that the whole operation of thinking is within the body, and that the correspondence of thoughts to external objects does not depend on any actual presence of the mind with those objects. The mind thinks of distance without traversing lines; of surfaces, without diffusing itself over surfaces; and of solids, without extending itself through solids. A resolution of ideas of space, into a diffusion of the mind, through the spaces which are the objects of its conceptions, involves a misconception of the nature of ideas, and of the conditions of thought. We conclude, therefore, that the mind does not go out of the body in thinking of external objects, but that its thoughts correspond to their objects by other means, without any such supposed operation.

§ 342. We return, therefore, to the brain as the proper home of thought, and inquire whether the thinking being which it contains, occupies a part of it or the whole? The brain is divided into superior and posterior portions, and each of them is subdivided laterally into divisions corresponding to the two sides of the body. Is the thinking being in one of these divisions or sub-divisions, exclusive of the rest? Is it in the superior portion, and not in the inferior? Or if it is in the superior portion exclusively; is it in the right lobe of that portion, and not in the left? Or in the left, and not in the right? To these questions the answer is clear, that the mind is an inhabitant of the whole brain. It occupies the superior apartments of this dwelling, and its inferior ones; its right side apartments, and its left side apartments. Nor need we wonder that this amount of room should not be too much for it. We may rather wonder that the thinking processes can all be performed within such narrow limits; and that a being which ranges through infinity in space and time, can accommodate itself, and not feel straitened in its transcendent operations, within such confined apartments.

§ 343. But how does it appear that the subject of sensations which is diffused through the whole body, and the subject of ideas which is restricted to the brain, constitute one mind? And what is the discoverable principle of their unity? Is not another supposition possible? And if not; why not? In respect to material beings, we infer the unity of atoms, considered as resisting beings, within indefinitely small spheres; and as attracting beings, in spheres indefinitely extended, because these different spheres have a com

mon center from which they repel in the smaller spheres, and towards which they attract in the larger. But how is it with the mind? In the brain, the mind is revealed as the subject of thoughts, affections, and acts of will. Here, then, within these limits, is the sphere of thoughts, affections and acts of will. Both within the brain and beyond it, through. out the entire nervous system, is the sphere of sensations. Is there any evidence to prove that the same mind occupies both these spheres, and performs the different processes of thinking, and experiencing sensations? In favor of this assumption we have the fact that the brain, which is the exclusive sphere of ideas, is the proper center of the sphere of sensations. But the matter is placed beyond all question by the common relations of sensations and ideas to consciousness. Consciousness is an exercise of the mind, and we are conscious equally of our ideas and sensations. If our consciousness of ideas proves that ideas belong to the mind, which is the subject of consciousness, our consciousness of sensations proves that sensations belong to the mind; from which we infer that one and the same mind is the subject, both of sensations and ideas. By a similar argument we prove the same thing in respect to the affections and acts of will. Each mind, therefore, sustains the same relations to the spiritual world, which each atom does to the material world.

§ 344. Having ascertained the existence of minds, as occupants both of the brain and of the entire nervous system, and as the sole subjective causes of sensations, ideas, affections, and acts of will, other questions are naturally suggested. Has the mind any other powers besides those above specified. It experiences sensations, thinks, exercises affections, and performs acts of will. Does it do any thing else? Yes. It produces voluntary muscular actions, by which we perform all the labors and arts of life. It moves the arm, the hand, the finger, the lower limbs, the head; it moves the eye, opens and shuts it, and produces a variety of muscular actions throughout the whole body. In these motions, it acts on the body as one body acts upon another, and acts in many cases with great power. It does not act directly on the muscles, but mediately; and it performs this action through the medium of the galvanic fluid. The action, however, commences with the mind, and originates in it. The power of acting thus is of a different order from

the power of thought, and the action itself is not an obj. ( of consciousness. We are conscious of volitions, and often of sensations attendant on our muscular actions; but we are not conscious of any mental action by which the coporeal action is produced. This is a fact which deserves to be particularly remarked.

§ 345. The question still recurs; has the mind any other powers? Do any other effects appear which cannot be resolved by referring them to matter, and which admit of a satisfactory solution by being referred to the mind?

There is a large class of facts comprehended under the title of the phenomena of organic life, which are of this description. They embrace the processes by which the entire body is formed and kept in repair, and in accordance with which, every organ receives its structure, form, and size. This class of operations belongs universally to human and animal bodies, and is of the constructive kind; but it cannot be accounted for by the known properties of matter. Matter has no constructive properties, by which it can organize itself into utensils of husbandry and implements of labor, into microscopes or telescopes. The power, therefore, by which it is formed into hands and eyes, and all the other organs of human and animal bodies, cannot reside in itself. Where then does it reside? It must reside in the mind or else in some other agent which is not material. But having discovered the mind to be an agent which is not material, and having discovered in it the power of operating on matter in a great variety of voluntary actions, such as in writing, walking, running, talking, and performing all the various processes of art and industry, we have no occasion for the hypothesis of a different immaterial agent, to account for the phenomena of organic life. The powers concerned in directing and producing the processes of organic life, are of the same kind, as those concerned in moving the hand, and in using the organs of speech in talking and singing. The mind is just as unconscious of the actions by which we talk write and labor, as it is of the actions by which the most refined processes of organic life are produced. On the ground, therefore, of this similarity of the effects, we are authorized to presume that the cause of one class of effects, is the cause of the other. But we know that the mind is the cause or all voluntary muscular actions produced in talking, walking, and performing every variety

of labors. We are authorized, therefore, to infer, that it is the cause of the organic actions, by which bodies are formed, nourished, and kept in a state of repair. But if this hypothesis is not satisfactory, the only other one, which is possible, is the hypothesis that there is another being contained in the body, besides the mind, which is not material, and which has no powers of sensation or ideas; and is, therefore, not spiritual. This intermediate being may be denominated the organic soul; and to it the entire structure of the body, may be referred as its author; and all the processes of organic life as their performer. As the nervous system is the known source of those influences, under which all the processes of organic life are performed, this organic soul must be connected with the nerves, in the same way that the mind is; and as the entire nervous system proceeds from the brain and spinal cord, in occupying the nervous system, this organic soul must have its principal seat in the brain and spinal cord. On the hypothesis, therefore, that sensations, ideas, and voluntary actions belong to the mind, and organic actions to the organic soul different from the mind, both these beings must be the joint occupants of the same brain and nervous system. Besides, as soon as life commences the mind is supposed to exist in the embryo being, in an undeveloped state, and the organic soul exists also in the same being, commences the formation of its organs, prosecutes this work till they are completed; and at death they both simultaneously leave the body. It is impossible therefore to prove that they are not one and the same being; inasmuch as they commence and end their connection with the body together; occupy the brain and nervous system together; and possess similar powers.

346. Another circumstance which adds considerably to the probability of the identity of these agents, is the great. influence of the mind on organic life. Excessive joy and sorrow have in several instances destroyed life instantaneously. Cheerfulness and moderate delight are favorable to health; any degree of melancholy is unfavorable to it; and great dejection and depression of spirits produce immediate and serious derangement of the organic processes; and in a short time destroy life entirely. Dangerous and distressing diseases have often been cured through the direct influence of the mind, by quack remedies, when a different state of

mind would have rendered the most effectual remedies of no avail.

§ 347. We conclude on the whole, therefore, that human and animal minds are always accompanied with organic souls, to build and keep in repair their bodies; and that the mind and body operate powerfully upon each other through the medium of this organic soul, or else that the mind itself possesses the organic powers which are exercised in constructing the body, and in keeping it in repair; and that the latter is the most probable.

The phenomena of vegetable life cannot be referred to matter, but require the supposition of vegetable principles, to act as agents in organizing and nourishing vegetable bodies. These principles possess organic powers, without intellectual ones.

Animal minds are of various orders. Human minds are of an order superior to that of the noblest animals. Above human minds are various ranks and orders of angels; and at the head of the universe, and on the throne of its dominion and glory, is the Divine mind.

Origin and Derivation of Minds.

§ 348. The origin of created minds is involved in obscurity. The amount of matter is incapable of being increased; and its elementary atoms are subject to no change. Minds are being continually multiplied by generation. Whence do they proceed? Do they come directly from the hand of the Creator? Or do they derive their existence from parent minds? And if there are organic souls, whence do they proceed? Do they come directly from the hand of God in generation? Or are they derived from the parent organic souls? One or other of these suppositions must be true. Is either of them capable of being established as true, or probable? It may be impossible to establish either as true, though it cannot be doubted that the truth lies between them; and several important and general facts, pertaining to hereditary traits of character, both in respect to the mind and body, indicate a derivation of minds from parent minds, and not a new creation.

§ 349. In early life, the mind is restricted within narrow limits. As the body becomes enlarged, the mind enlarges its dimensions so as to fill and occupy it; and if growth