also find, that this affection receives no countenance from reason or revelation.

Some suppose that there is in the human mind naturally a capacity of being pleased with the misery of others. But what good purpose could such a capacity answer? And when all our bodily capacities are adapted to answer good purposes, why should the all wise Creator give us a mental capacity which can answer no good purpose? But this supposition is erroneous; and is not substantiated by the actual phenomena of the mind. On a critical examination, we find in the mind the capacity to delight in the happiness of other beings, and to experience pain from their misery; but we do not find in it any capacity to delight in the pain of other beings, as an ultimate end, in any case whatever; but the contrary.

We conclude, therefore, that the human mind is constituted to delight in good, and to be pained in view of evil, and that it is as much without capacity to delight in the misery of a fellow-being, as it is without capacity to fly, or to perform any other act which exceeds the limitation of its faculties. The constitution of the human mind is a noble and glorious fabric; and furnishes less excuse than many suppose for the deep degradation and sin which have blighted in all past ages, the brightest interests of the hu

man race.

$469. The doctrine that the human mind possesses power to delight in the happiness of others, considered simply as an end, without any capacity to delight in their misery, except as a means to an end, draws after it the most important consequences, and contradicts one of the greatest practical errors, both of ancient and modern times. The ancient systems of Ethics recognized vindictive justice as a virtue. Christ taught the contrary; but his instructions on this subject were soon misinterpreted and misunderstood, and by being misunderstood, lost much of their practical effect. Even down to our times the doctrine of vindictive justice has been strenuously supported, and generally held throughout the civilized world. Its inconsistency with the doctrines of the Scriptures, has been perceived by some, and has been strenuously insisted upon, but the great mass of philosophers and moralists have never so much as allowed the question of its truth to be seriously entertained.

A revengeful spirit is early developed, and like other dis positions gains strength by indulgence. It is painful to be the object of injury, and right to repel injury, by any means which are consistent with the laws of mutual love. It is right to lay restraint on injurious persons, and to protect society effectually against their depredations. To this extent we are led by the love of our own happiness and that of others, without finding any occasion for delighting in the misery of the wicked.

§ 470. The Scriptures teach us to love all men, even our enemies. But it is impossible to take delight in the misery of those whom we love. This appears both from the nature of the case, and from the experience of parents and good magistrates in the infliction of domestic and civil punishments. The silent progress of civilization has come to the aid of Christianity on this subject, and is far in advance of speculative Ethics. The civil magistrate pronounces sentence on the worst of malefactors, but so far from expressing a fiendish delight in his sufferings, recoils from them in sadness and sorrow. He is glad to pronounce sentence according to a just law, and is glad to have that sentence executed, not as a matter of revenge, but as a matter of usefulness; not in consideration of the past as the ultimate reason of his procedure, but in consideration of the future, and in pursuance of rules of action which are necessary to the production and preservation of happiness. Justice is punitive but not vindictive. It is founded in impartial regards for one and all, and consults for the happiness of one and all on equal terms. It allows evil doing to be restrained by punishments, and requires the infliction of adequate punishments for this purpose; but it does not attempt the monstrous absurdity of making the wicked miserable for the gratification of the injured, or of inflicting misery upon them in retaliation and revenge for their wicked doings.

§ 471. In the foregoing argument revenge is admitted as a phenomenon which is an object of experience and observation; and is accounted for without admitting in it a delight in misery for its own sake, or in consideration of past wickedness merely; and a revengeful disposition is imputed to an aberration of judgment which is not uncommon. contrary is the hypothesis generally entertained, and the truth lies between these two. There is such a passion as revenge. Revenge in its largest sense is a disposition to

The

injure the wicked because they have injured others, and involves delight in injuring them and in seeing them injured in a degree proportionable to the injury which they have inflicted. The fact of this delight is not called in question, but the supposed object and nature of it. This delight relates to misery as an effect, and regards it as delightful on its own account; or else it relates to it as a means to some good end, and regards it as delightful solely on account of the end which it answers. An end is another name for an effect, and must be subsequent in the order of time to its cause. The legitimate object of punishing the wicked is some good effect to be produced by it both in respect to them and to others, as far as the interests of both can be harmonized; and the greater good of others at the expense of the wicked, as far as wickedness brings the interests of its subjects into collision with those of others. In prosecuting this end to its utmost extent we find no occasion for the principle of revenge or for delight in misery as a remuneration of wickedness, and an ultimate end of moral action.

But in revenge itself, in its most diabolical forms there is an association and blending of different objects. Misery is apparently inflicted and delighted in, as a compensative effect, as a return for injury; but at the same time, there are intimately and universally associated with it ideas of putting restraint on the malefactor, of deterring others from evildoing, of vindicating ourselves from dishonor, relieving our own pain, and of increasing indirectly our safety and happiness, to such an extent as to enable us to account for the supposed delight in misery on the principle of association; admitting that misery is the apparent cause of the delight experienced; but claiming that the real cause is to be found exclusively in the associated objects.

CHAPTER VI.

NATURE AND EXERCISES OF THE WILL.

§ 472. The faculty by which the mind forms purposes, and uses its powers for the accomplishment of its purposes, is called the will. The exercises of the mind which are attributed to this faculty are choices, purposes, and volitions. Choice is the preference of one object to another in conformity with the system of acting for the greatest good. Choices which are directed towards future possible actions, are divided into purposes and volitions. Those which have respect to remote actions are called purposes, and those which have respect to immediate actions, volitions.

Beings are made capable of sensations, ideas, affections, and desires, not to be passive in experiencing them, but in order that they may choose the good and refuse the evil. This is true to some extent of animals and insects, which are made capable of happiness, in order that they choose and obtain it; and are made capable of misery, in order that they may refuse and avoid the things which lead to it; and the same is true, to a still greater extent of men, whose capacities of knowledge, and of happiness and misery, are incomparably greater than those of the noblest animals. The sphere of choice is limited, and is proportionable to the capacities of the agents. Those agents which have the greatest capacities, have most to choose and refuse; and those which have the least capacities, least either to choose or refuse. The sphere of human choice is of vast extent; and the objects which it embraces are innumerable. Voluntary animal or human action is that which proceeds from choice. All other action is involuntary. To will is to choose; and to perform voluntary action, is to act from choice. Involuntary action may be simply involuntary or contra-voluntary. The actions of material agents in resistance and attraction, are simply involuntary; that is, do not proceed from choice on the part of their subjects. The same is true of respiration and all those organic actions which we choose to have go on, though they proceed independently of our choice. They are involuntary, but not contra-voluntary, except in cases where we choose to have

them cease. Pain and other conscious exercises are contravoluntary, when they are experienced contrary to our choice. The immediate object of choice is happiness of some kind; and its remote objects the means of happiness, both subjective and objective. The choice of immediate good produces volitions and consequent actions, and that of remote good, purposes. Purposes, when continued till the time and occasion for their accomplishment, give place to volitions, which like other volitions terminate in immediate action. All the phenomena of the will, therefore, may be comprehended under choices, purposes, and volitions.

Nature and Laws of Choices.

§ 473. Choice is synonymous with election and preference; and it implies a capacity to choose, and objects of choice. Things not endowed with capacities to choose, cannot exercise choice; and beings endowed with these capacities, cannot exercise them without objects of choice, any more than beings endowed with capacities of sight, can see without visible objects; or those endowed with capacities to reason, can reason without objects to reason from. All possible varieties of pleasure and pain, and all their concurring causes, both immediate and remote, are legitimate objects of choice. We prefer to have an object, rather than not to have it; we prefer to have one object rather than another; and prefer to have an object now, rather than to have it at another time; or at another time rather than now. Choices may be distributed into positive and negative. In positive choices, we choose to have particular objects in preference to others, or in preference to not having them; and in negative choices, we choose not to have particular objects in preference to others; or not to have them in preference to having them. The faculty of choice is common to men and animals, and is exercised contemporaneously with the other mental faculties.

The essential conditions of choice are ideas of objects of choice; just as the essential conditions of love are ideas of objects of love; and those of desires, ideas of desirable objects. In order to choose one apple from a number, we must have ideas of the apples which we are to choose from; and in order to choose to have an apple, or to choose not to have it, we must have ideas of our reception or