looked. From facts pertaining to the mind, the whole philosophy of the mind must be developed. Facts are not wanting for this purpose. They exist in sufficient numbers and varieties to form the basis of a liberal and highly useful science, and from them alone can a true development of mental science take place. Of all the facts which pertain to the mind, the most important are its moral actions. These have awakened a degree of interest, in all ages, and are destined to awaken a continually increasing interest till they shall be generally understood, to an extent which has seldom yet been attained by the most enlightened minds. It is one of the principal misfortunes of ignorance, to suppose that all useful knowledge is embraced within the contracted sphere of its ideas. Men do not usually appreciate the value of any species of knowledge till it has been obtained and applied to useful purposes. Imperfect as the general knowledge of mankind is, on the subject of moral actions, it answers many purposes of the greatest usefulness, and exerts a commanding influence on the development of our intellectual and moral powers, and in the promotion or destruction of our happiness.

Just in proportion as moral actions shall be more accurately observed, and more correctly reasoned from and understood, the more extensive will our knowledge of them become, and the greater will be our ability to subordinate our moral agency to the promotion of the happiness, both of ourselves and others.

CHAPTER XXIII.

NATURE AND GENERALIZATION OF MORAL ACTIONS.

§ 315. The classification of actions, as voluntary and not voluntary, is founded in distinctions which are obvious, and concerning which there is no room for debate. The subdivision of voluntary actions into moral and not moral, depends on properties which are less obvious and less easily defined, but which are universally apprehended to a sufficient extent to answer most of the purposes of practical reason. The voluntary actions of animals and insects, and those of children, together with many of the actions of adult persons, are generally reckoned as not moral, and in the estimates which we form of them, are not regarded as moral actions. This is true, not of a few only, but of the great mass of the human family; and is in accordance with the deductions of universal reason. Men generally have passed judgments upon voluntary actions as moral and not moral, and have divided them as above indicated. What is the ground of this division? What is the generic peculiarity which distinguishes moral actions from those which are not moral ? What is the specific difference between the moral voluntary actions of men, and the not moral voluntary actions of men; and the moral voluntary actions of men, and the not moral voluntary actions of animals, insects and children? It is generally admitted that there is a difference; but what that difference is, and where it is, are matters of earnest, and often of angry debate; and of protracted and acrimonious controversy. The difference cannot be in the fact of the actions being voluntary; for this is common to moral actions, and to those which are not moral; it cannot be in the action itself; for the not moral action of the animal may be of the same kind as the moral action of the man. A dog may do good or evil, without having his actions recognized as possessing any moral character; and a man may be considered as morally good or morally evil in performing the same actions, showing, both that moral goodness does not belong to the action for what it is in itself, and that goodness is different from moral goodness, and is related to it as a genus to the species. Let us now review

our position, and see precisely to what point we have advanced. We began with dividing facts into actions and states; and then divided actions and states in voluntary and involuntary actions and states. We then divided voluntary actions into moral and not moral, or morally good actions, and morally evil actions; distinguishing morally good actions as a species of good actions, and morally evil actions, as a species of evil actions. We resolve, therefore, the question concerning the nature of moral actions into the two questions concerning the nature of that class of good actions, of which we predicate moral goodness; and of that class of evil actions of which we predicate moral evil. Our ultimate distinction, therefore, is between goodness, and moral goodness; and evil, and moral evil.

§ 316. Good and evil are generic terms, and denote either happiness or misery; or things which have some subverviency to happiness or misery; and in their generic and highest sense, they denote happiness and things which are conducive to happiness on the whole; and misery and things which are conducive to misery on the whole. Voluntary actions may all be distributed to one or other of these classes, and those which constitute happiness, or the means of happiness on the whole, be denominated good; and those which constitute misery, or the means of misery on the whole, be denominated evil. Having made this distribution of actions as good and evil, we cannot stop here, but are obliged to take another step, and distinguish a part of good actions from the rest as morally good, and a part of evil actions from the rest as morally evil. The question now is concerning the ground of this last generalization. What is the element which must be added to a good voluntary action, to make it morally good? And what is the corresponding element, which must be added to a bad voluntary action, to make it morally bad? What is there in the morally good voluntary action of a man, which is not in the same action when performed by an animal?

§ 317. The only difference conceivable, is one which has respect to the final cause or purpose of the action, as part of a scheme of general and permanent good, which is characteristic of the good moral agent, and the absence of this great idea, in the case of the not moral agent.

The tendency of the human mind to generalization leads the whole human race to generalize every class of its ideas. Among these ideas are those of natural good and evil, the objects of which are all referred to their respective classes. From ideas of partial good we deduce ideas of general good; from ideas of inferior good, those of superior good; from ideas of temporal good, those of eternal good; and so on. All these deductions terminate in ideas of the greatest possible good, embracing as its subjects one and all who comply with its essential conditions. The idea of the greatest possible good cannot be the good of one or a few, and cannot have any other limitations than those which are created by its essential conditions. It must, therefore, be the good of one consistently with that of all, and the good of all consistently with that of each; and also the good of the present consistently with that of the future, and inferior good in subordination to superior, and in consistency with the greatest possible degrees and amounts of good on the whole. Actions performed in pursuance of this greatest good are morally right; beings which are not capable of forming conceptions of this great object of moral action are not capable of performing morally good actions; and all moral actions which are performed on any other principle, than that of subserviency to the greatest good, or on any principle inconsistent with it, are morally wrong. They are wrong in their purpose and end, even when they are naturally good; but they generally agree in being both naturally and morally evil.

We thus arrive at a solution of the question concerning the nature of moral actions in general, and of right and wrong actions in particular, by the strictest methods of observation, analysis, and generalization. We find actions universally generalized, while the principles of this generalization have been subjects of dispute. All men have recognized the distinction of moral actions; and of right moral actions, and wrong moral actions; but great diversities and contrarieties of opinion have prevailed respecting the grounds of these distinctions and the precise qualities on which they depend.

Epicurean System of Virtue.

§318. Erroneous theories of virtue have generally been founded in theological errors. The ancient Epicureans, and some infidels in modern times, have made virtue consist in utility on the scale of the present life; and have regarded certain actions and certain systems of actions as virtuous, or otherwise, according as they are subservient to the temporal prosperity and happiness of men, or the reverse. This system excludes all consideration of a future state, and of an endless progression of good and evil, and furnishes no such thing as infinite and boundless good or evil to be objects of human regard. Its good is limited, partial, and uncertain; and its evil of the same character. The interests which it recognizes are conflicting and jarring interests, which bring men into inevitable collision and conflict with one another, and embrace no boundless, soul satisfying ob-. jects either of joy or sorrow, of hope or fear.

The.incorrectness of such a theory and its perfect inadequacy to give us any consistent system of virtue, or any certain and invariable principles of right and wrong, are too obvious to require comment. A system of Atheism is incompatible with any consistent and true system of virtue. If there is not a virtuous God, no practicable system of virtue is possible. There may be such a thing in theory, but there cannot be such a thing in fact.

Stoic System of Virtue.

$319. A more plausible, but scarcely less erroneous, theory of virtue, is that of the Stoics, who, without distinguishing between infinite and finite, universal and partial, temporary and permanent good, made virtue not the principle of the greatest happiness only, but the principle of all happiness, and denied that there was any good but

virtue.

The Stoic system did not separate happiness from virtue, but confounded it with virtue, making the cause and effect the same. This led to some inconsistences in their statements, and to apparent and real contradictions, and has been the occasion of their being often misunderstood. Cicero expounds the Stoic system both as a system of hap