others accused of a conspiracy to commit an assault upon the President of the United States.

In 1804, Wilson Bryan was ordered into the custody of the Marshal for refusing to take the oath of a juror, alleging that he was a Methodist but stating that he did not know whether or not the taking of an oath was opposed to a tenet of his religion. After a day's entertainment by the Marshal, he came into Court and was sworn by holding up his right hand. The Court had trouble with the jury in the case of Offutt vs. Parrott. Three jurors escaped from the jury room, and, upon being captured and brought before the Court, explained that, finding the jury not likely to agree, there being a great deal of warmth among them, they thought it would be productive of no good for them to remain together, and made the best way out of it. Each one was fined $15. In Ladd vs. Wilson, an attempt was made to obtain a new trial upon affidavits of the jury that they had made a mistake in calculating and because of the misconduct of some of them; but new trial was refused. A new trial was asked in the case of Kerr vs. Hamilton, one of the grounds assigned being that the jurors misbehaved, in that two of their number left the room after 11 o'clock and spiritous liquors were brought to the jury in their blankets. In United States vs. Alexander Carnot, 1824, the point was raised that a foreigner has the right to be tried by a jury of his own countrymen, following the decisions of Chief Justice Marshall and Judge St. George Tucker. In United States vs. Palmer the procedure was much confused. An effort was made to send witnesses to the grand jury on the part of the accused, claiming that this had been done on the trial of Burr, a short time before. After the trial had progressed some time, it was found that the magistrate who had committed Palmer was on the jury trying him. United States vs. John Lee, IV Cranch, 446,

held that a man who does not believe in the existence of God, other than nature, or in a future state of existence, is not a competent witness. In Rutherford vs. Moore, it was held that a witness who has declared his disbelief in a future state of rewards and punishments is a competent witness although such views may affect his credibility.

In United States vs. King, it was held to be the law, that in order to convict one of highway hobbery the road on which the robbery was committed must be a public road laid out by authority of the County Court; however, the prisoner was held for robbery, the punishment of which was to be burned in the hand and given one hundred stripes. Insolvent debtors at this time were also branded in the hand with a letter "T", signifying thief. The sentence in the case of United States vs. Betty Wright, a slave accused of theft was one cent fine and twenty lashes; while Frances Murray, convicted of stealing a watch, was given thirty-nine stripes and fined $10. James Snow, convicted of perjury, was imprisoned for six months, fined one hundred dollars and placed in the pillory for one hour. Joseph Lambert was convicted of bigamy, was held to be entitled to the benefit of clergy, was sentenced to be burned in the hand and was committed. Samuel Black was accused of horse-stealing and although Mr. Jones contended that it was punishable with death, the Court held that it was ordinary larceny, under an act of Congress, although it was punishable by death in Maryland, or by labor on the roads of Baltimore County. In United States vs. Dixon, an effort was made to have capital punishment inflicted for burglary, which the Court stated was then the law; but the jury brought in a verdict of not guilty as to burglary, although guilty of feloniously stealing goods.

W. Prout and Adam Lindsay were each fined $100 for selling liquors to negroes; but, under the same law, one Mickle was acquitted of a charge of gratuitous distribution

of ardent spirits at a public gaming table constituting a retailing of spirituous liquors. Koones vs. Thomee, I Cranch, 290, illustrates a peculiar law. It applied the rule that a tavern keeper can not recover more than $5 for liquor sold in one year to one person, to be drunk in the tavern, whether the person be a boarder at the tavern or reside within twenty miles of it.

Robert Speedon was held for keeping a gambling device called "Equality," the Court thinking that the phrase "or other device" was broad enough to include the equality game. At July Term, 1811, a Spanish gentleman by the name of Bascadore,was found guilty of cheating at cards, and was fined $37.50, five times the value of his winnings, and the Court added six months' imprisonment. In the same term Robin Hood was found guilty of keeping a faro bank and was fined and imprisoned. In Corporation of Washington vs. Eaton, 1833, Eaton was fined $10 for firing a pistol, idly and for sport and amusement within 250 yards of a dwelling house.

There were a great many cases in the early Courts of negroes suing for their freedom because they had been removed for the period of two years from one commonwealth to another and to and from the District. Such decisions as that in Dred Scott vs. Sandford were frequent between 1801 and 1835. In Thomas vs. Jameson, I Cranch, 91, it was adjudged that a slave can not be a witness if a free white man be a party to the suit. United States vs. Isaac Butler, DecemberTerm, 1806, held that the property which a man has in a slave is not of the same nature as that in a horse. It gives only a right to his perpetual services. In Negro Harry Wiggle vs. Kirby's Executor, it was held that a slave cannot be manumitted by will if over forty-five years of age, the policy of the law being that he should not be rendered likely to become a public charge after having given his labor to an

individual. In Crease vs. Parker it was held that a promise of a slave does not bind him when free, although it be to pay the money borrowed by which he obtained his freedom, and even though he acknowledge the debt after the suit was brought. The case of Billy Costin vs. the Corporation of Washington, declared that the power, given by the Congress to the Corporation, to prescribe the terms and conditions upon which free negroes and mulattoes may reside in the City, is not repugnant to the Constitution. In the case of Johnson vs. Brown, 1832, it was held that neither the Constitution of Maryland nor any statute of that State, nor the Constitution or a statute of the United States, deprives a colored person, merely as such, of any civil rights of a citizen. At November Term, 1816, Joseph Deane brought suit against the Common Council for committing his slaves to jail on the charge of violating a by-law against the nightly meeting of slaves, and the Court held that the authorities had no power under the statutes. And in Nichols vs. Burch and Waters, 1839, it was held that the Corporation of Washington had power to pass a by-law to prevent free colored persons from going at large through the City after 10 P.M., without a pass. In Negroes Peter and Lewis vs. Cureton and Preuss, the mother of the plaintiffs' had been leased by one of the defendants to the other for a term of years, during which time the plaintiffs were born. The plaintiffs desired to be declared free. The Court could not decide whether they were slaves of the lessor or lessee, but held that they were slaves of one or the other, and dismissed their bill. In Bell vs. Hogan, Judge Fitzhugh said: "The ground of those instructions was, that the plaintiff's color was prima facie evidence of his being a slave, and justified his being taken up under a suspicion of his being a run-away. In any question respecting a negro's freedom, it is incumbent upon the negro to show that he is free; and this must be by producing a record of his

emancipation. If he had been proved to have been born a slave, he is presumed to be always a slave, and the burden of proving his emancipation developed upon him.

The foreging cases do not show an exact cross-section of the work done by the early Courts, but are typical of only a small section of it. The majority of the decisions were on a par with any Court in the land. Chief Judge Cranch occupied a position in the District Court analogous to that of Chief Justice Marshall in the Supreme Court of the United States, and to him is generally given credit for the stability of the early Court. During part of the period treated, he was official reporter of both the United States Supreme Court and the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia and his reports are an invaluable contribution to the case law of the entire country. In every Court of general jurisdiction, more or less grotesque cases can be found, but, because of the national and cosmopolitan situation in the District of Columbia, some of the decisions here, now, as in the early days, are extraordinary, in regard to importance and the angle of the law involved.