tives they may be concealed) exist in the breast of every man, who systematically and avowedly disregards, any one of the dictates of his moral and religious nature.* 66 Religion cannot exist where immorality generally prevails, any more than a light can burn where the air is corrupted." † Thus much, on Causes of doubt, originating in the abuse of instincts, which, properly restrained, are beneficial. *“A watch-maker told me, that a gentleman had put an exquisite watch into his hands, that went irregularly. It was as perfect a piece of work as ever was made. He took it to pieces and put it together again twenty times: no manner of defect was to be discovered, and yet the watch went intolerably. At last it struck him, that, possibly the balance wheel might have been near a magnet. On applying a needle to it, he found his suspicions true. Here was all the mischief. The steel work in the other parts of the watch had a perpetual influence on its motions; and the watch went as well as possible with a new wheel. If the soundest mind be magnetized by any predilection, it must act irregularly." -Cecil. ↑ Sir Walter Scott's "Life of Napoleon," vol. i. 54. PART THE SECOND. CHAPTER II. PRIDE. AMONGST the almost infinite variety of circumstances which are fruitful in engendering and fostering doubt on religious and moral questions, an erroneous estimate of the powers of the human mind; an intense desire of originality; an almost universal scepticism; and an absence of that continual reverence and humility which, on the supposition of a presiding Deity are due to Him; are, frames of mind, too common to be met with, to be properly passed over, in this endeavour to ascertain, the fundamental causes of religious doubt. "That implicit credulity is a mark of a feeble mind, will not be disputed; but it may not perhaps be as generally acknowledged, that the case is the same with unlimited scepticism: * on the contrary, we are sometimes apt to ascribe this disposition to a more than ordinary vigour of intellect. Such a prejudice was by no means unnatural at that period in the history of modern Europe, when reason first began to throw off the yoke of authority, and when it unquestionably required a superiority of understanding, as well as of intrepidity, for an individual to resist the contagion of prevailing superstition. But in the present age, in which the tendency of fashionable opinions is directly opposite to those of the vulgar, the philosophical creed, or the philosophical scepticism, of by far the greater number of those who value themselves on an emancipation from popular errors, arises from the very same weakness with the credulity of the multitude. There is, I think, good reason for hoping, that the sceptical tendency of the present age, will be only a temporary evil. See Appendix, iv. While it continues, however, it is an evil of the most alarming nature."* We do unquestionably live in an age when this species of intellectual irregularity is carried to a fearful extent; and I confess that I do not see the same probability which Mr. Stewart expresses, for its speedy removal. While every friend to independence of thought and vigorous cultivation of those faculties which God has vouchsafed us, for the best of purposes, rejoices in the present unexampled spread of opportunities, and desire of instruction; it is impossible altogether to forget the frequently quoted warnings of Pope and Bacon, on the peril of a "little learning." Truly it is too much, with the former, to insist, "Drink deep, or taste NOT the Pierian spring.” Why, should any degree of knowledge, deep or superficial, be at all, necessarily, dangerous? In my opinion, a little knowledge * "Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind," by Dugald Stewart.-Introduction, pt. ii. sec. 1. is better than none, on points where we want it; but I yield very readily, that a little and superficial knowledge is often sought to be concealed, by startling paradoxes, and vehemence of assertion, on points which few can be deeply versed in, and which probably, from their very nature, are incapable of the fulness of explanation, the kind of proof and degree of evidence, which is presumptuously required. The professed scepticism of young men, especially, just emerging from public schools to the universities and professions, is almost inevitably, in very great part, of this kind. Inexperienced and superficial, the most obvious method of gaining attention, is by a forcible rejection of established opinions, and an authoritative demand for explanations which, if not impossible, they are probably too unprepared and unstable to comprehend. What Bayle remarks of Des Barreaux and his friends, is true of most of them:—“ They have made no deep examination; they have learned some few objections, which they are |