to the claim of Colonel Pepper for additional compensation as a commissioner to negotiate a treaty with the Miami Indians in 1838, and requesting my opinion upon the point of law involved in the case.

I do not find among the papers any statement either of the facts of the case, or of the question of law on which my opinion is desired. As I collect the facts from the papers sent me, they are these: In the year 1838, Colonel Pepper was appointed, in conformity with the provisions of the act of 30th June, 1834, and the regulations authorized by and adopted under the same, a superintendent of Indian emigration, and was allowed therefor an annual salary of $2,000. In the course of the same year he was also appointed, under instructions from the Secretary of War, through the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, one of the commissioners recognised by the same regulations to negotiate a treaty with the Miami Indians, for which he was to receive a compensation of eight dollars a day. This service he satisfactorily performed. On presenting his accounts, he claimed to be allowed the stipulated compensation at the same time, and during the same period, for each class of service. This claim was rejected by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, as inconsistent with the 10th section of the act of 30th June, 1834, which forbids any person to hold more than one office at the same time under that act; and which, in his opinion, was intended to preclude those employed in the Indian department from receiving the salary or compensation of more than one office during the same period.

Upon this statement of facts, I am of opinion that the decision of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs was correct, and that one compensation only should be allowed to Colonel Pepper for the same period.

To the SECRETARY OF WAR.

H. D. GILPIN.

COASTWISE TRADE UNDER ACT PROHIBITING SLAVE-TRADE.

Steamboats and other vessels passing from Ponchartrain, by Lake Borgne and Pascagoula bay, to Mobile, and touching on their passage at intermediate places, are not to be considered as sailing coastwise, within the meaning of the act of 2d March, 1807, to prohibit the importation of slaves.

The navigation between New Orleans and Mobile, by the route described, is authorized in any vessel whatever.

The object of the act is to prevent the slave-trade by vessels from the sea, without evidence that the slaves on board had been previously within the United States.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

April 16, 1840.

SIR: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 13th January, enclosing certain documents in relation to the conduct of B. J. Shain, surveyor and inspector of Port Ponchartrain, and inquiring "whether the route taken by steamboats and other vessels passing from Port Ponchartrain, by Lake Borgne and Pascagoula bay, to Mobile, and touching on the passage at intermediate places, is to be considered as sailing coastwise, within the meaning of the act of 2d of March, 1807, entitled 'An act to prohibit the importation of slaves,' &c. "

The facts of the case, as disclosed in the documents, appear to be, that the steamboat plying between New Orleans and Mobile passes through Lake Ponchartrain, Lake Borgne, the bay of Pascagoula, and the bay of Mobile, touching at several places along the shores of each, and entering the bays of St. Louis and Biloxi. It is contended that on this voyage, when passengers are going from place to place on the route, having their slaves or servants with them, the provisions of the act of 2d March, 1807, relative to transportation of slaves coastwise, must be complied with; the manifests therein specified be made out, and the oaths be taken which are therein prescribed.

The provisions of the act in question, which have reference to the case, are those contained in the 8th and 9th sections. The former of these forbids the master of a vessel of less than forty tons from taking on board or transporting any negro, for the purpose of disposing of him as a slave, or with intent that he may be so disposed of; but it contains an express provision which authorizes the transportation of the negroes, in any vessel whatever, "on any river or inland bay of the sea, within the jurisdiction of the United States." The 9th section requires the master of a vessel of more than forty tons, sailing coastwise, from one port to another of the United States, who has on board any negro for the purpose of being disposed of as a slave, or held to service or labor, to deliver to the collector or surveyor a manifest of such negro previous to the departure of his vessel from port, and to make oath that the negro so transported was not imported into the United States since the 1st of January, 1808, and that he is held to labor under the law of the State. Upon this, the collector or surveyor is to give the captain a permit, authorizing him to procced to the port of destination. This permit is to be delivered to the collector or surveyor, on arrival at the port; and no other negroes than those so stated are to be taken on board during the voyage.

I am of opinion that the navigation between New Orleans and Mobile, by the route mentioned in the documents before me, is clearly within the proviso of the 8th section, and, as such, authorizes the transportation of slaves "in any vessel whatever." Lake Ponchartrain, Lake Borgne, and the bays of St. Louis and Biloxi, are, in the strictest sense, inland bays of the sea; and the bay of Pascagoula is separated from it by a range of islands, the channels between which only admit the entrance of vessels of a very small draught.

I am also of opinion that the terms of the 9th section in regard to ves. sels of more than forty tons "sailing coastwise," do not apply to vessels navigating rivers or inland bays of the sea, within the jurisdiction of the United States; but that they are used in contradistinction to such interior navigation, and are meant to apply to vessels sailing along the seacoast, or in open bays of the sea, on voyages from one port or revenue district to another. The evident and declared object of the act is to prevent the slave trade, and to guard against facilities which might be given for its prosecution if any vessel were allowed to enter the ports of the United States from the sea, without clear evidence that the slaves on board had been previously within the jurisdiction of the United States. Hence the necessity of requiring the manifest at the ports of departure and arrival, and the oaths of the master, owner, and shipper, that the slaves had not been imported from abroad subsequent to the 1st of January, 1808, and the prohibition to take any on board in the progress of the voyage. It was not the design of the act to regulate the interior transportation of the slaves,

which does not, in any way, interfere with the object for which the law was intended to provide.

It may also be observed, as evident, that the use of the phrase "sailing coastwise" is not to be taken as signifying every vessel engaged in the coasting trade; from the fact, that although the laws regulating that trade embrace in their provisions all vessels within the jurisdiction of the United States, which are not engaged in foreign trade, whether they navigate the interior or exterior waters, yet they constantly refer to those sailing "on the seacoast," as distinct from those which ply on internal waters. With much more force, then, may this distinction be regarded as within the intention of Congress, when they use the phrase "sailing coastwise" in an act of which the object is to guard against an illicit foreign trade; but not to interfere with voyages prosecuted "on rivers or inland bays of the sea." H. D. GILPIN.

To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

ACTIONS AGAINST DEBTORS IN THE INDIAN COUNTRY.

There is no provision of law concerning intercourse with the Indian tribes, or conferring juris diction upon courts, which can enable the United States to maintain a civil action against a debtor residing in the Indian country, upon a contract or indebtedness created in the States.

SIR: I had the honor to receive your memorandum endorsed on the letter of the district attorney of the United States for the district of Arkansas, dated the 23d of January, 1840, and have considered the inquiry therein stated. That inquiry is, whether there is any mode by which a civil suit may be instituted and prosecuted on behalf of the United States, against a debtor of the name of Noland, who is now residing in the Indian country, without the jurisdiction of any State or organized Territorial government. I have examined the acts of Congress relating to the Indian country, and regulating intercourse with the Indian tribes; but have not been able to discover that any judicial tribunal has been established by Congress, with jurisdiction over such a case; or that any provision has been made by law, which gives, under such circumstances, a personal remedy against the debtor by means of a civil suit. Ample provision is made for the apprehension and prosecution of criminals, and for the punishment of those who violate the various provisions of the intercourse laws; but the subject to which your inquiry refers-that of a personal proceeding, to recover debts contracted in the United States, by those who subsequently take refuge in the country beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of their courts-does not appear to have been acted upon by the legislaH. D. GILPIN.

ture.

To the POSTMASTER GENERAL.

FEES OF DISTRICT ATTORNEYS.

District attorneys are not entitled to any compensation over and above their annual salary and stated fees for any services whatever rendered by them as such officers in the prosecution of offenders.

But where, under special instructions, district attorneys render services of various sorts, necessary to discover criminals and in procuring adequate evidence, for such services they may be allowed an adequate compensation by the proper department.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

April 17, 1840.

SIR: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 16th of March, in which you inquire whether the fourth section of the act of 3d of March, 1817, which allows the district attorney of the United States for the district of Indiana an annual sum of $200, in addition to his stated fees, as a full compensation for all extra services, is to be considered as precluding the allowance of a claim which he makes for extra services rendered by him in the prosecution of Postmaster Keen for embezzling certain public money.

In reply, I have to state that, in my opinion, no other compensation than the stated fees and annual salary above mentioned can be allowed to the district attorney for any services whatever, which are necessarily rendered by him as a public officer, in the prosecution of an offender. It may, however, happen, and frequently does, that in criminal cases of this nature, preliminary inquiries and services of various sorts necessary to discover the criminal, and procure adequate evidence, must be made at much trouble and expense. Such services I do not think a district attorney can be expected to render, without special instructions and reasonable remuneration; nor do I consider them as falling within the class for which the above-mentioned law intended to provide. For services, therefore, of this nature, rendered by the district attorney of Indiana, previous to the passage of the third section of the act of the 3d of March, 1839, I think a reasonable allowance may be made by the head of the proper executive department.

To the SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

H. D. GILPIN.

COMPENSATION OF QUARTERMASTER OF MARINE CORPS.

Since the 3d of March, 1835, quartermasters have not been allowed any extra compensation on account of disbursements for public supplies.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

April 17, 1840.

SIR: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 28th of February, enclosing the communication of Judge McLean, and other papers connected with the claim of the representatives of the late quartermaster of the marine corps, for an allowance of one per cent. commission on certain purchases of public supplies made by hinı subsequent to the 3d of March, 1835.

I have given the communication of Judge McLean the most attentive consideration, but 1 am unable to come to the opinion that the claim in question ought to be allowed. I am led to this, from a consideration of the terms of the act of Congress of the 30th June, 1834, which have not been adverted to by Judge McLean. The fifth section of that act declares that "the officers of the marine corps shall be entitled to and receive the same pay, emoluments, and allowances, as are now, or may hereafter be,

allowed to officers of similar grades in the infantry of the army." Previous to the 3d March, 1835, the allowances of officers of the army, of grades similar to a quartermaster in the marine corps, embraced a commission of one per cent. on purchases; and that allowance was accordingly made to Major Weed. On the 3d of March, 1835, Congress prohibited extra allowances or compensation in any form to an officer of the army, on account of the disbursing any public money appropriated by law, during that session, for the purchase of public supplies of any description. This law, in accordance with an opinion given by my predecessor, (Mr. Butler,) on the 7th of March, 1835, has ever been considered as a permanent regulation In conformity, therefore, with this law, no commission similar to that claimed on behalf of Major Weed has been allowed to any officer of like grade in the army-or, indeed, to any officer whatever. It cannot, then, be allowed under the act of the 30th of June, 1834, to the quartermaster of the marine corps, for it was obviously the object of that act to make the allowance to infantry of the army and to the marine corps exactly the same; any changes in the allowances to the latter being made to conform to those which might take place in the former, whether they increased or lessened the compensation the officer was thus to receive. H. D. GILPIN.

To the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

SALES OF CHOCTAW RESERVATIONS.

Where a Choctaw reservee conveyed his reservation to D, in trust, to sell and apply the proceeds to the payment of a debt owing by the reservee to A. and R., who thereupon sold a portion of the land, and with the proceeds paid a part of the said debt; and, at this stage of the affair, the reservee died, leaving two children, whose guardian, under pretence that he was acting for the children, bought the residue at a sum far below its value, who, after taking H. into partnership with him, conjointly with him sold the land to Banks and Lewis, without the consent of the President, and refused to pay over any part of the proceeds to said children-DECIDED, that the President ought not to give his approval to the sale to said Canks and Lewis, as it would probably deprive the children of their inheritance.

ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE,

April 18, 1840.

SIR: I had the honor to receive your letter of the 24th of March, enclosing two reports from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, relative to the application of Messrs. Banks and Lewis for the consent of the President of the United States to a sale to them of part of a reservation made to Jack Pitchlynn by the Choctaw treaty of the 27th September, 1830; and inquiring whether, in my opinion, this consent ought to be given.

The material facts of the case are as follows: The nineteenth article of the treaty referred to, declares that certain reservations of land were to be admitted; but provides that the several reservations so secured "may be sold with the consent of the President of the United States." In the treaty, no reservation is secured to Jack Pitchlynn; but, in a supplement. ary article, dated the following day, and ratified as a part of the treaty, the commissioners agree to request that he may be entitled to a reservation of two sections of land. In an opinion given to the War Department by my predecessor, (Mr. Taney,) on the 1st of November, 1831, that supplement is held to be a part of the original treaty; and the reser