CHAPTER IV.

PHILOSOPHY OF DESIRES.

Nature and Office of Desires.

§ 450. Desires are a class of emotions dependent on ideas of objects considered as concurring causes of pleasurable o painful sensations, primary emotions or affections; and are subsequent in the order of succession to sensations and primary emotions; and also to the affections. They are sometimes denominated emotions, and sometimes affections. All these exercises, like different classes of ideas, have several generic properties in common; but they are also capable of being distinguished from each other, and reduced to subordinate genera, all belonging to the single genus of emotions or feelings dependent on ideas. We contemplate possible objects of pleasure, and desire to enjoy them; possible objects of pain, and desire not to suffer them. Desires are common to men and animals. Those of men are far more numerous than animal desires; relate to many objects of far greater importance; and extend to incalculably longer periods of duration.

The desires of moral beings agree with their other modes of voluntary action, in being either right or wrong. Wrong desires imply a competition of interests among moral beings, and an indifference to the happiness and misery of other beings, for which there is no just occasion under the Divine government.

The desires sustain important and interesting relations to all the other classes of mental phenomena. They relate to some other mental exercises as their essential concurring causes, and to others as their uniform effects. Ideas of desirable objects are essential conditions of desires. Without ideas of life, we cannot have desires to live; without ideas of food, we cannot have desires of food; and without ideas of happiness, we cannot have desires of happiness. So of all objects of desire. Desires terminate on the objects of ideas, and cannot be produced except by means of those objects, and of the ideas which relate to them.

§ 451. Desires are common to all voluntary beings. God is as really the subject of them, as his rational creatures. Desires of different objects can co-exist in created minds only to a limited extent, corresponding to that of the coexistence of ideas. As far as we can have co-existing ideas, we may have contemporaneous desires; no farther. To desire objects of which we have no ideas at the time, is impossible. The sphere of our possible desires is co-extensive with that of our possible ideas; and that of our actual desires is limited by that of our actual ideas. Different con temporaneous desires may agree or disagree, according as their objects are compatible or incompatible with each other. We may desire different objects at the same time, which are compatible with each other, and those which are incompatible. When we are the subjects of contemporaneous disagreeing desires, the desire of one object counterbalances that of another, which is incompatible with it; so that we may desire each, considered by itself; but in consideration of their incompatibility, may desire only the one which we judge most desirable. Many objects are desirable on some accounts, and undesirable on others. these cases we compare the properties of objects which render them desirable, with those which make them undesirable; and either desire them or desire not to have them, as we judge their desirable or undesirable properties to predominate.

In

Contemporaneous desires may be opposite in some respects, but they cannot be opposite in all respects. We may desire to have an object on some accounts, and desire not to have it on other accounts, at the same time. But the ultimate objects of desire in these cases, are different. What we desire to have, is an object possessing certain desirable properties; and what we desire not to have, is an object possessing certain undesirable properties. Where we associate these properties as those of one and the same object, that object becomes desirable or undesirable, according as one or other of these classes of properties predominate.

The connection between desires and ideas, is similar to that between emotions and ideas adapted to excite them; and to that between sensations and organic impressions. Appropriate ideas excite particular desires, as uniformly as ideas of beautiful objects excite emotions of beauty, or those of sublime objects, emotions of sublimity. Ideas of

objects as desirable or undesirable, have respect to them as objects of sensation or emotion of some kind. That which does not, in our judgment, sustain the relation of an object to some possible sensations or emotions, either pleasurable or painful, cannot be an object of desire; that which is not capable of being an object of desire, from its real or supposed relations to the possible sensations or emotions of the subject, cannot be an object of desire at all. The relation of desirable objects to the emotions of the subject of desire, may be direct or indirect, immediate or remote. Many objects are highly desirable on account of their remote and ultimate relations to the happiness of individuals, which, considered with respect to their immediate effects, would be highly undesirable.

§ 452. Persons who contemplate objects only as related to their capacities of pleasurable or painful sensations, desire them or not, as those objects are supposed capable of administering to their sensual enjoyment or not. Those who contemplate objects as capable of ministering to their intellectual pleasure, desire them for these higher and nobler purposes; and those who contemplate them as capable of affording intellectual pleasure of the highest order, desire them for purposes of the highest order. A similar comparison may be instituted between objects considered in respect to their relations to our immediate, remote, and ultimate happiness or misery. Those who contemplate objects only as adapted to promote their present gratification or otherwise, desire them only on account of such adaptations, and in degrees proportionable to them. Those who embrace in their conceptions of objects, ideas of all their possible adaptations to promote their happiness or misery, both immediate and remote, desire them or not, according as they appear on the whole to be desirable or undesirable.

It is necessary to contemplate objects in all their discoverable relations, and to consider in our estimates of them, all their possible effects, in order to have properly regulated desires in regard to them. Partial views often lead us to exercise desires, when more liberal and extended ones excite within us the strongest aversions. Our desires cannot correspond to the real qualities of things, unless our ideas correspond to them. The attainment of just and adequate ideas is, therefore, an essential condition of appropriate and well regulated desires. Just and adequate ideas of knowledge

lead us to desire knowledge; just and adequate ideas of the favor of God, lead us to desire the favor of God; and just and adequate ideas of human happiness, lead us to desire human happiness. So of all other objects of desire. In the case of moral beings, the most adequate ideas of objects possible, are subjects of moral obligation, considered as the concurring causes of desires. The same is true of them considered as the concurring causes of the emotions and affections, which are previous to desires in the order of succession.

Beings not endowed with powers of moral agency, are the subjects of obligation to attain adequate desire-producing ideas equally with moral beings; and to exercise corresponding desires by means of such ideas; but their obligations to do this, like those which relate to their other actions, are not moral, and are comparatively slight.

Desires of Knowledge.

§ 453. Knowledge is an appropriate object of thought, as something useful. Thus, we easily think of a knowledge of language, of mathematics, and the arts. We see persons derive great benefit from a knowledge of particular sciences, particular departments of literature, and particular arts; and experience the benefit of knowledge in numerous instances ourselves. By experience and observation of the utility of knowledge generally, and of particular branches of it to persons in particular circumstances, we become qualified to judge respecting our own wants in this respect. We find that some branches of knowledge are useful to all, and that others are useful to individuals in particular circumstances. Anticipating our own future circumstances, we judge that we shall need particular branches of knowledge appropriate to them. Having judged that knowledge generally will be useful to us, or that this is the fact in respect to particular branches of it, we immediately have desires for those branches of knowledge, and for those degrees of knowledge in respect to them, which our greatest happi. ness and prosperity require.

We cannot desire knowledge of any kind, without first having formed ideas that it will be useful to us. If we judge that it will be useful in a slight degree, we exercise comparatively feeble desires for it; if we judge that it will

be highly useful, we desire it with proportionable strength. The desire of knowledge may be general or particular. The most intense desires of this class, have respect to particular branches and items of knowledge, from which we judge important and particular benefits are capable of being derived. Desires of Wealth.

$454. Wealth embraces a great variety of objects, capable of appropriation to the satisfaction of the wants of individuals, and possessing exchangeable value. In consequence of their exchangeable value, they serve as means of procuring any objects whatever, that are in the market, and that do not exceed them in value. Wealth, therefore, is an object of affection and desire, considered without respect to its form, simply as something which possesses exchangeable value. We judge wealth to be capable of affording us gratifications, and desire it accordingly. According to the nature and extent of the pleasure which we judge it capable of affording, will be the intensity and nature of our desires for it. We have desires of considerable strength for wealth generally; but those which arise most frequently, and which are of the greatest strength, have respect to more or less particular kinds and amounts of wealth. Thus a farmer desires to free a particular farm from all incumbrances, and to have it properly stocked and furnished; mechanics, merchants, and adventurers of every class, have definite acquisitions constantly in view, to which this class of desires are chiefly directed.

Men desire particular amounts and kinds of property, after which they are striving, more than they desire all the world of wealth besides. Their desires are mostly limited to definite and small acquisitions, which they regard as immediate objects of pursuit, and which are followed by other similar desires corresponding to the varying conditions and means of acquisition possessed by individuals. One man in given circumstances, desires a dollar more than another desires a thousand; shillings, dollars, thousands, and ten thousands of dollars are the successive objects of desire in the experience of the same individual, according to his circumstances and necessities, and his supposed means of acquisition.