opinion in the Bankers' Case had been influenced by a wish for still higher elevation, sent for him to Hampton Court, and, showing him the "bauble," offered immediately to deliver it into his hand, with the title of Lord Chancellor, a peerage being to follow. What must have been the royal astonishment when Holt pronounced these memorable words,-"I feel highly honored by your Majesty's gracious offer; but all the time I was at the bar I never had more than one cause in Chancery, and that I lost, so that I cannot think myself qualified for so great a trust." The King in vain attempted to shake his resolution, which was perhaps strengthened by the reflection that the tenure of the office he already held was far more secure, as there seemed little probability of any administration being formed which could last many weeks. All that Holt could be induced to promise at this interview was, that if there should be a necessity for putting the great seal into commission for a short time, he would act as one of the Lords Commissioners. Trevor, the Attorney General, and others on whom it was pressed, having likewise refused it, a commission became necessary, and it was delivered to the joint keeping of Lord Chief Justice Holt, Lord Chief Justice Treby, and Lord Chief Baron Ward.

These Lords Commissioners held it nearly a month; but this was chiefly in the Vacation between Easter Term and Trinity Term, and we have no report of any of their decisions. Holt was probably surprised to find that he got on so well as an Equity Judge, but he felt no regret in transferring the great seal to Sir Nathan Wright, and returning to that court where he was sure both to decide properly and to decide with applause.

Nothing else very memorable occurred to Holt during the reign of William III. There seemed a probability of his being placed in a difficult and delicate position, as adviser to the Peers, upon the impeachment of Lord Somers; but he was relieved from this embarrassment by the quarrel between the two Houses, which put a sudden end to the trial.

It is a curious fact that our "Deliverer," although professing such a regard for liberty, actually vetoed a bill

1 1 Granger, i. 164; Cole's Memoirs, p. 128.

passed by the two Houses of Parliament to appoint the Judges quamdiu se bene gesserint, and still insisted on their holding during pleasure as long as he himself should rule, although he agreed to a clause in the "Act of Settlement," providing, that after the limitation of the crown, thereby introduced, should take effect, they should only be removable on the address of the two Houses of Parliament.' It may add to our admiration of Holt's independent conduct on the bench, that he might have forfeited his office by displeasing the Government; but as the arbitrary dismissal of Common Law judges had been one of the loudest complaints against James II., the actual peril that a Revolution. judge ran must have been very inconsiderable.

On the accession of Queen Anne, Holt was immediately reappointed, and under her he continued Chief Justice of England for eight years longer, with unabated energy and still increasing reputation.

The two Houses of Parliament were soon in an unprecedented state of antagonism to each other. From the appointment of Whig bishops, from the elevation. of some good Whigs to the peerage, and, I must add, from the superior intelligence which then distinguished the high aristocracy of England,-among the Lords there was a decided majority who supported Whig principles. But Anne's first House of Commons was filled with men of whom Addison's "Tory Fox-hunter" and Fielding's "Squire Western" might be considered fair types, ignorant, bigoted, and factious,-professing a love for Church and Queen, but mostly Jacobites in their hearts, and, although only secretly drinking to "the King over the water," openly professing an abhorrer.ce of Dissenters, among whom they classed all men of tolerant religious feelings. Their grand scheme was to perpetuate their power by disqualifying all who did not take the sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England, from being either electors or representatives, and by deciding on every controverted election in favor of their own partisans. In consequence, Tory candidates with only a small minority of real electors in their favor, by making corrupt bargains with re

1 12 & 13 W. III. c. 2.

turning officers, were sent to parliament; and petitions to the House of Commons, complaining of these abuses, were found wholly unavailing.

Under these circumstances began the contest about parliamentary privileges, which has rendered the name of Holt so illustrious. In the course of it he committed some errors, and his zeal was sometimes that of an advocate eager for victory, rather than of a magistrate only desirous of justice; but on the whole he showed great discrimination as well as intrepidity, and deservedly earned the glory which he acquired.

One of the most corrupt returns was by the Bailiffs of Aylesbury. The defeated candidates, who had a considerable majority of legal votes, being Whigs, knew that it would be in vain to petition the House of Commons, and it was resolved that several of the electors whose votes had been rejected, should respectively bring actions, in the Court of Queen's Bench, against the returning officers. In the first of these, one Ashby was the plaintiff, and he, clearly making out his case before a jury, recovered a verdict with large damages. The defendants then moved in arrest of judgment, on the ground that, although all the facts alleged by the plaintiff were true, an action at law could not be maintained by him, and that the only remedy was by petition to the House of Commons.

The three Puisne Judges associated with Holt were respectable men, but they labored under a suspicion of being Toryishly inclined; and, being rather of timid minds, they were alarmed by a species of action which. had not been brought hitherto, although the principle on which it rested was as old as the law itself; and they severally gave opinions in favor of the defendants,-assigning very weak and inconsistent reasons. Holt, of a bold and masculine understanding, as well as a deep lawyer, saw that, a private injury being sustained from breach of duty in a public officer, compensation ought to be given by legal process and I make no doubt that his indignation was exalted by the thought that he was now resisting an attempt to deprive the subject of legal redress against a corrupt and arbitrary system of government established by a faction in the House of Commons.

Knowing that he was to be overruled in his own court, thus, in a noble strain of judicial eloquence, he poured forth arguments and authorities which he hoped might prevail in a superior tribunal, and which he was sure would justify him to his country:—

Holt, C. F.: "The single question is, whether if a free burgess of a corporation, having an undoubted right to give his vote in the election of a representative of the borough in parliament, be maliciously hindered from giving it by the returning officer, he may maintain an action against the returning officer for the injury he has suffered? I am of opinion that judgment ought to be given for the plaintiff. My brothers differ from me in opinion, and they all differ from one another in the reasons for the opinion they have expressed. My brother Gould thinks no action will lie against the defendant, because, as he says, he is a judge; my brother Powys indeed says he is no judge, but quasi a judge; while my brother Powell thinks that the defendant is neither a judge, nor anything like a judge, but only an officer to execute the precept, to give notice to the electors of the time and place of election, to assemble them together in order to elect, to cast up the poll, and to declare which candidate has a majority. First, I will maintain that the plaintiff has a right to give his vote. Secondly, that being wrongfully hindered in the enjoyment of that right, the law gives him this action for redress. From what my brothers have said, I find that I must begin to prove that the plaintiff had a right to vote. It is not to be doubted that the Commons of England form a part of the government, and have a share in the legislature, without whom no law passes; but, because of their numbers, this power is not exercisable by them in their proper persons, and therefore by the constitution of England it is to be exercised by representatives chosen by and out of themselves, who have the whole power of all the Commons of England vested in them. Knights of the shire, citizens of cities, burgesses of boroughs, duly elected, form the Commons' House of Parliament.' After entering at great length into the history of the representation of counties, cities, and boroughs, he continues: "Hence it appears that every man that is to

give his vote in the election of members to serve in parliament, has a several and particular right in his private capacity as a freeholder, citizen, or burgess. And, surely, it cannot be said that this is so inconsiderable a right as to apply that maxim to it, de minimis non curat lex. A right that a man hath to give his vote at the election of a person to represent him in Parliament, there to concur in the making of laws which are to bind his liberty and his property, is of a transcendent nature, and its value is set forth in many statutes. Thus 34 & 35 H. VIII., c. 13, giving Members of Parliament for the first time to Cheshire, says that, 'for want thereof, the inhabitants have sustained manifold dishonors, losses, and damages, as well in their lands, goods, and bodies, as in the civil and politic governance of the commonwealth of their said county. Here, therefore is a right. 2. If the plaintiff has a fight, he must of necessity have means of vindication if he is injured in the exercise or enjoyment of it. Right and remedy, want of right and want of remedy, are reciprocal. It would look very strange, when the commons of England are so fond of sending representatives to parliament, that it should be in the power of a sheriff or other returning officer to deprive them of such right, and yet that they should have no redress; this would be a thing to be admired at by all mankind. My brother Powell, indeed, thinks that an action on the case is not maintainable because here is no hurt or damage to the plaintiff: but, surely, every injury imports a damage; a damage is not merely pecuniary; an injury imports a damage when a man is thereby hindered of his right. For slanderous words, though a man does not lose a penny by the speaking of them, yet he shall have an action, because the right to his fair fame is injured. So, if a man receives a slight cuff on the ear, though it cost him nothing, no, not so much as a little diachylon, yet he shall have his action, for it is a personal injury. It is no objection to say this leads to multiplicity of actions; for if men will multiply injuries, actions must be multiplied too. Every man injured ought to have his recompense. But, says my brother Powys, we cannot judge of this matter, because it is a arliamentary thing.' O! by all means be very tender