the good or ill speeches of others, and puts it in the power of every malicious tongue to throw him into a fit of melancholy, and deftroy his natural reft and repofe of mind? especially when we confider that the world is more apt to cenfure than applaud, and himself fuller of imperfections than virtues.

We may farther obferve, that fuch a man will be more grieved for the lofs of fame, than he could have been pleafed with the enjoyment of it. For though the prefence of this imaginary good cannot make us happy, the abfence of it may make us miferable; because in the enjoyment of an object we only find that share of pleasure which it is capable of giving us, but in the lofs of it we do not proportion our grief to the real value it bears, but to the value our fancies and imaginations fet upon it.

So inconfiderable is the fatisfaction that fame brings along with it, and fo great the difquietudes to which it makes us liable. The defire of it ftirs up very uneafy motions in the mind, and is rather inflamed than fatisfied by the prefence of the thing defired. The enjoyment of it brings but very little pleafure, though the lofs or want of it be very fenfible and afflicting; and even this little happiness is fo very precarious, that it wholly depends on the will of others. We are not only tortured by the reproaches which are offered us, but are disappointed by the filence of men when it is unexpected; and humbled even by their praises.

C.

Tuesday, December 25.

N° 257.

Οὐχ εὕδει Διὸς

Οφθαλμος· ἐγγὺς δ ̓ ἔτι καὶ παρὼν πίνω.

Incert. ex Stob.

No flumber feals the eye of Providence,
Prefent to ev'ry action we commence.

THAT

HATI might not lofe myfelf upon a fubject of fo great extent as that of fame, I have treated it in a particular order and method. I have first of all confidered the reafons why providence may have implanted in our mind fuch a principle of action. I have in the next place fhewn from many confiderations, firft, that fame is a thing difficult to be obtained, and eafily loft; fecondly, that it brings the ambitious man very little happinefs, but fubjects him to much uneafinefs and diffatisfaction. I fhall in the laft place fhew, that it hinders us from obtaining an end which we have abilities to acquire, and which is accompanied with fulness of fatisfaction. I need not tell my reader, that I mean by this end that happiness which is referved for us in another world, which every one has abilities to procure, and which will bring along with it "fulness of joy and plea"fures for evermore.

How the purfuit after fame may hinder us in the attainment of this great end, I fhall leave the reader to collect from the three following confiderations.

Firft, Because the ftrong defire of fame breeds feveral vicious habits in the mind.

Secondly, Because many of thofe actions, which are apt to procure fame, are not in their nature conducive to this our ultimate happinefs.

Thirdly, Because if we fhould allow the fame actions to be the proper inftruments, both of acquiring fame, and of procuring this happiness, they would nevertheless fail in the attainment of this laft end, if they proceeded from a defire of the first.

Thefe three propofitions are felf-evident to those who are verfed in fpeculations of morality. For which reafon I fhall not enlarge upon them, but proceed to a point of the fame nature, which may open to us a more uncommon field of fpeculation.

From what has been already obferved, I think we may make a natural conclufion, that it is the greatest folly to feek the praise or approbation of any being, befides the Supreme, and that for these two reafons; becaufe no other being can make a right judgment of us, and esteem us according to our merits; and because we can procure no confiderable benefit or advantage from the esteem and approbation of any other being,

In the first place, no other being can make a right judgment of us, and elteein us according to our merits. Created beings fee nothing but our outfide, and can therefore only frame a judgment of us from our exterior actions and behaviour; but how unfit these are to give us a right notion of each other's perfections, may appear from feveral confiderations. There are many virtues, which in their own nature are incapable of any outward reprefentation: many filent perfections in the foul of a good man, which are great ornaments to human nature, but not able to difcover themselves to the knowledge of others; they are tranfacted in private, without noife or fhow, and are only visible to the great searcher of hearts. What actions can exprefs the intire purity of thought which refines and fanctifies a virtuous man? that fecret rest and contentedness of mind, which gives him a perfect enjoyment of his prefent condition? that inward pleasure and complacency which he feels in doing good? that delight and fatisfaction which he takes in the profperity and happiness of another? these and the like virtues are the hidden beauties of a foul, the fecret graces which cannot be discovered by a mortal eye, but make the foul lovely and precious in his fight, from whom no fecrets are concealed. Again, there are many virtues which want an opportunity of exerting and fhewing themselves in actions. Every virtue requires time and place, a proper object and a fit conjuncture of circumftances, for the due exercife of it. A ftate of poverty obfcures all the virtues of liberality

and munificence. The patience and fortitude of a martyr or confeffor lie concealed in the flourishing times of Chriftianity. Some virtues are only feen in affliction,. and fome in profperity; fome in a private, and others. in a public capacity. But the great Sovereign of the world beholds every perfection in its obfcurity, and not only fees what we do, but what we would do. He views our behaviour in every concurrence of affairs, and fees us engaged in all the poffibilities of action. He, difcovers the martyr and confeffor without the trial of flames and tortures, and will hereafter intitle many to, the reward of actions, which they had never the opportunity of performing. Another reafon why men can. not form a right judgment of us is, becaufe the fame, actions may be aimed at different ends, and arife from quite contrary principles. Actions are of fo mixt a nature and fo full of circumftances, that as men pry into them more or lefs, or obferve fome parts more than others, they take different hints, and put contrary interpretations on them; fo that the fame actions may reprefent a man as hypocritical and defigning to one, which make him appear a faint or hero to another. He therefore who looks upon the foul through its outward actions, often fees it through a deceitful medium, which is apt to difcolour and pervert the object: fo that on this ac-, count alfo, He is the only proper judge of our perfections, who does not guefs at the fincerity of our intentions from the goodness of our actions, but weighs the goodness of our actions by the fincerity of our inten

tions.

But further; it is impoffible for outward actions to reprefent the perfections of the foul, because they can never fhew the ftrength of those principles from whence they proceed. They are not adequate expreffions of our virtues, and can only fhew us what habits are in the foul, without dicovering the degree and perfection of fuch habits. They are at best but weak refemblances of our intentions, faint and imperfect copies that may acquaint us with the general defign, but can never exprefs the beauty and life of the original. But the great Judge of all the earth knows every different Atate and degree of human improvement, from those

N® 257• weak ftirrings and tendencies of the will which have not yet formed themfelves into regular purposes and defigns, to the laft intire finishing and confu mation of a good habit. He beholds the fift imperfect rudiments: of a virtue in the foul, and keeps a watchful eye over it in all its progrefs, until it has received every grace it is capable of, and appears in its full beauty and perfection. Thus we fee that none but the fupreme Being can efteem us according to our proper merits, fince all others muft judge of us from our outward actions; which can never give t em a juft eftimate of us, fince there are many perfections of a man which are not capable of appearing in actions; many which, allowing no natural incapacity of fhewing themfelves, want an opportunity of doing it; or, fhould they all meet with an opportunity of appearing by actions, yet thofe actions may' be misinterpreted, and applied to wrong principles; or though they plainly difcovered the principles from whence they proceeded, they could never fhew the degree, ftrength, and perfection of thofe principles.

And as the fupreme Being is the only proper judge of our perfections, fo is he the only fit rewarder of them. This is a confideration that comes home to our intereft," as the other adapts itfelf to our ambition. And what could the most aspiring, or the most selfish man defire more, were he to form the notion of a being to whom he would recommend himself, than fuch a knowledge as can difcover the least appearance of perfection in him, and fuch a goodness as will proportion a reward to it.

Let the ambitious man therefore turn all his defire of fame this way; and that he may propofe to himself a fame worthy of his ambition, let him confider that if he employs his abilities to the best advantage, the time will come when the fupreme Governor of the world, the great Judge of mankind, who fees every degree of perfection in others, and poffeffes all poffible perfection in himself, fhall proclaim his worth before men and angels, and pronounce to him in the prefence of the whole creation that best and noft fignificant of applaufes, "Well done, thou good and faithful fervant, enter thou into thy Master's joy.”