was extremely ill taken, that a fimple mortal fhould pretend to give Ariftotle the lie. During the infancy of reafon, authority is the prevailing argument mila at banTS? Reafon is eafily warped by habit.' 'In the difputes among the Athenians about adjusting the form of their government, thofe who lived in the high country were for democracy; the inhabitants of the plains were for oligarchy; and the feamen for monarchy, Shepherds are all equal: in a corn-country, there are a few mafters and many fervants: on fhipboard, there is one commander, and all the reft fubjects. Habit was their advifer: none of them thought of confulting reafon, in order to judge what was the best form

* Aristotle, it would appear, was lefs regarded by his cotemporaries than by the moderns. Some perfons having travelled from Macedon all the way to Perfia with complaints against Antipater; Alexander obferved, that they would not have made fo long a journey had they received no injury. And Caffander, fon of Antipater, replying, that their long journey was an argument against them, I trusting that witneffes would not be brought from fuch a distance to give evidence of their calumny. Alexander, fmiling, faid, "Your argument is one "of Ariftotle's fophifmns, which will ferve either fide equally."

upon

upon the whole. Habit of a different kind has has an influence no lefs powerful. Perfons who are in the habit of reafoning, require demonstration for every thing: even a self-evident propofition is not fuffered to escape. Such demonftrations occur more than once in the Elements of Euclid, nor has Ariftotle, with all his fkill in logic, entirely avoided them. Can any thing be more felf-evident,' than the difference between pleasure and motion? Yet Ariftotle attempts to demon166 No moftrate, that they are different.

tion," fays he, except circular motion, is perfect in any one point of "time: there is always fomething wanting during its course, and it is not per

perfected till it arrive at its end. But plea"fure is perfect in every point of time "being the fame from the beginning to "the end." The difference is clear from perception: but instead of being clear from this demonftration, it should rather follow from it, that pleafure is the fame with motion in a circle. Plato, alfo at"tempts to demonstrate a felf-evident propofition, that a quality is not a body.

Every body," fays he,

0.0.2

is a fubject:

"quality

so quality is not a fubject, but an accir dent ergo, quality is not a bodysAgain, An body cannot be in a fubject: every quality is in a subjectat engio, quag lity is not a body." But Defcartes affords the most illuftrious inftance of the kind, He was the greatest geometer of the tage he lived in, and Tone of the greatest of any age; which infenfibly led him to overlook intuitive knowledge, and to admit no propofition but what is demonftrated or proved in the regular form of fyllogifm. 1 He took a fancy to doubt even of his own exiftence, till he was convinced of it by the following argument. Cogito, ergo fum: I think, therefore I exift. And whats fort of a demonstration is this after all sho In the very fundamental propofition he acknowledges his existence by the term 7}* and how abfurd is it, to imagine a proof necessary of what is admitted in the fun-” damental propofition? In the next place, How does our author knowbothat hẻ thinks? If nothing is too be taken for granted, an argument is no lefs neceffary to prove that he thinks, than to prove that he exifts. It is true, that he has intuitive knowledge of his thinking; but has he

not

e

not the fame of his exifting? Would not a man deferve to be laughed at, who, after warming himself at a fire, fhould imagine the following argument necessary to proves its exiftence," The fire burns, ergo "bit exifts?" Liften to an author of high reputation attempting to demonstrate a felf-evident propofitionio ffoThe labour of

B cannot be the labour of C; because it "is the application of the organs and powers of B, not of C to the effecting “of something; and therefore the labour "is as much B's, as the limbs and faculties "made ufe of are his. Again, the effect

or produce of the labour of B, is not "the effect of the labour of C: and there"fore this effect or produce is B's, not "C's; as much B's, as the labour was "B's, and not C's: Becaufe, what the la"bour of B caufes or produces, B pro "duces by his labour; or it is the pro

ducts of B by his labour: that is, it is "B's product, not C's, or any others! "And if C-fhould pretend to any property "in that which B can truly call his he “would act contrary to truth (a).” egy ot In every fubject of reafoning, to define (a) Religion of Nature delineated, fest. 6 paragr. 2.

terms

ning a teher

terms is neceffary in order to avoid miftakes:" and the only poffible way of defiis to exprefs its meaning in more fimple terms. Terms expreffing ideas that are fimple without parts, admit not of being defined, because there are no terms more simple to exprefs their meaning. To fay that every term is capable of a definition,, is in effect to fay, that terms resemble matter; that as the latter is divifible without end, fo the former is reducible into fimpler terms without end. The habit however of defining is fo inveterate in fome men, that they will attempt to define, words fignifying fimple ideas. Is there any neceflity to define motion: do not children understand the meaning of the word? And how is it poffible to define it, when there are not words more fimple to define it by? Yet Worster (a) attempts that bold task.

66

"A continual

change of place," fays he," or leaving δε one place for another, without remain"ing for any fpace of time in the fame That every

place, is called motion."

body in motion is continually changing place, is true: but change of place is not

(a) Natural Philofophy, p. 31.

motion ;