point of view the fallacy of the commonly received doctrine.

"When a person little accustomed to metaphysical speculations is told, that, in the case of Volition, there are certain invisible fluids, propagated from the mind to the organ which is moved; and that, in the case of perception, the existence and qualities of the external object are made known to us by means of species, or phantasms, or images, which are present to the mind in the sensorium; he is apt to conclude, that the intercourse between mind and matter is much less mysterious than he had supposed; and that, although these expressions may not convey to him any very distinct meaning, their import is perfectly understood by philosophers. It is now, I think, pretty generally acknowledged by physiologists, that the influence of the will over the body, is a mystery which has never yet been unfolded; but, singular as it may appear, Dr. Reid was the first person who had courage to lay completely aside all the common hypothetical language concerning perception, and to exhibit the difficulty in all its magnitude, by a plain statement of the fact. To what then, it may be asked, does this statement amount ?-Merely to this; that the mind is so formed, that certain impressions produced on our organs of sense by

external objects, are followed by correspondent sensations; and that these sensations (which have no more resemblance to the qualities of matter, than the words of a language have to the things they denote) are followed by a perception of the existence and qualities of the bodies by which the impressions are made; that all the steps of this process are equally incomprehensible; and that, for any thing we can prove to the contrary, the connexion between the sensation and the perception, as well as that between the impression and the sensation, may be both arbitrary; that it is therefore by no means impossible, that our sensations may be merely the occasions on which the correspondent perceptions are excited; and that, at any rate, the consideration of these sensations, which are attributes of mind, can throw no light on the manner in which we acquire our knowledge of the existence and qualities of body. From this view of the subject, it follows, that it is external objects themselves, and not any species or images of these objects, that the mind perceives; and that, although, by the constitution of our nature, certain sensations are rendered the constant antecedents of our perceptions, yet it is just as difficult to explain how our perceptions are obtained by their means, as it would be upon the supposition, that the

mind were all at once inspired with them, without any concomitant sensations whatever *.”

Berkeley, by pushing home to all their consesequences the arguments of Leibnitz and Locke, and by presuming to trace the origin of powers of which we are almost necessarily ignorant, and for the investigation of which we have no data to found our enquiries upon, was gradually led to doubt of the existence of matter, and apparently to oppose the evidence of common sense, and the very principles of human conviction. I say apparently; for it is a mistake, to suppose that he was sceptical enough to reject the testimony of his senses, or to deny the reality of his sensations-he disputed not the effects but the causes of our sensations, and was therefore induced to inquire whether these causes took their birth from matter external to ourselves, or proceeded merely from impressions on the mind through the immediate immaterial agency of the Deity.

The talent, the elegance, and metaphysical acuteness of our author's productions, very strongly attracted the attention of the public; and, in February, 1713, he visited London for the purpose of printing a Defence of his System of Im

* Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind, p. 91, 92, second edition.

materialism, under the title of " Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous *.”

To great compass of learning, and great brilliancy of imagination, were added, in the character of Berkeley, the most undeviating virtue, the most amiable disposition, and the most prepossessing manners. Thus gifted, he very rapidly acquired, and very uniformly retained, numerous and valuable friends. Among these were Sir Richard Steele and Dr. Swift; who, though differing widely in political opinion, were united in loving and admiring the virtues and the talents of their philosophic friend. Sir Richard, who had just commenced the Guardian, was happy to secure an assistant in Berkeley; to whom, upon very good authority, it is said he gave a guinea and a dinner for every paper that he contributed. To the patronage of Sir Richard, he was early indebted for an intimacy with Pope, which was never broken; and by Swift he was introduced to Lord Berkeley of Stratton, as a relation of that nobleman, and with the humorous recommendation, that he was good

*The year preceding the publication of these Dialogues, he had printed three sermons in support of the doctrine of passive obedience; a subject to which he was led by the perusal of Locke's Two Treatises of Government. They were the cause, some time afterwards, through the medium of Mr. Molyneux, of introducing him to Queen Caroline,

for something. The Dean likewise presented him to the Earl of Peterborough, and mentioned him with such encomia, that when this nobleman was appointed Embassador to the King of Sicily, and the Italian States, in November, 1713, he selected Mr. Berkeley to accompany him as his chaplain and secretary *.

From this tour he returned to England with his Lordship in Aug. 1714, and about six weeks

"It may not be amiss," says the writer of our author's Life in the Biographia Britannica, "to record a little incident that befel Mr. Berkeley, during this tour, in the city of Leghorn; with the relation of which he used sometimes to make himself merry among his friends. Basil Kennett, the author of the Roman Antiquities, was then chaplain to the English factory at Leghorn, the only place in Italy where the English service is tolerated by the government. This gentleman requested Mr. Berkeley to preach for him one Sunday. The day following, as Berkeley was sitting in his chamber, a procession of priests in surplices, and with all other formalities, entered the room, and without taking the least notice of the wondering inhabitant, marched quite round it, muttering certain prayers. His fears immediately suggested to him that this could be no other than a visit from the Inquisition, who had heard of his officiating before heretics without licence, the day before. As soon as they were gone, he ventured with much caution to enquire into the cause of this extraordinary appearance, and was happy to be informed, that this was the season appointed by the Romish Calendar for solemnly blessing the houses of all good catholics from rats and other vermin; a piece of intelligence which changed his terror into mirth."