IV. OMNISCIENCE. This essential attribute is forcibly presented in the following passages. Heb. iv. 13. "Neither is there any creature that is not manifest in his sight; but all things are naked and opened unto the eyes of him with whom we have to do." Acts xv. 18. "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world." Ps. cxxxix. 1-4. "O Lord, thou hast searched me, and known me. Thou knowest my down-sitting and mine up-rising, thou understandest my thought afar off. Thou compassest my path and my lying down, and art acquainted with all my ways. For there is not a word in my tongue,' but lo, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether." Ps. cxxxix. 12. "Yea, the darkness hideth not from thee, but the night shineth as the day; the darkness and the light are both alike to thee." 1 Chron. xxviii. 9. "For the Lord searcheth all hearts, and understandeth all the imaginations of the thoughts." Ps. cxlvii. 5. “Great is our Lord, and of great power:

his understanding is infinite."

Thus we perceive clearly that God possesses the attribute of knowledge in the highest possible perfection. With him there can be nothing difficult; - nothing mysterious; but all things are alike plain to his understanding, and open to his view.

This perfect knowledge is restricted to no particular part of his dominions, but extends alike to heaven, earth, and hell; yea, throughout the illimitable bounds of immensity. Nor may we suppose that it is applied only to things which, according to the judgment of finite capacities, are of consequence and importance. It extends to all things, great and small. The insect, as well as the angel, is perfectly known in all its mysterious organization, and minute history.

The infinite knowledge of God not only comprehends everything, great and small, whether animate or inanimate, material or immaterial, throughout the immensity of space, but also throughout the infinite periods of duration. All things, past and future, are just as clearly seen, and as fully comprehended, by the omniscient God, as the plainest events of the present.

Again; this knowledge is not to be considered as having a possible existence in some things, and an actual existence in others, accordingly as they may be deemed more or less important, so as to deserve, or not deserve, the Divine attention; but, in all cases, it is an actually existing knowledge. Indeed, the power to know, and knowledge itself, are quite distinct things. The former constitutes no part of the attribute of omniscience, but is properly embraced under the attribute of omnipotence. Therefore, to say that God does not actually know all things but, in reference to some things, only possesses the power to know them without choosing to exercise that power, would be plainly to deny Him the perfection of omniscience.

Again, the knowledge of Deity must be understood perfectly to accord with the things known, not only in reference to their nature, but also in reference to the period of their existence. He sees and knows things as they are, whether present, past, or future; and not as they are not. Thus, to suppose that he sees and knows past events as future, or future events as past, would be absurd. And it would seem equally absurd, to suppose that he sees or knows either past or future events as present, when they are not so in fact. It is true, that "all things are naked and opened unto the eyes of him with whom we have to do." The past and the future are seen with as much clearness as the present; but to say that they are seen as present, when in fact they are not present, would imply that God does not see and know things as they really are; and, consequently, that his knowledge is imperfect. The sentiment that " with God there is one ETERNAL NOW," if it be understood to mean only, that present, past, and future, are all seen at the same time with equal clearness, is both rational and scriptural; but if it be understood to imply, that with Deity past, present, and future, are all the same, and that duration, with him, is essentially different in itself from what it is with us, and does not flow on in a regular succession of periods, the idea is either unintelligible or absurd.

Once more; the knowledge of God, although it has no influence upon the nature of things, so as to render that necessary which would otherwise be contingent, yet it sees them as they are; - necessary events as necessary, and contingent events as contingent. But in reference to contingent events, we are not to infer any imperfection in the Divine prescience. For while God sees that an event, because he has made it contingent, may take place or not, according to the circumstances upon which the contingency turns, yet the Divine penetration darts through the maze of contingencies, and knows certainly whether the event will take place or not, and all about the circumstances by which it shall be determined.

Thus we conclude, from Scripture and reason, that the great Creator of all sees the end from the beginning, and possesses knowledge in absolute perfection.

Upon the Divine prescience of contingent events, we subjoin the following remarks from Mr. Watson: "The great fallacy in the argument, that the certain prescience of a moral action destroys its contingent nature, lies in supposing that contingency and certainty are the opposites of each other. It is, perhaps, unfortunate that a word which is of figurative etymology, and which consequently can only have an ideal application to such subjects, should have grown into common use in this discussion, because it is more liable, on that account, to present

itself to different minds under different shades of meaning. If, however, the term contingent, in this controversy, has any definite meaning at all, as applied to the moral actions of men, it must mean their freedom, and stands opposed, not to certainty, but to necessity. A free action is a voluntary one; and an action which results from the choice of the agent is distinguished from a necessary one in this, that it might not have been, or have been otherwise, according to the self-determining power of the agent. It is with reference to this specific quality of a free action that the term contingency is used,-it might have been otherwise; in other words, it was not necessitated. Contingency in moral actions is, therefore, their freedom, and is opposed, not to certainty, but to necessity. The very nature of this controversy fixes this as the precise meaning of the term. The question is not, in point of fact, about the certainty of moral actions, that is, whether they will happen or not, but about the nature of them, whether free or constrained, whether they must happen or not. Those who advocate this theory care not about the certainty of actions, simply considered, that is, whether they will take place or not; the reason why they object to a certain prescience of moral actions is, that they conclude that such a prescience renders them necessary. It is the quality of the action for which they contend, not whether it will happen or not. If contingency meant uncertainty, the sense in which such theorists take it, the dispute would be at an end. But though an uncertain action cannot be foreseen as certain, a free, unnecessitated action may; for there is nothing in the knowledge of the action, in the least, to affect its nature. Simple knowledge is, in no sense, a cause of action, nor can it be conceived to be causal, unconnected with exerted power; for mere knowledge, therefore, an action remains free or necessitated as the case may be. A necessitated action is not made a voluntary one by its being foreknown; a free action is not made a necessary one. Free actions foreknown will not, therefore, cease to be contingent. But how stands the case as to their certainty? Precisely on the same ground. The certainty of a necessary action, foreknown, does not result from the knowledge of the action, but from the operation of the necessitating cause; and, in like manner, the certainty of a free action does not result from the knowledge of it, which is no cause at all, but from the voluntary cause, that is, the determination of the will. It alters not the case in the least, to say that the voluntary action might have been otherwise. Had it been otherwise, the knowledge of it would have been otherwise; but as the will, which gives birth to the action, is not dependent upon the previous knowledge of God, but the knowledge of the action upon foresight of the choice of the will, neither the will nor the act is controlled by the knowledge, and the action, though foreseen, is still free or contingent.

"The foreknowledge of God has, then, no influence upon either the freedom or the certainty of actions, for this plain reason, that it is knowledge, and not influence; and actions may be certainly foreknown, without their being rendered necessary by that foreknowledge. But here it is said, if the result of an absolute contingency be certainly foreknown, it can have no other result, it cannot happen otherwise. This is not the true inference. It will not happen otherwise; but, I ask, why can it not happen otherwise? Can is an expression of potentiality; it denotes power or possibility. The objection is, that it is not possible that the action should otherwise happen. But why not? What deprives it of that power? If a necessary action were in question, it could not otherwise happen than as the necessitating cause shall compel; but then that would arise from the necessitating cause solely, and not from prescience of the action, which is not causal. But if the action be free, and it enter into the very nature of a voluntary action to be unconstrained, then it might have happened in a thousand other ways, or not have happened at all; the foreknowledge of it no more affects its nature in this case than in the other. All its potentiality, so to speak, still remains, independent of foreknowledge, which neither adds to its power of happening otherwise, nor diminishes it. But then we are told, that the prescience of it, in that case, must be uncertain; not unless any person can prove, that the Divine prescience is unable to dart through all the workings of the human mind, all its comparison of things in the judgment, all the influences of motives on the affections, all the hesitancies and haltings of the will, to its final choice. Such knowledge is too wonderful for us,' but it is the knowledge of him who understandeth the thoughts of man afar off."-(Watson's Institutes.)

V. OMNIPOTENCE. Perhaps no attribute of God is more gloriously exhibited in the Scriptures than this. That the Divine power is infinite, is clearly seen in the first chapter of Genesis, where the stupendous work of creation is presented. To create something out of nothing, is a work which none but Omnipotence can perform. How wonderful then the power of God, by which, at a word, he called into being, not only this earth with all it contains, but perhaps millions of worlds, and systems of worlds, that now roll in their respective spheres, throughout the immensity of space! In further tracing the illustrations of this attribute, as contained in the Scriptures, we would notice the following passages: 1 Chron. xxix. 11, 12. Thine, O Lord, is the greatness, and the power, and the glory, and the victory, and the majesty: for all that is in the heaven and in the earth is thine; thine is the kingdom, O Lord, and thou art exalted as head above all. Both riches and honor come of thee, and thou reignest over all; and in thine hand is power

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and might; and in thine hand it is, to make great, and to give strength unto all." Job xxvi. 14. "But the thunder of his power who can understand?" Ps. lxii. 11. "God hath spoken once; twice have I heard this, that power belongeth unto God." Jer. x. 12, 13. "He hath made the earth by his power, he hath established the world by his wisdom, and hath stretched out the heavens by his discretion. When he uttereth his voice, there is a multitude of waters in the heavens, and he causeth the vapors to ascend from the ends of the earth; he maketh lightnings with rain, and bringeth forth the wind out of his treasures." Hab. iii. 3-6. "God came from Teman, and the Holy One from Mount Paran. Selah. His glory covered the heavens, and the earth was full of his praise. And his brightness was as the light; he had horns coming out of his hand, and there was the hiding of his power. Before him went the pestilence, and burning coals went forth at his feet. He stood, and measured the earth: he beheld, and drove asunder the nations; and the everlasting mountains were scattered, the perpetual hills did bow: his ways are everlasting." Gen. xxxv. 11. "And God said unto him, I am God Almighty."

Thus we see how clearly the Scriptures exhibit the omnipotence of God. This, as well as all the other attributes, is possessed in the highest possible perfection. And we understand hereby, that God is able to do all things which can be effected by omnipotent power. But, at the same time, all the attributes harmonize, and infinite power can never be exercised so as to perform what implies a contradiction in itself, or what is inconsistent with the Divine nature; but this implies no imperfection in this attribute, but rather exhibits its superlative excellency.

VI. OMNIPRESENCE. The declarations of Scripture, in proof and illustration of this attribute, are at once clear and sublime. Ps. cxxxix. 7, 10. "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit, or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me." Prov. xv. 3. "The eyes of the Lord are in every place, beholding the evil and the good." Jer. xxiii. 24. "Can any hide himself in secret places, that I shall not see him? saith the Lord. Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord." Isa. lxvi. 1. "Thus saith the Lord, The heaven is my throne, and the earth is my footstool." 2 Chron. vi. 18. "Behold, heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee; how much less this house that I have built." Amos ix. 2,3. "Though they dig into hell, thence shall my hand take them; though they climb up to heaven, thence will I bring them down. And though they hide them