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close to me whenever I required to communicate with them:

I did recommend and concur in the measure of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal with their arms aud baggage; and here I must observe that it was particularly understood in the negociation of the armistice, that in the words, property of all descriptions," was to be included only military baggage and equipment; that this understanding was carried into execution by a separate article of the Convention, and that the commissioners for executing the Convention acted upon this principle.

The enemy had collected their forces after the defeat of the 21st, and were about to resume the position of Cabeça de Montachique, from whence their retreat was open to other positions in front of Lisbon, and from thence across the Tagus into Alentejo. They had all the facilities in their power to make these movements, and when they would have reached Lisbon, the possession of that river by the forts and by the Russian fleet, and the great number of boats of which they would have had the use, would have enabled them to cross, in one body, covered by the citadel and the high grounds, and they would scarcely have lost their rear guard. In Alentejo they had provided ample supplies.

On their arrival in that province, the French would have had to march, unmolested, by the finest road in Portugal, to Elvas, which is a fortress, at least of the second order among the fortresses of Europe; where they would have placed a part of their corps in garrison, and they would have sent the remainder across the Upper Tagus to Almeida. This place was already provisioned in some degree; and that part of their force which the French would have detached to Almeida, would have experienced no difficulty in relieving the distant blockade kept up by the Portuguese peasantry, and in throwing in such quantities of provisions as they would have required.

Our operations would have been those of a superior army pressing upon an inferior on its retreat; but nothing which we could have done, would have cut off their retreat; the enemy must have been in Lisbon before us; the Tagus would have been the enemy's to the last moment of their passage; and after they would have crossed, the necessity of possessing ourselves of the forts on the river, and the Russian fleet, in the first instance, and the want of boats, which the enemy would have carried off, would have given them ample time to make all their arrangements in Alentejo before our troops could reach them.

But in carrying on these operations, we should have been involved in many difficulties, and distresses, which might have again

placed, in a state of risk, all the objects of the campaign.

The communication with the shipping on the coast of Portugal, is at all times precarious, and becomes more so towards the end of August, and is at length quite impracticable. In fact, many boats were swamped in the last week in August, vessels lost their anchors, and more than once the fleet was obliged to go to sea in danger. On the 22d of August there were cleven days bread in camp, for the original force which marched from Lavaos on the 9th and 10th of August; the troops which had landed on the 20th, had brought four days bread for themselves, and the supply for the whole might have been for eight or nine days, and no means could be procured of moving a larger quan. tity; no bread whatever could be procured in the country; and in point of fact, I believe, that, excepting a few thousand rations of bread left behind by the French at Alcobaça, Caldas, and Torres Vedras, and which were given to the Portuguese troops, the country supplied not a single ration, from the time the troops landed, till I came away, on the 20th September.

It was obvious then, that when Sir John Moore's corps should land at Marceira, and should nearly double the consumption of the army, without increasing the means of procuring and conveying its supply, there was a risk of its being in want.

After we should have obliged the enemy to cross the Tagus, and we should have possessed ourselves of the forts on that river, and of the Russian fleet, and we should have crossed that river with the British army, we must have placed ourselves in a situation to invest Elvas for a blockade, or a regular siege. In either case, the army would have been exposed to the effects of a bad climate in the worst season of the year; and in the latter case, they would have had to move the means for the siege from Abrantes, beyond which place the Tagus would not have carried them to the scene of action, a distance of not less than sixty miles.

After having performed this operation, the army would have been obliged to renew it, in order to obtain possession of Almeida.

I am convinced that we should not have had possession of Elvas till late in December; and I think it more than probable, that we should have been glad to allow the French to evacuate Portugal in that month, instead of August, if we had persevered, after having sustained a loss of a great part of our army by sickness, and of three months of most valuable time with reference to further operas tions.

I conceived that the objects of his Majesty, and of the Spanish nation were, that the British army should co-operate with the Spa

nish armies. I believed that the only mode in which the operations of the Spanish corps could be brought to bear upon the same object, was by the influence which the co-operation of a British army would give to the government; and I believe that it was important to the Spanish nation, to have the co-operation of 30,000 British soldiers in Spain, to receive the assistance of 4000 Spanish soldiers, who were prisoners to the French, and of about 2000 who were employed in Portugal.

I considered these objects to be so important, as to counterbalance the disadvantage of throwing 20,000 additional French troops, at no very remote period, upon the Pyrenees; that the Spanish nation would gain even upon a comparison of numbers, not less than 16,000 good troops......

copy of the instrument to the officers who were writing it, and before he wrote or dictated the title, he asked Sir Hew Dalrymple who was to sign it? and Sir Hew said himself." General Kellermann then represented that he (Sir Hew) being commander in chief, ought not to sign an agreement with inferior officer, and proposed that I should sign it:

an

Sir Hew Dalrymple then came into ano. ther room where I was, and told me, that General Kellermann had proposed that I should sign the instrument; and he asked me, whether I had any objections to doing so? My answer was, that I would sign any paper he wished me to sign.

When it was drawn up, I read it over, and at the table gave it to Sir Hew Dalrymple to read, with an observation, that it was an extraordinary paper. He answered, that it did not contain any thing that had not been settled; and I then signed it.

mann...

The next point of importance was that relating to the length of time during which the suspension of hostilities should last; and Sir Hew Dalrymple admits, that I proposed to limit the duration of the suspension of hostilities to 48 hours only, whereas he preferred the proposal of General Kellermann, that the suspension should be unlimited in the first instance, and followed by a limited suspension of 48 hours, when either party should wish to put an end to it.

This point was most important in a view to the state of our resources, to the state of the season, and to the tone in which the Convention should be negociated; and, above all, it was important in a view to the threats of the French, in respect to the Russians. If there was any foundation for those threats, which I acknowledged I imagined there was, and that they would have received assistance from the Russians, if the adiniral refused his consent to the article respecting the Russian fleet, which I was sure he would do, it was most important, that if the negociations should then be broken off, and notice given of the conclusion of the suspension of hostilities, a period of forty-eight hours should not be allowed to the French to equip and prepare the Russians before we should begin our operations......

When the terms had been generally settled, General Kellermann was dictating the fair

It is perfectly true, that I advised the principle of the arrangement, and I assisted the commander in chief in discussing the different points with General Kellermann, and that I gave him my opinion when he asked it, and when I thought it desirable to give it him. But I was not the negociator, and could not be, and was not so considered, the com

But this instrument about which so much has been said, and respecting which I have troubled the court so much at length, is in point of fact a dead letter; it was never ratified by any of the parties in whose name it was conducted, and no one article in it was ever carried into execution, excepting that by which hostilities were suspended."

Sir Arthur states also that he differed from. Gen. Sir H. Dalrymple on several points included in the Convention. He says,

"My object was to get the Russians out of the hands of the French; and I did think that it was a matter of indifference what arrangements was made with them, or what became of the Russian fleet, provided it was not allowed to return to the Baltic.-I was, and am still of opinion, that the best arrangement would have been to leave them in the port of Lisbon, on the ground of its neutrality; two events might have occurred, either of which would have placed them in- our hands, and in the mean time, the officers and seamen would not have been sent back to Russia to co operate in the war against the Swedes.

One of the events is the declaration of Russia against the Spaniards and Portuguese, the other the re-entry of the French into Portugal. But whatever may have been the nature of the terms to be granted to the Rus

sians, it appeared to me the most important, that the French should have nothing to do with the negociations affecting their fleet.

It always occurred to me, that one of the practical effects of the Convention with the French for the evacuation of Portugal, must have been to give to the Russians the benefit of the neutrality of the port of Lisbon.

The Convention must have provided for the occupation of the forts of the Tagus by the British troops; and at this time the - Portuguese flag would be hoisted. It would be impossible for the British admiral to go in and attack the Russians, while the arrangement under the Convention should be in the course of execution; and while they would have continued in this state, the Russians would have time to claim, and the Portuguese to grant, the neutrality of the port; the question then must have been referred to the British government, and would have been discussed between them and the Portuguese.

Sir H: Dalrymple directed the giving to the French a circuit of two leagues round Lisbon, with a league of distance between their posts and ours; and to us the possession of all the forts on the right bank of the Tagus, including Belem.

But there is one atticle in the Convention, particularly disapproved of in this country, of which I approved. It relates to the Spanish prisoners, who were certainly, at the time of the Convention, completely and entirely in the power of the French.

The court will observe, that the principle upon which I thought that any Convention ought to be made with the French, was, that they had the military possession of the country and that their retreat was open to | Elvas and Almeida; they had in their power to do as they pleased with their Spanish prisoners; and I conceived that they had a fair claim to be allowed for them in the negocia tion. The exchange of the Frenchmen taken in Spain, not in military operations, for these Spaniards, appeared to me to be not an unreasonable arrangement; and it was one to which I had reason to believe the junta of Galicia, at least, would not object."

It is sufficiently well understood, that Sir Ilarry Burrard thought Sir Arthur Wellesley had undertaken a task beyond his powers, in attempting to expel the French from Lisbon, with his present army. Caution is as necessary to a commander as courage and no imputation on the courage of Sir Harry is jus table because he deemed the advantages then in possession of the French to be greater than he could cope with. We are also to take into consideration, the possibility, that at some position favourable to the defenders, (and the country around Lisbon has many such) the British army had sustained a

case.

heavy loss, and to reflect on what censure would have attached to our generals, in that Sir Hew Dalrymple appears to have seen the affair in the same light. Accord ingly, with intention to insure the deliverance of the Portuguese territory from the enemy, speedily, he overruled several propositions of Sir Arthur Wellesley's, which he suspected might prove choquant to the French commander.

The opinion of the officers who composed the court of Inquiry, will close our epitome of the proceedings in Portugal. We trust that we are correct in expressing the most decided approbation of that prudence which has waited till after a complete investigation of circumstances once thought so degrading to the British arms, by a court competent to the purpose; and which has acquiesced in the opinion given on the whole by that court, notwithstanding there are sundry particulars in the transaction, that certainly, will be deemed exceptionable by reflecting minds.

The Report which has been submitted to his Majesty is of very great length. It consists of 50 folio pages. The whole substance of the evidence being therein stated, the Court subjoined the following Opinion.

"On a consideration of all the circumstances, as set forth in this Report, we most humbly submit our opinion, that no further military proceeding is necessary on the subject; Because, however some of us may differ in our sentiments respecting the fitness of the Convention, in the relative situation of the two armies, it is our unanimous declaration, that unquestionable zeal and firmness appear throughout to have been exhibited by Lieutenant-Generals Si Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, as well as that the order and gallantry of the rest of the officers and soldiers, on every occasion during this Expedition, have done honour to the troops, and reflected lustre on your Majesty's armis."

On this Opinion being delivered to the Commander in Chief, his Royal Highness found it was not so explicit, on the Armistice and Convention, as the words of his Majesty's Warrant appeared to enjoin; the Court was therefore ordered to re-assemble, and subjoin their Opinion.

"Whether, under the relative situation of the two armies on the 22d of August, an armistice was advisable; and if so, whether the terms were such as ought to be agreed upon?"——Also,

"Whether under the relative situation of the two armies subsequent to the Armistice, and after the whole of the British force had been landed, a Convention was advisable; and if so, whether the terms were such as ought to be agreed upon?"

Upon these two questions being separately