and data of Religion, and the doctrines of the science to whose skirts religion attempts to cling, such as may reasonably be expected to render the forgiveness in most instances unavailing. Not only is behavior prescribed, but belief in unreasonable propositions is enjoined. On pain of eternal punishment man must not only do as he is bid, he must believe as he is bid. If there is valid authority for this, it must be divine authority. If there is divine authority for it, it has no affinity for nor anything in common with Reason. It is as far above reason as heaven is above earth-as the Almighty is above man.

No one can reasonably believe that he was justly under condemnation without having voluntarily offended. No one can reasonably believe that the iniquities of the fathers are justly visited upon the children. No one can reasonably believe that justice demands his eternal punishment for any offence whatever. No one can reasonably believe that a just demand for the eternal punishment of all men can be justly satisfied in the temporary punishment of one Man. No one can reasonably believe that there was any justice in the divine demand for his own eternal punishment, if, by a mere change of opinion as to the merit of a certain doctrine, and by affecting a devotion to its Author, he can escape such punishment and secure eternal happiness. That would be the cancellation of too great a debt, and giving too great a reward to be reasonable.

If specific belief is an essential part of religious duty, Religion should cut the acquaintance of science as soon as possible. Science says, "the secret of certain aptitudes,-of such or such a native predisposition, is naturally derived from a preponderance of such or such a group of sensorial impressions, which find in the regions of psychical activity in which they are particularly elaborated a soil ready prepared, which amplifies and perfects them according to the richness and degree of vitality of the elements placed at their disposal." Man's real belief will be just such as his aptitudes-his native predisposition-enable, compel, or permit him to extract from the data of his conscious existence and the facts he lives amidst. The unreasonableness of requiring specific belief is aggravated in the manner in which the requirement is generally urged. Without sincerity there is

no real belief. A nervous system constructed on a certain plan, and predisposed in a certain way by inherited instincts-transmitted experiences-is susceptible to impressions. The individual cannot from among the infinite externals choose for himself those which shall be presented to his sensuous faculty, nor can he determine the impressions they shall make. “A small difference in the pigment of a sense" may determine his whole destiny, it may rule the entire character-intellectual and moral." An external presented to his sensuous faculty may be the argument of a so-called moral philosopher, the doctrine of an alleged religion. He is placed in a dilemma. He must admit the validity of the science which teaches him that his aptitudes and susceptibilities are inherited and hence beyond his control, because the religion which is after him claims akin to this very science. Yet, although he is helpless to control his aptitudes and susceptibilities, and cannot determine the impressions to be made, he must determine that the impressions made by this particular external so presented, shall aggregate in a belief in the validity of its doctrine. He must suppress the aptitudes, instincts, and native predispositions which this very religion (by clinging to the science which says so) says will rule his whole destiny. By such means he is to arrive at belief.

CHAPTER XVIII.

PHILOSOPHY OF FAUST.

The Tragedy Sixty Years in Incubation-The Philosophy Takes all Purpose Out of Religion-Nothing can be Thought as Self-Limited-Duality of Man's Nature, as Incomprehensible as the Trinality of God's Nature-Parallel Between Faust and Jcb, Both were mere Chattels-Satan Imposed on in Both Transactions-Divine Jugglery-No Possible Occasion for More than One Compact in the Tragedy—Faust's Sudden Transition from Philosopher to Rake-No Duty without Freedom-Von Ihering's View of Shylock's Claim-Dissimulation is Dishonest in any Cause-Justice Required Faust to Refuse Salvation-Abstract Principles Cannot be Personified in Tragedy. The American Editor of a Tragedy reputed to be the "Literary masterpiece of modern times" declares that "Faust is represented as saved by no merit of his own, but by the interest which Heaven has in every soul in which there is the possibility of a heavenly life." That his Author "had the penetration to see and he meant to show, that the notion implied in the old popular superstition of selling one's soul to the Devil; the notion. that evil can obtain the entire and final possession of the soul is a fallacy; that the soul is not man's to dispose of, and cannot be so traded away. We are the soul's, and not the soul ours. Evil is self-limited, the good in man must finally prevail. long as he strives he is not lost. Heaven will come to the aid of his better nature. This is the philosophy of Faust."

So

If there was no doubt as to the philosophic purport of the Tragedy these declarations imply a doubt and profess to remove it. The Editor's name is decorated with a D. D. and he has written some alleged philosophy. But instead of dispelling the doubt as to the philosophy of the tragedy, he has only darkened the doubt as to his own conception or it. A tragedy which was sixty years in process of incubation cannot be said to have been very inconsiderately dashed off. One so far (as Faust) out of the usual range of tragedy, was probably intended to import a moral philosophy, a mild type of religious apologetics.

If the philosophy is accurately stated by the Editor, the Tragedy may be called the masterpiece of modern philosophic

nonsense more appropriately than the literary masterpiece of modern time.

Whatever is necessarily implied in a declaration, is as legitimately a part of it as if it were expressed. That one is saved by no merit of his own, but by the interest which Heaven has in every soul in which there is the possibility of a heavenly life, implies that some souls have not such possibility, and that no man need concern himself with his soul's salvation. Man need not strive, for by no merit of his own can he be saved. His soul may be devoid of the Heavenly possibility, in which case he certainly need not strive. If it contains such possibility it will be saved solely by the interest which Heaven has in it, and strife were superfluous.

That some souls are inevitably lost, is implied in the declaration that some are saved solely by the interest which Heaven has in them, by reason of their having in them the heavenly possibility. If all souls contained such possibility then the heavenly interest in them would render salvation absolutely certain and universal, and moral philosophy, so far as promoting the safety of souls is concerned, would be a superfluity. There could then be no purpose in religion. Genius would be obliged to seek some other outlet or occasion for its excrescences.

Should philosophy devise some means of distinguishing souls in which there is, from souls in which there is not such possibility, it might make a decisive, though melancholy move toward the applicability of its doctrine. It could thus bring itself into worse repute than it now is, because those in whose souls it should find there is no such possibility would reject it, while it would enervate those in whose souls it should find there was such possibility. Men would shrink from the doctrine which damns them for the want of a quality which they cannot supply; they are not apt to strive for that of which Heaven has already assured them the realization. Until such philosophy does devise some means of such distinction, it is entirely without meaning to all men, and then it could have no other effect than that just stated.

If the soul is not man's to dispose of he cannot possibly lose it, but must submit to salvation from the interest which Heaven

own.

has in his soul if it is worth saving-he is equally helpless to save it, and must submit to perdition from the absence of such interest if it should be devoid of such possibility. The extent of his responsibility for the presence or absence of such possibility is not declared; but the implication is that there is no such responsibility if he is not to be saved by any merit of his Without responsibility there can be no purpose in moral philosophy. That there is no responsibility is implied in the declaration that the soul is not man's to dispose of and cannot be traded away. If by his conduct he divests his soul of such possibility, so that Heaven loses the interest in it to save it for him, he disposes of his soul, trades or perhaps throws it away. If all souls once contain such possibility and are not man's to dispose of, and cannot be so traded away, then none can be divested by man of such possibility; and salvation without reference to man's conduct is absolutely inevitable and universal, and moral philosophy is without a purpose. If some souls do while others never contain such possibility, then for reasons above given moral philosophy is still without a purpose, unless it can distinguish between them; in which case it would, as above shown, become a sort of prognosticator, ominous and incredible to some, and enervating if believed by others.

If men able to do otherwise should divest their souls of such possibility, they would lose them by demerit of their own. If others able to do otherwise should maintain in their souls such possibility they would save them by merit of their own. If the conduct is of no effect to destroy or maintain such possibility, then moral philosophy is without meaning, so far as the salvation of the soul is concerned. If the conduct has effect to destroy or maintain such possibility, then the salvation of the soul depends upon the conduct, and man is saved by his own merit, or damned by his own demerit. If with all the good one can do he is still unworthy, and must plead the pangs of Another who has atoned (to Himself) for him, it is still a merit to avail himself of such vicarious atonement. There is some merit in appreciation of and gratitude for favors; there is more in the disposition to make them as available as possible for the purposes for which they may be bestowed. If one lays down his