the manner of mathematicians." And then he subjoins a remark which, while it confirms in every way the exquisitely true delineation of Mr. White, above quoted, is well calculated to illustrate the position assumed as the basis of this chapter; and explains the otherwise almost unaccountable difficulties of some persons and authors, even of the highest name and integrity. "This difference," adds Mr. Stewart, "between the technical meaning of the word probability, as employed by logicians, and the notion usually attached to it in the business of life, has led many authors of the highest name, in some of the most important arguments which can employ human reason, to overlook the irresistible evidence which was placed before their eyes, in search of another mode of proof, altogether unattainable in moral inquiries, and which, if it could be attained, would not be less liable to the cavils of sceptics."*

On the subject of this only attainable species of proof in moral and religious inquiries,

*Stewart's Elements of the Mind. Vol. ii. ch. 4.

the learned to the latest posterity, will owe a debt of gratitude to Bishop Butler, for his profound and well-known "Analogy." It seems to have been reserved for this great man to achieve, in this department of human knowledge, improvements, scarcely inferior to those of his great contemporary Sir Isaac Newton, in the world of nature. It is only to be regretted that his celebrated treatise, is, both from its style and structure, so repelling to many who might otherwise be induced to read it. It is encumbered with many speculations which are now seldom heard of; and these meet one so thickly throughout the whole of the first division of the work, that it is not unfrequently abandoned in despair by many, who would highly appreciate the arguments which were awaiting them in the second grand partition; and to which, a more experienced hand might at once have directed them, to the unspeakable relief of their heartfelt and

perplexing difficulties. Without producing any of Butler's arguments in support of the

Christian revelation in particular, I feel that I shall nevertheless do good service to those who are in uncertainty as to the nature of the evidence which they ought to have, by laying before them, from this sagacious writer, a few of those invaluable statements, which have relieved the anxieties of so many thousands in this matter.

Amongst so much to the purpose, it is not easy to select. Perhaps, however, those which are presently to follow are as appropriate as any others. Most, in first setting out in their inquiries into the just grounds of human action and assent, have experienced difficulty in getting clear notions of that probable evidence, of which we have already spoken. It seemed a fair way to argue, "I cannot admit this, until, all my objections are removed—until you have given me a clear conception, and an unclouded demonstration, that it is obligatory! While there remain so many opposing circumstances, in the midst of such conflict, I cannot believe." Every thoughtful student has experienced something of this kind, at

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some period or other of his life. It is perfectly natural; the error arises, from confounding together two species of proof, essentially different; both equally binding, but each, perfectly distinct, as the following will well explain. "Probable evidence is essentially distinguished from demonstrative by this, that it admits of degrees, and of all variety of them, from the highest moral certainty, to the very lowest presumption-it affords in its very nature but an imperfect kind of information, and is to be considered as relative only to beings of limited capacities; but to us, probability is the very guide of life."* From these things it follows, that in questions of difficulty,

"In the economy of human life, we act almost entirely upon probabilities; and in most instances I believe. it will be found, that the more important the tendency, or the result of a particular action, or series of actions may be, the slighter need be the preponderance of probability to determine our adopting it. It is probable, for example, that we may be heirs-at-law to a valuable estate; therefore we examine the legal instruments which ascertain our title to such estate. It is probable a particular line of conduct will be successful; therefore we pursue it. It is probable, a certain commercial speculation will be productive; therefore we put it in prac

or such as are thought so; where more satisfactory evidence cannot be had, or is not seen; if the result of the examination be, that there appears, upon the whole, any the lowest presumption on one side, though in the lowest degree greater, this determines the question, even in matters of speculation; and in matters of practice, will lay us under an absolute and formal obligation, in point of prudence and of interest, to act upon that presumption or low probability, though it be so low as to leave the mind in very great doubt which is the truth. For surely, a man is as really bound in prudence to do what upon the whole appears, according to the best of his judgment, to be for his happiness, as what he certainly knows to be so. Nay, further, in questions of great consequence, a reasonable man will think it concerns him to remark lower probabilities and presumptions than these; such as amount to no more than shewing one side to be as sup

tice. It is probable, a particular medicine will be beneficial to the constitution; therefore we have recourse to it."-Olinthus Gregory on Christianity, i., 282.