whose wisdom and goodness are so gloriously exhibited throughout his works, in the perfect adaptation of the means to the end, cannot be supposed, in reference to the moral government of man, the most important being belonging to sublunary creation, to have blundered so egregiously as to have selected inappropriate means for the accomplishment of his excellent and glorious purpose.

7. The only remaining consideration, in order that we may arrive at the ground of necessity for the atonement, is for us to ascertain whether there was a necessity for the execution of the penalty, after the law had been violated; or whether it might have been remitted, independent of satisfaction or expiation? To this inquiry we would reply, that every consideration which urged the propriety of the threatening, or even of the establishment of the law itself, with equal propriety and force demanded the execution of the penalty. To affix a penalty to a law, and then permit disobedience to pass with impunity, and the threatened penalty to be entirely forgotten or disregarded, would be perfect mockery. Therefore, when man transgressed, the truth, justice, mercy, and all the attributes of God, as well as the stability and honor of the eternal throne itself, cried aloud for the execution of the penalty of the violated law.

1. Those who have denied the necessity, and consequently the reality, of the atonement, have contended that the Almighty might, consistently, by the exercise of his mere prerogative, as Governor of the universe, have extended pardon to the sinner, without any satisfaction or condition whatever. To this we would reply, that perhaps such might be the case, provided the Almighty were destitute of moral character, and regardless of moral principle. But a little reflection will show that such a course of procedure would be at war with the holy and immutable perfections of God.

(1.) God had positively denounced the penalty, "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." This was the unequivocal language of God himself. Had no regard been paid to this after man had transgressed, where would have been the truth of God? And what kind of a lesson on the subject of veracity would herein have been inculcated upon the intelligent universe?

(2.) Upon this principle, where would have been the justice of God? Had not the affixing of the penalty been in accordance with the eternal rectitude of the Divine character, it never could have been threatened; and if so, it will necessarily follow that the same immutable principles. of rectitude which first authorized the penalty will require its execution. Indeed, to say that God has a right to remit a threatened penalty, independent of satisfaction or atonement, is to deny that he has the right

to execute it; for a right to inflict a penalty or punishment can only be founded upon the supposition that it is just; and if it be in accordance with justice to inflict the penalty, it must follow that if it be not inflicted the claims of justice are infringed. Again; upon the supposition that God has a right to remit any penalty, by the mere exercise of his prerogative, it would follow, that, upon the same principle, he may remit every penalty, and that not only in reference to its severity, but to its whole extent and influence. And if it be right, according to the principles of justice, to remit all penalty and punishment, it cannot be consistent with goodness to inflict any punishment whatever; for it is most clear, that the goodness of God must always seek the happiness of his creatures, so far as it can be done consistently with his rectitude. Thus it would appear, that pardon without an atonement, on the principle of prerogative, would deprive the Almighty of all right to punish offenders, nullify the principles of justice, and overturn the government of God altogether.

(3.) But, in the next place, it may easily be seen, that the above plan of pardon by prerogative, independent of atonement, is also repugnant to the goodness of God. The grand object of law is the happiness and well-being of the intelligent universe. The great Governor of all cannot act upon the principle of clearing the guilty without inflicting a positive injury on the innocent; for it is to the interest of all intelligent beings, that the Divine government be sustained. Upon its stability depends not only their happiness, but their very existence itself. Let it be known that crime is not to be punished, that law is merely a form, and threatened penalty but a mockery, and who can tell the consequence that would immediately result throughout the vast extent of God's moral dominions? A license for universal rebellion would be proclaimed; and soon the intelligent universe would become a ruinous wreck. With such an example of disregard for principle in the Divine administration before. them, what hope could there have been that man, or any of the subjects of God's moral government, could afterward have paid any regard to the Divine command? Therefore, the Divine goodness itself, which would prevent the universal prevalence of anarchy and rebellion, and the consequent misery and eternal ruin of millions of worlds, joins her voice with the pleadings of justice, for the honor and security of the Divine throne, for the preservation of the principles of immutable rectitude in the Divine administration, and for the promotion of the happiness of God's intelligent creatures, in opposition to the ruinous scheme of pardon by prerogative, independent of atonement.

2. In the next place, we will notice that some have contended, that, even if there were a doubt with regard to the propriety of extending

pardon by prerogative to all classes of transgressors indiscriminately, there can be no doubt of its propriety and fitness on the condition of repentance. This is the ground taken by Socinus, and it has been strenuously insisted upon by Dr. Priestley, and the modern Socinians and Unitarians generally. But that it is alike repugnant to reason, fact, and Scripture, we think may be easily shown.

(1.) Let it be remembered, that to plead for the propriety of pardon on the ground of repentance, is, in effect, to acknowledge that it cannot consistently be conferred by the mere prerogative of God, by which it has been contended that he may relax his law at pleasure, and relinquish his right to punish the sinner. To say that repentance is required as the condition, is to admit that there is something in the principles of unbending rectitude, by which the Divine government is swayed, that would render it improper to pardon offenders indiscriminately, merely on the principle of mercy. This scheme, then, evidently acknowledges the necessity of a satisfaction of some kind, in order to pardon; but the question is, whether that satisfaction is bare repentance. Here we may observe, in the second place, that the word repentance, in the Scriptures, is taken in two different senses; but in neither acceptation can it furnish a just and independent ground for pardon. 1. It means sorrow for sin, induced solely by the apprehension or realization of the dreadful punishment and misery necessarily resulting therefrom, without being founded upon any pure principle of hatred to sin on account of its intrinsic moral evil, or leading to any genuine reformation of heart and life. The dispensing of pardon upon a repentance of this kind, is not only destitute of the least countenance from fact and Scripture, but it would be as completely subversive of all moral government as if no condition were required whatever. If this principle were admitted, it would follow that God is bound to extend pardon to every repentant criminal, and that, too, as soon as he begins to repent. This is contradicted by the fact that all men, even after they repent of their sins, are left in this world to suffer more or less the evil consequences thereof. Now, if repentance is the only and sufficient ground for pardon, every repentant sinner should immediately be released from all punishment whatever. But again; is it not evident that any sinner, so soon as all hope of advantage from crime were gone, and he began to feel the just punishment of his sins, would immediately begin to repent; and thus no sooner would the punishment begin to be felt, than it would be removed? This would, in effect, overturn all government, and proclaim complete and immediate indemnity for all transgression.

(2.) In the next place, repentance, in the Scriptures, is taken for that sincere and heartfelt sorrow for sin, on account of its intrinsic evil and

offensiveness in the sight of a holy God, which leads to a reformation of heart and life, from pure and evangelical principle. In reference to a repentance of this kind, we would say, in the first place, that, independent of grace received through the atonement of Christ, it is utterly out of the power of any man thus to repent. This necessarily follows from the totally depraved character of man as a fallen sinner, which has already been discussed. Now, to make this repentance, which can only result from the atonement of Christ, a consideration by which the necessity of that atonement shall be superseded, is manifestly absurd. But even if we admit the possibility of repentance, in the full sense of the word, independent of the atonement, this repentance could nevertheless be no just ground for pardon. It could not change the relation of the sinner to the violated law. He would still be charged with the guilt of transgression, however penitent he might be. This guilt nothing but pardon can remove. Were it the case that repentance could remove the guilt of the sinner, independent of pardon, then pardon itself would be entirely superseded. Again; it is clear that repentance, however sincere it may be, and however great the immediate benefits resulting from it, can have no retrospective bearing, so as to cancel past offence. Were it true that full and immediate pardon flows directly consequent upon repentance, then it would follow that the broken constitution of the intemperate, the wasted fortune of the profligate, and the blasted character of the criminal, would, upon reformation of heart and life, immediately be restored; but such is evidently not the fact. As in reference to the things of this life, repentance, while it may deliver us from falling again into such crimes and misfortunes as we have forsaken and endeavored to escape, cannot immediately deliver us from the bitter consequences of past misdoings and folly; so, upon the same principle, in reference to spiritual things, while it may prevent a further accumulation of guilt, and an exposure to increased punishment, it cannot affect the past, so as to remove the guilt, and release from the punishment already contracted and incurred.

Again; to suppose that repentance can purchase exemption from punishment incurred by past offence, is to suppose that we are not continualiy indebted to God the full tribute of all the service we are capable of rendering. If the service of to-day may not only meet the demands of God upon us for the time being, but also enable us to satisfy the unliquidated claims of yesterday, then it follows that it is possible for us to perform works of supererogation; - to do more than God requires of us, and thus procure a surplus of merit, which we may transfer to the benefit of our more destitute neighbor; or by which we may accumulate an account in our own favor, so as to bring the Almighty, according to

strict principles of law, actually in our debt. How absurd the hypothesis !

Once more; a close examination of the subject will show, that pardon, upon the principle of repentance alone, is self-contradictory and absurd. To say that pardon is predicated upon repentance, is to admit that it cannot take place otherwise; and if so, then it would follow that there must be a hindering cause: but no hindering cause can exist, except the obligations of the Almighty to maintain the principles of his moral government. But if the Almighty is under obligations to maintain the principles of his moral government then it will follow that he is not at liberty to pardon, even the penitent offender, without an atonement or expiation for past guilt; for the law denounces "death as the wages of sin," irrespective of penitence or impenitence. Thus it appears that pardon for sin without atonement, whether the sinner be penitent or impenitent, would be repugnant to the principles of law; and this plan of pardon would abrogate the Divine government, as really as it could be done by the system of pardon on the principle of mere prerogative.

Finally; the Scriptures give no countenance to either of these modes of pardon. It is therein declared that God "will by no means clear the guilty." "The soul that sinneth, it shal. die." "The wages of sin is death;" and "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them." These are the statutes of the Divine government; and they stand with equal force against the penitent and the impenitent; nor can they, in the least, mitigate their rigor, or release their hold upon the criminal, however penitent he may be, till their claims are met, and their full demands satisfied, by an adequate atonement. It is true that the Scriptures present the promise of mercy to the sincere penitent; but it is not upon the ground or merit of repentance, but through the atoning sacrifice of him who is "exalted a prince and a Saviour, for to give repentance to Israel and forgiveness. of sins." Thus have we seen that the necessity for the great work of the atonement of Christ is founded upon the principles of the Divine government, taken in connection with the grand design of the Almighty in the creation of man, as well as the true character of man as a free moral agent, who, by the abuse of that liberty, has fallen under the penalty of a violated law, and consequently lies in a state of guilt and misery.