an order to take their departure, and many of them did not belong to any public body, or acknowledged class of the community. The emperor fully expected, from the acquiescence of these individuals, a mask under which to conceal his usurpation. But he was utterly deceived. Instead of finding weak men, convenient to the designs of his mercenary ambition, he was met by ministers incorruptible, grandees worthy of their rank, and representatives who were faithful defenders of the interest and of the honour of their country. They all, with one accord, informed him, that they held powers much restricted, that they were not the legitimate representatives of Spain, and that they could not compromise her rights. These and other similar reflections were treated with insolence in the tribunal of the usurper, who, far from being discomfited, put into activity all the means of oppression, flattering himself that by victories on the one hand and corruption on the other, he should so colour over injustice that he would not be considered by the world as the subverter of general tranquillity. I do not enter into the particulars that occurred in this congress; but one of the ministers of the council of Castile, who does so much honour. to his robe, will satisfy the curiosity of the public as to this particular. I ought not to speak of what I have suffered for my king and country: the truth is, I have not suffered, for all I have done has been required by my most sacred duties. It was to me the highest satisfaction to see my lodging in Bayonne surrounded by the satellites of government: to these succeeded spies, who abound always where those are in authority who,in history,usurp the characters of Heroes. My steps were reckoned-my visits observed-espionage, under the mask of compassion, approached to examine the secrets of my soul; but nothing disturbed the tranquillity of my mind. What I could not behold with patience, was to see myself condemned to a confinement within the frontier of France, until the emperor should consider that my narration of the scandalous proceedings could not destroy the lofty fabric of a new Spanish monarchy. In vain, for two months, I applied to the minister for foreign affairs with the utmost importunity to be permitted to return to my beloved country; the determined resistance I made to the attempt of usurpation made the French government deaf to my intreaties, believing, not without good reason, that 1 should endeavour to inflame heroism in niy country, denominated insurrection in the jour nals of Bayonne. In such unfavourable circumstances, a mode presented itself to me of avoiding a state of indefinite banishment. Such were the repeated entreaties of Joseph Napoleon that I should continue with him in the situation of minister, to which I acceded with repugnance and from constraint, but without prejudice of my right to abandon it at a convenient opportunity. This opportunity occurred the moment I set foot in Madrid. From that instant I only thought of availing myself of the most early means of redid in the signing my new character, which manner shewn in document No. 12. Joseph Napoleon could not be grieved at the disappearance of a minister who so frequently opposed his wishes (11), and who, in the opinion of some of those who immediately surrounded him, was a Quixote in his maxims, wHO COULD NOT COMPREHEND THE SUBLIME INTENTIONS OF THE GREATEST OF HEROES IN FAVOUR OF THE REGENERATION OF SPAIN. They shew in this narrative with clearness and fidelity, the series of the principal events in this important epoch, carefully avoiding to enter into minute particulars foreign to my object, or which should make this exposition too prolix; and I have endeavoured to place before my readers, in its true point of view, all the injustice and violence with which the French government has conducted itself towards our beloved sovereign, and the whole nation. It has already been proved, that the renunciation of Charles IV. in favour of his son Ferdinand' VII. is vitiated in no respect. In the slight sketch which we have drawn of the perfidious and de-' ceitful arts with which the emperor has made the progress we have seen, the series of atrocious insults offered to Spain, and to the 'unfortunate king Ferdinand VII. remains depicted in indelible colours. he The emperor alarms Charles IV. in order that may induce him to take flight for America, with all the royal family, and abandon the peninsula to the former: he lights up the flame of discord between the royal parents and the child, in order to debilitate Spain, dividing it into parties, after having disgraced the royal persons; he draws Ferdinand VII. from his court by false promises; he makes him captive in Bayonne ; and when he saw that the virtue of the young king knew how to resist his designs, and that Ferdi nand could not be induced to renounce his crown, Who can doubt, from this clear evidence, that the renunciation executed by Ferdinand VII. in favour of his august father, and that which succeded in favour of the emperor, are absolute nullities? Who will doubt, but that if the last should have emanated from a free exercise of the will, the rights of the dynasty of Bourbon are not (11) I may particularly instance the affair of the paths, when Joseph Buonaparte arriving at Madrid, wanted to compel every body to swear allegiance to him; and that of the banishment of the council of Castile to Bayonne, for its noble resistance. prejudiced by it? Who does not know, that in case of the extinction of such a family, and by the very establishment of the Spanish monarchy, the nation alone can invite another dynasty, or can introduce such a form of government as it shall most approve? In another part of this narrative, I have shewn that Ferdinand VII. was too honourable to suppose that the emperor could entertain such atrocious designs. The king desired to free Spain from the oppression of the French troops; it was promised him, that this and all other matters should be regulated with the emperor, and that he should return to his kingdom with the fruit of his exertions for the good of his vassals; and no hour of his life was unseasonable to him to exert himself for their happiness. This I saw, and can testify. During his confinement, nothing afflicted his generous heart so much as the sufferings of his people; and when his liberty began to be doubtful, he adopted the means the most agrecable to his paternal solicitude: such was the order which he gave for the regency, naturally sought, when his freedom was interrupted; and such was the command that the cortes should be assembled to determine those questions, which in their proper places have been noticed. Valour and patriotism have successfully armed the whole nation in its own defence, and for the protection of their legitimate sovereign, although the people had no knowledge of the will of their beloved Ferdinand as to this movement. That patriotism, united to wisdom, will now impel them irresistibly to perform with promptitude the most important work of the central government or regency, which may administer the affairs of the kingdon in the name of his majesty, Thus will be completed, for the advantage of all, the last expression of the will of the king, which he condecended to use the moment before he was forced to renounce the crown; thus will the nation be preserved from this dreadful tempest; it will have exhibited before Europe an ex'ample of loyalty, honour, and generous energy, which will be the subject of admiration in every age, and in every country. Madrid, Sep. 1, 1808. PEDRO CEVALLOS. DOCUMENTS. No. 1-Secret Treaty between his Catholic Majesty and his Majesty the Emperor of the French, by which the high contracting Parties stipulate every thing respecting the future condition of Portugal,-Fontainbleau, October 27, 1807. We, Napoleon, by the Grace of God and the Constitution, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, having seen and examined the treaty concluded, arranged, and signed at Fontainbleau, Oct. 27, 1807, by General of Division Michael Duroc, Grand Marshal of our Palace, Grand Knight of the Legion of Honour, &c. &c. in virtue of the full powers conferred by us upon him for this purpose, with Don Eugenio Izquierdo de Ribera y Lezaui, Honorary Councillor of State and of War to his Majesty the King of Spain, who was also furnished with full powers by his sovereign, which treaty is of the following tenor: His Majesty, the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, and his Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, wishing to regulate by common consent the interest of the two States, and to dejermine the future condition of Portugal, in a way that shall be consistent with sound policy as to both countries, have named for their Ministers Plenipotentiary; that is to say, his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Jtaly, and Protector of the Confederation of the bine, General of Division Michael Duroc, Grand Marshal of the Palace, Grand Knight of the Legion of Honour and his Catholic Majesty, King of Spain, Don Eugenio Izquierdo de Ribera y Lezaun, his Honorary Councillor of State and of War, both which Ministers having exchanged their full powers, have ageeed as follows: Article 1. The province of Entre Mino y Duero, with the city of Oporto, shall be made over, in entire property and sovereignty, to his Majesty the King of Etruria, with the title of King of Northern Lusitania. II. The province of Alantejo, and the kingdom of the Algarves, shall be made over, in entire property and sovereignty, to the Prince of Peace, to be by him enjoyed under the title of Prince of the Algarves. III. The provinces of Beira, Tras los Montes, and Portuguese Estremadura, shall remain undisposed of until there be a general peace, to be then disposed of according to circumstances, and conformably with what may be agreed upon between the two high contracting parties. IV. The kingdom of Northern Lusitania shall be held by the descendants of his Majesty the King of Etruria heredi tarily, and according to the laws of succession which are established in the family on the throne of Spain. V. The principality of the Algarves shall be held by the descendants of the Prince of Peace hereditarily, and ac cording to the laws of succession which are established in the family on the throne of Spain. VI. If there should be no descendants or legitimate heirs of the King of Northern Lusitania, or of the Prince of the Algarves, these countries shall be disposed of by investiture by the King of Spain in a manner so that they shall never be united under one head or annexed to the crown of Spain. VII. The kingdom of Northern Lusitania and the principality of the Algarves shall acknowledge as Protector his Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, and in no case the sovereigns of those countries shall make peace or war without his consent. VIII. In case that the provinces of Beira, Tros los Montes and Portuguese Estremadura, held in sequestration, should devolve at a general peace to the House of Braganza, in exchange for Gibraltar, Trinidad, and other colonies, which the English have conquered from Spain and her allies, the new sovereign of those provinces shall have, with respect to his Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, the same obligations as the King of Northern Lusitania, and the Prince of Algarves, and shall hold them under the same conditions. IX. His Majesty the King of Etruria cedes the kingdom of Etruria, in full property and sovereignty, to his Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy. X. As soon as the provinces of Portugal shall be definitively occupied, the different Princes who are to possess them shall mutually appoint commissioners to ascertain their natural boundaries. Italy guarantees to his Catholic Majesty, the King of Spain, XI. His Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of the possession of his dominions on the continent of Europe, situated to the south of the Pyrenees. XII. His Majesty the Emperor of the French and King of Italy engages to recognise his Catholic Majesty, the King of Spain, as Emperor of the Two Americas, when every thing is ready for his Majesty's assuming that title, which may be either at the general peace or at farthest within three years therefrom. XIII. The two high contracting Powers shall mutually agree upon an equal partition of the islands, colonies, and other transmarine possessions of Portugal. XIV. The present treaty shall be kept secret. It shall be ratified, and the ratification shall be exchanged at Madrid, within twenty days, at the latest, from the date of its signature. Done at Fontainbleau, October 27, 1807. DUROC. No. II.-Secret Convention concluded at Fontainbleau between His Majesty the King of Spain and His Majesty the Emperor of the French, by which the two High Contracting Parties adjust all that relates to the occupation of Portugal.—At Fontainbleau, 27th October, 1807. Napoleon, by the Grace of God and the Constitution, Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, having seen and examined the Convention concluded, arranged, and signed, at Fontainbleau, on the 27th of October, 1807, by the General of Division Michael Duroc, Grand Marshal of our Palace, Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour, &c. &c. in virtue of the full powers with which we thereto conferred upon him, on the one side; and on the other side by D. Eugenio Izquierdo de Ribera y Lezaun, Honorary Councillor of State and of War to his Majesty the King of Spain, equally furnished with full powers by his sovereign-the tenor of which Convention is as follows: His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, and his Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, being desirous of entering into an arrangement with respect to the occupation and conquest of Portugal, according to the stipulations of the treaty signed this day, have appointed, viz. his Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, and Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, the General of Division Michael Duroc, Grand Marshal of his Palace, Grand Cordon of the Legion of Honour, and his Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, Don Eugenio Izquierdo de Ribera y Lezaun, his Honorary Councillor of State and of War, who, after exchanging their full powers, have agreed upon the following Articles: I. A body of French Imperial troops, consisting of 25,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, shall enter Spain, and march direct for Lisbon: they shall be joined by a body of 8000 Spanish infantry and 3000 cavalry, with 30 pieces of artillery. II. At the same time a division of Spanish troops, consisting of 10,000 men, shall take possession of the province of Entre-Minho-Douria, and of the city of Oporto; and another division of 6000 men, also consisting of Spanish troops, shall take possession of Alentejo, and the kingdom of Aigarves. III. The French troops shall be subsisted and maintained by Spain, and their pay shall be provided by France during the time occupied by their march through Spain. IV. The moment that the combined troops have entered Portugal, the government and administration of the provinces of Beira, Tras los Montes, and Portuguese Estremadura (which are to remain in a state of sequestration) shall be vested in the General commanding the French troops; and the contributions imposed thereon shall accrue to the benefit of France. The provinces that are to form the kingdom of Northern Lusitania, and the principality of the Algarves, shall be administered and governed by the Generals cominanding the Spanish divisions which shall enter the same; and the contributions imposed thereon shall accrue to the benefit of Spain. V. The central body shall be under the orders of the commander of the French troops, to whom also the Spanish troops attached to that army shall pay obedience. Nevertheless, should the King of Spain or the Prince of Peace think fit to join the said body, the French troops, with the General commanding them, shall be subject to their order. VI. Another body of 40,000 French troops shall be assembled at Bayonne by the 20th of November next, at the latest, to be ready to enter Spain for the purpose of proceeding to Portugal, in case the English should send reinforcements therein, or menace it with attack. This additional corps, however, shall not enter Spain until the two High Contracting Parties have come to an agreement on that point. VII. The present Convention ahall be ratified, and the Ratifications exchanged at the same time with those of the treaty of this date. Done at Fontaiublean, 27th October, 1857. E. IZQUIERDO. Our limits restrict us to a succint analysis of the contents of the following documents. No. III. is Buonaparte's letter to Ferdinand, given already in Panorama, Vol. IV. p. 598. The proposals made to Ferdinand (No. IV.) display the overbearing disposition of Buonaparte in glowing colours. "1. That the Emperor has irrevocaby_determined that the Bourbon Dynasty shall no longer reign in Spain.-9. That the King shall cede his rights to the crown both in his own Dame and that of his sons, should he have any.-3. That should this point be agreed upon, the crown of Etruria shall be conferred upon him and his descendants, according to the terms of the Salique law.-4. That the Infant Don Carlos shall make a similar renunciation of his rights, and that he shall have a right to the succession to the crown of Etruria, in default of issue of the King.-5. That the kingdom of Spain shall henceforth be possessed by one of the brothers of the Emperor.-6. That the Emperor guarantees its complete integrity, and that of all its colonies, without suffering single village belonging to it to be separated from it.-7. That in like manner he guarantees the preservation of religion, property, &c. &c.-8. That should his Majesty refuse those propositions, he shall remain without compensation, and his Imperial Majesty will carry them into execution by CONSENT or FORCE 9. That if his Majesty agrees, and demands the niece of the Emperor in marriage, this connection shall be immediately se cured on the execution of the treaty. These propositions, made by a man who had no right even of the most distant kind, to suggest them, were refused by Ferdinand; as appears from the same paper, dated Bayonne, April 27, 1808. No. V. is the application of Don Cevallos to M. Champagny, for permission for Ferdinand to return to Spain. It urges the promises repeatedly made by Ferdinand to his people, and the danger of tumults during his absence. No. VI. is a royal decree addressed to the supreme council of Castile by Ferdinand, infor ing them of the demand made for the liberation of the Prince of Peace; but announcing Ferdinand's intention of continuing his deten tion. No. VII. Letter of Ferdinand to his father, in which he reminds him how repeatedly he affirmed, that his abdication had been voluntary, and that if any one affirmed to the contrary he should not be believed. Ferdinand proposes if he must resign, to resign in due form, at Madrid. No. VIII. is already given in Panorama, Vol. IV. p. 600. No. IX. Letter from Ferdinand to his father, vindicating his conduct, political, filial, and moral. Complaining of detention at Bayonne, and repeating the offer of resignation when arrived in Spain. No. X. Ferdinand to his father. Complains of having been insulted in the presence of his venerable mother, and of the Emperor, by appellations the most humiliating:" whence we infer the certainty of those conversations on the subject of his illegitimacy, to which we had not ventured to give credit; thinking them too far out of nature to be true. No. XI. Note from M. Champagny to Don Cevallos, informing him that as Ferdinand was not acknowledged king by Buonaparte, the couriers he sent off from Bayonne were not entitled to national protection.-The letters sent, having been taken from the person of the courier, should be forwarded by the post. No. XII. Don Cevallos's letter to Joseph Buonaparté, stating his resignation; and that Spain is almost unanimously opposed to recognize Joseph as king. An APPENDIX contains a history of the manner in which Murat obtained from the Junta an order for the delivery of the Prince of Peace. To say that Murat employed threats and terror, is compressing the whole of this Appendix into one word. Since this paper of Don Pedro Cevallos was published, Don J. M. J. Navarro, who was the messenger entrusted with a verbal commission from Ferdinand to the Junta at Madrid, has further explained, that he left Bayonne at six in the morning, April 23, arrived at Madrid, taking cir cuitous routes, at nightfall, April 29. Was engaged in delivering and expatiating on his message, and its import, the whole night of the 99th and the morning of the 30th, sired that I should assist in the sitting held on it, consist "In which his highness the infanta, Don Antonio, deing of most of the members of the Supreme Junta, of all the presidents of the tribunals, and of two ministers from cach, with the twofold object of informing all of my commission, and learning the news of the day, and other business that might be discussed, in order that I might inform his Majesty of the whole at Bayonne, where I returned on the evening of the 6th May."" He also informs us, that Ferdinand had resolved, at that time, not to offend the French, lest Serious consequences should result to the King, the Infanta, and as many Spaniards as accompanied his Majesty." And that the arch mover in these treasons had said, "That he was not so stupid as to neglect an opportunity so farsourable as that which presented itself, having a formida ble army in the heart of Spain its fortresses and principal points occupied, nothing to fear from the North, and the persons of the King and the Infantado, Don Carlos, in his power, advantages too great to expect they should offer themselves at a future time." A letter from Buonapar e to Ferdinand explaining that he has no right to the crown but through his mother, inserted among others already referred to, does not appear, through delicacy, no doubt, among the documents of Don Cevallos: but the tenor of his publication goes strongly to prove its authenticity. HYPOTHETICAL IDEAS ON THE STATE OF THE FRENCH ART IN SPAIN. We are very desirous of communicating some ideas on the present state of the French army, with which is King Joseph in person. But being unwilling to resort to conjecture, we have extracted what information may be thought to bear on this point, from the events of the last war between the French and Spaniards in 1793, 4, 5. By being advanced to the bank of the Ebro, the present line of the French has many advantages; inasmuch as it may obtain provisions from a greater extent of Country: but, in a military point of view, it is, in our opinion, a bad position; as its extremities are too distant from its centre: and as they must be maintained in force, or they may be turned, to a certainty. A fleet on the coast may land a truly formidable enemy in the rear of this encampinent, on its right; while its left may be gradually closed in, and contracted, so that even its retreat may be endangered. The inability of the French to possess themselves of Saragossa is fatal to this army. The wings have each one opening, through which to escape; if they divide, each may be beaten, separately. If the whole army continues in its position, the loss of a convoy will be more than hazardous to it. To enable it to move forward will require, at least 100,000 fresh troops. We are, on the whole, of opinion, that no general action will be risqued by the Spaniards. There is no necessity for it. The French flanks will be the scenes of action: and the most persevering will conquer. If the French cannot beat off the Spaniards, they must decamp. The anxiety of the public mind is so great, that we hope the following information relative to the mode of warfare, and the consequences of it, as absolutely imposed by the nature of the country adjacent to the Pyrennees, will be acceptable to our readers. LOCAL PARTICULARITIES. From Bayonne to Pampeluna, the high road is good, and especially on the Spanish side from Irun to Painpeluna. Waggons and carts may pass in these parts during summer, but, in winter, mules themselves cannot at all times perform the journey. the year. But, as we descend, the major part of the mountains assumes a less savage aspect, and offers plentiful pastures to their very summits. From the southern peak, the third range declines to the level of the peak of Ania (called by the Biscayans, Ahugna: by the Spaniards, Cenia-Larra). This peak is in height 2560 yards. The fourth range declines to the level of the mountain of Hory, the height of which is 2002 yards. The fifth range may be taken at the level of Orsansurietta, which is in height 1602 yards. The level of the mountain of Haussa, above the valley of Baztan, which is 1334 yards in height, forms the sixth level; that of la Rhune, above St. Jean de Luz, which is 924 yards high, forms the seventh; that of the mountain of Aizquibel, on the border of the sea, but rising above its surface 556 yards, forms the eighth and last in this series of steps. This mountain declines rapidly to the very edge of the sea. There are many passages, called by the French cols (necks); by the Spaniards puertos (openings). Reckoning from Bareges to the Atlantic, they are more than sixty: but they are rugged, intricate, and hardly practicable for laden beasts. All however are not of this description. Mules, though heavily laden, pass in some places: but the winds and the snows frequently block up these ways effectually. In proportion as they decline towards the sea, these mountains offer more easy passages between them. Almost all the vallies between the mountains have plains, as well as defiles and this is altogether in favour of whoever defends the country, for if he be inferior in number to his enemy, he awaits him in the defiles: if he be superior in number, he fights him in the plain. The heat of the sun is so great in some of the vallies, that unusual exertion has been known to prove in:mediately fatal to officers, and also to troops. Fogs render some parts of these mountains almost invisible, and uninhabitable, at all times of the year. In other parts they appear occasionally. MILITARY OPERATIONS. Military operations are usually limited to the more practicable defiles, those between Baygorry and St. Michel, including a dis trict of about four leagues in extent. Two chains of mountains traverse this space, in a direction almost parallel, from north to south. These offer the most easy communications between France and Spain: that to the east, from St. Jean Pied du Port, leads to Pampeluna. Although this road be formed in zigzag, yet carriages with difficulty effect the passage. On the Spanish side from Garralda to Arriba, in the space of 2,300 yards the descent is 238 yards; more than 1 in 10. The Pyrennees mountains, seen in profile, present, a sort of amphitheatre, which declines by steps of about 400 yards each, estimating them from the point of Viguema! to the Ocean. The point of Viguemal is 3456 yards, in perpendicular height: from hence is a rapid declivity to the level of la Somma de Souba, which is in height 3214 vards. A similar declivity leads to the southern peak of the valley of Ossau, which is only 2944 yards in height. All these mountain- General Moncey was thirty-two hours in tops are formed of naked rock, and are co-marching over the mountains of Atchiola: vered, though not every where, with snow all although the distance is not more than twenty two miles. On the ordinary roads among the mountains, the army marched about a mile and a half in an hour. There is but one route practicable for artillery: this is from St. Jean Pied du Port to Pampeluna. In this war neither men nor money were spared: the losses of their enemy were enninerated; those of the French were not beheld. The wings of victory were clotted with gore. The kind of warfare carried on amidst the mountains neither demanded, nor admitted, of extensive military evolutions: the soldiers were taught to handle their arms with dexterity; to take aim correctly; and to advance with agility; these were thought to be exercises sufficient for a war of posts and monotains. The grenadiers were at first employed as light troops but finding them exposed to be cut off in detail by skirmishes and ambushes, they were ordered to join their corps. At the peace few real grenadiers remained. Notwithstanding the success attending certain irruptions of the French, they were obliged to retreat from positions so inhospitable as those they were forced to occupy. The roads became more and more impracticable; the carriages were completely ruined; the soldiers were enfeebled by want of food, which frequently occurred, and by the corrosive water of the mountain streams. Naked and miserable, they flocked in crowds to the hospital. From the same causes, and in the same places, a French army, commanded by the Duc de Valois, afterwards Francis I, was almost annihilated in 1519. FOOD. PRODUCTIONS. The western Pyrenees are surrounded by an unproductive country. 20,000 rations per day soon exhausted it. The maize grown hereabouts, is not fit subsistence for an army. There are considerable intervals between the fertile districts. Seldom could stores for the certain consumption of a few days be obtained. Amidst the sterile mountains, where scarcely any inhabitants could be found, the army demanded 800 quintals of grain daily. The produce of requisitions diminished daily notwithstanding every effort of the contractors, aided by threats and proclamations. At one time the delivery of bread ceased entirely : instead of it were delivered six ounces of rice, two ounces of pulse, one-sixth part of a French pint of brandy, one-twentieth part of a French pint of vinegar. Supplies had been drawn from Biscay and Alava, but it was supposed that these provinces were so far exhausted, that want of provisions alone would have forced the French to retreat, had not a pacification been concluded. A separate department of the army was obliged to be formed, to erect ovens, &c. for cooking provisions in these desert mountains. Animal food was well supplied; there were 80,000 beèves. Salt in plenty. Oxen were employed for draught, and with the horses made 15,000 cattle, DISEASES. Scarcely had the French taken up their winter quarters, when an epidemic disease, occasioned by the crowded state of the hos pitals, broke out among them. The most experienced medical men considered it as the true hospital fever of Pringle. This destructive scourge swept off multitudes of men; all the roads were covered with open carts, psing amidst regions of snow, laden with soldiers, lately fierce and active, now speechless and dying. These trains of sick were often sent along a line of more than a hundred leagues, Twenty hospitals were filled in a single day. The father scarcely dared to witness the last agonies of his son: he spread into his family the contagion that he had imbibed. The towns, the villages were de populated. The wretches, who at their last gasp laid along the roads, in vain implored assistance; or, if they could reach a ha bitation, hospitality was refused them, lest they should introduce infection: they died in solitude: cast out. In the course of three months at least thirty thousand persons in the army and in the country around it, fell victims to this epidemic. Famine added its horrors. In the towns near the army the inhabitants had no other nourishment than potatoes. In the army the distribution of bread was exhausted, rice was supplied as a substitute, a food by far too insufficient for men exposed to violent fatigue. The diseases were intermittent and putrid fevers, catarrhs, Aluxions on the breast, rheumatisms, and the itch, which is very common among the Spaniards in these parts. The twenty hospitals contained from 4,000 to 5,000 sick. The hospital reports marked every ten days 11, or 1200 deaths: besides those who died on the roads, in private houses, or unregistered in the hospitals. The medical men (about 1500) also died more than half of them in the same space of time: and of the attendants almost or altogether every one, If the houses allotted to convalescent patients be included, the number of hospitals was fifty-five, on a line of an hundred leagues. TRANSPORT SERVICE. The number of drivers, &c. was 3204; horses or mules 5350. The number ought to have been at least, 25,000 horses: besides those that died, the remainder was so harrassed, worn out and miserable, that little service was derived from them. Often the allowances to these cattle were reduced to 5lbs. of hay: and sometimes this allowance was stop ped; such scarcity of forage was experienced in this indispensable department of the army. When all that was at hand was consumed, the increased distance from whence the consumption was to be supplied diminished the advantage to a trifle. Of 5.000 draught horses, 3,000 perished in a single quarter of a |