard our confidence in the Bible.

II. In the second place, we inquire concerning the propriety of the Divine administration, as connected with the circumstances of the fall of

man.

1. It is asked, could not the Almighty, who certainly foresaw the apostasy of man, have prevented it? And if so, how can we reconcile it with Divine goodness, that he did not thus interpose? I am persuaded that this difficulty has not only been tauntingly urged by the infidel, but it has presented itself to the mind of many a candid inquirer after truth; therefore, it merits some serious consideration.

In the first place, that God foresaw the fall, we firmly believe; for he seeth"the end from the beginning."

In the second place, that he could have prevented it, we freely admit; for God can do anything which does not imply an absurdity, and which is consistent with his own perfections. We do not suppose that Deity was necessarily compelled to create man originally. The fact that he

did not perform this work till a few thousand years ago, is sufficient evidence that he might have suspended it even till now, had he seen proper. If, then, he was not compelled to create man at first, but acted with perfect freedom, it would follow, that he might still continue to exercise the same freedom, and unmake what he had made, or so change it as to constitute it something entirely different. So far, then, as the simple question of potentiality is concerned, the Deity could have prevented the fall. He could have prevented it by omitting to create man. He could have prevented it by making man a stock or a stone, or anything else beside a moral agent. But that he could have prevented it consistently with his own attributes, without destroying the moral agency of man, is what we believe never can be proved. Seeing, then, that the only way by which God could have rendered the apostasy of man impossible, was, not to have made him a moral and accountable agent, the question then amounts to this: was it better, upon the whole, that moral agents should be brought into being, or not? Before the Divine administration can be impeached, as improper or inconsistent with goodness, it must be shown either that it was improper to create moral agents, or that the possibility of transgressing is not essential to the character of a moral agent. That it was improper to create moral agents, is a position contradicted by the fact that God did create such beings. This must be admitted by all who acknowledge their own existence, and that they have been brought into being by a Creator, whether they believe the Bible or not. Therefore, we are compelled to admit, that in the judgment of God, who alone is infinitely wise and capable of surveying the whole ground, more good than evil would result from the creation of intelligent, accountable beings; and that therefore it was better, upon the whole, that such beings should be created. In the next place, that the possibility of apostasy is essential to the character of a moral and accountable agent, is easily shown in the following manner: -1. A moral agent implies a capacity for performing moral action. 2. Moral action implies a law by which its character is determined. 3. A law for the government of moral action must necessarily be such as may either be obeyed or disobeyed by the subject; otherwise, there can be no moral quality, no virtue or vice, no praise or blame, attached to obedience or disobedience; and this would destroy the character of the moral agent. Thus it is clear that the power to obey or disobey is essential to the character of a moral agent; consequently, God could not have prevented the possibility of the apostasy and fall of man without destroying his moral agency.

2. The nature of the prohibition made to Adam has been considered by some as a ground of serious complaint against the Divine adminis

tration. That the fruit of one of the trees of Paradise should be interdicted by the Almighty, has been represented as absurd, and treated with ridicule. This solemn transaction has been made the subject of many" a foolborn jest" by the captious and profane. It would be well for shortsighted and fallible creatures, before they launch forth with such presumptuous arrogance and audacious raillery, with much humility and honesty of heart, more carefully to examine so serious a matter.

In reference to this prohibition, it may be observed that the objection. is not that man was placed under a law; the propriety of this, all who acknowledge that he was constituted a moral agent must admit; but the ground of complaint is against the peculiar character of the law. "What harm could there be in eating an apple," it is asked, "that our first parents should be placed under so strict and unreasonable a restraint?"

To this we would reply, that we can see no just reason for complaint, because the prohibition was what has been termed, not a moral, but a positive precept. The chief difference in these is, that the reason of a positive precept is not seen by us, whereas, in a moral precept, we perceive, in the very nature of the command, something of its propriety.

In reference to moral precepts, it must be admitted that the reasonableness of the duty is not in every case equally obvious. May we not, therefore, infer, that, in positive precepts, a sufficient reason for them may exist in the mind of God, which, in consequence of the weakness of our understandings, we cannot perceive. That our minds do not perceive the reason upon which a command is founded, cannot possibly be an evidence that no such reason exists, with any who admit the finitude of the human understanding. Therefore, to object to the prohibition as unreasonable, merely because we do not perceive the reason upon which it is founded, is seen to be fallacious.

Again; even if we were to admit that there was no previous reason, in the nature of things, for the particular precept given to Adam, and that another precept might just as well have been substituted for it, how can we see any valid objection to the Divine administration upon this supposition? Is not the ground of all obligation, whether connected with a positive or moral precept, founded upon the will of God? For instance, the duty of industry is said to be moral in its character, because we can perceive some propriety in it, even in the absence of a command. But is it not clear that our obligation to be industrious is founded upon the command of God? In the absence of the known will of God in the case, I might be led, from mere choice or policy, to the exercise of industry, but I could not feel that I was bound to be industrious, and that a failure would be a crime. Hence we conclude, that,