1. States of a subject ;

2. Actions which terminate on other objects.

This classification corresponds to that of causes as subjective, and associate subjective and objective.

States and actions admit of being sub-divided into many different classes, the most important of which are physical and voluntary. A physical state or action is one which depends on the physical powers of the subject; and a voluntary state or action, one which depends on the will of the subject, and is produced directly by volition. Bodies are capable only of physical effects; minds are capable both of physical and voluntary ones. Besides the above divisions, effects, like causes, may be considered as subjective or objective; immediate and remote; concurring and exclusive; ultimate and subordinate.

CHAPTER XXI.

OBSERNATION, ANALYSIS, AND GENERALIZATION OF FACTS.

§ 291. Effects are generalized for the common purposes of reasoning, under the title of facts. Facts denote things to be observed and accounted for, and do not involve any theory concerning their nature, except that they are operations and manifestations of causes of some kind. They represent both actions and states of being, though the word originally denoted actions chiefly, in which there is the operation both of a subject which acts, and of an object which is acted upon. Thus sensations, thoughts, muscular actions, the motions of the earth and heavenly bodies, and the compositions and decompositions of bodies, with all the phenomena of life and motion, are facts.

§ 292. The first step to be taken in philosophical reasoning is the observation of facts; and all our conclusions depend ultimately on facts. From the observed facts of sensation we infer the existence of bodies; from the observed facts of consciousness, that of minds; and from the same facts, and others taken in connection with our previous conclusions, we infer all our knowledge. Our sensations and ideas are the first facts from which our reasonings com

mence; from these we discover other facts; and reason from them, to others still, indefinitely. The whole system of ideas is conditioned on facts. We have conceptions of time and space as necessary and eternal. We cannot be

mistaken in these conceptions. We know that there are such things as time and space; that there always have been such things; and that there always must be; and we regard these objects, therefore, as absolute, independent, unconditional, necessary, and eternal. We know that this is the nature both of time and space. But how do we know it? On what ground do we base these conclusions? What is the origin and reason of this faith? It seems to be supposed by some, that these ideas are a kind of innate furniture of the mind developed but not created; but philosophy cannot accept of such a hypothesis. She demands a reason for them, and that demand must be met. Considered as facts, the conceptions of time and space have the mind for their subjective cause, as all other conceptions do, and in this respect do not differ from other conceptions. Considered as ideas, a species of facts which relate to things, and which depend on specific conditions; these ideas have their specific conditions in previous and contemporaneous facts of sensation and consciousness; but considered as ideas which relate to real objects, and not to merely imaginary ones, they have conditions belonging to the category of reality, from which we infer their existence in the same way and on the same principle, that we infer the existence of any thing. From the facts of sensation and consciousness we infer, first, the existence of definite spaces and times, and from these we infer unlimited and unalterable extensions both of spaces and times. How then do we know the existence of space and time? We know it from sensations and consciousness, and from ideas dependent on these conditions. Are space and times objects of sensations and consciousness? Space and time are not objects either of sensation or consciousness; but are the objects of ideas inferred from sensations and consciousness. What then is the ground of our belief that there are any such things as space and time? The grounds of our belief that there are such things as space and time, are sensation's and consciousness. Are we absolutely certain then that there are such things as space and time? We are perfectly certain of the existence and reality of these objects, but not absolutely. Our perceptions of

them being conditioned on our sensations and consciousness, are not absolute, but relative. Their certainty is precisely equal to the certainty and reality of our sensations and consciousness. If these are in the least degree uncertain, then we have no certain knowledge whatever; and as these are the primary conditions of all our possible knowledge, certain knowledge is not possible or conceivable.

ter.

§ 293. It is worth while, therefore, to inquire accurately into the nature of the primary facts of human experience, in order to know whether there is any such thing as knowledge; and if there is, to determine precisely its nature and limits. These facts are briefly comprehended in sensations and consciousness. The great question concerning these is, are they real facts, or is it possible that they may be merely supposed ones? Here are two suppositions; one is, that the facts of human sensations and consciousness, which are the primary conditions of all ideas, and the primary grounds of all our judgments, comprehending the formation of our ideas of quantity, equally with those or reality, those of time and space equally with those of bodies and minds, are real; and the other is that they are imaginary. That they are real is the universal judgment of the human mind. But we cannot take the testimony even of universal reason as a sufficient ground for our faith in this fundamental matWe want the evidence on which that testimony is based; we demand not only what all men suppose themselves to know on this subject, but how they know it; and on what grounds they draw their universally agreeing conclusion? Is it possible, then, that the primary facts of sensations and consciousness can be entirely imaginary, and the primary deductions of reason false ? Is it possible that our sensations are not sensations, and not any thing? Is it possible that our consciousness is not consciousness, and is not any thing? Is it possible that the very question which we are now considering is not a question, and that the very thought which I now have is not a thought, and not any thing? Reason answers no. This supposition is not possible, it contradicts every idea of possibility. It is as true as truth can be; and as certain as certainty itself. Our experience, then, is a reality from which we ascend to all other realities, and the primary condition of all possible knowledge. It is an object of our knowledge, not of our opinions only, and serves as conditions of judgments, from

which we extend our discoveries indefinitely, both in space and time, and in the entire worlds of reality and possibility. Having established the validity of the primary facts of human experience, we infer that of all others, which are the legitimate objects of perception and judgment. Here, then, are objects and sources of knowledge, in numbers without

number.

§ 294. But, admitting the reality of sensations and consciousness, it has been argued by some, that the primary perceptions of bodies and minds, may be erroneous, on the ground that the primary facts from which we infer them being mere states of mind, God is able to produce them by a direct agency of his own, without any intervention of second causes. If, therefore, God can produce sensations without any instrumentality of sensible objects; sensations do not prove the existence of such objects; and the external world may be a mere figment of the imagination; and if God can produce sensations without minds to be their subjective causes, there may be no created minds; and for aught that we can know, the whole supposed universe of matter and minds may be resolved into one absolute cause, and be but manifestations of God, and consist of him alone. This is the doctrine of the Pantheists, and absurd as it seems, is held and taught by some of the ablest reasoners in modern times. It is not, therefore, a work of supererogation to inquire into it, and estimate the grounds on which it rests.

§ 295. Is God able to produce sensations by a direct agency of his own? Of this there can be no doubt. The denial of it would be in contradiction to all consistent ideas of God, and would be without the least rational foundation. The fundamental assumption of the Pantheists, therefore, must be admitted. God has power to produce any particular sensation, and all the sensations that ever occur, by a direct agency of his own, and without any intervention of second causes, he pleases; he also has power to produce all the other effects ascribed to matter, according to the same laws and in the same modes in which they are now produced. To account, then, for sensations, and for all the facts belonging to the material world, we have two theories. One is the common theory of matter as a created cause, differing from God, deriving its powers from him, and depending on him; and the other is the theory that God produces all these effects by direct exercises of his omnipotence, without any inter

vention of created objects. All the facts may be explained on either hypothesis; and that which refers them directly to God has the advantage of the greater simplicity. But does this supposition abolish the external world? Or does it resolve the external world into nothing, by resolving it into the Creator? Farthest possible from it. It not only recognizes an external world, but by resolving it into the Creator, it exhibits the creature matter as a manifestation of the Creator, and as involving an exercise of his transcendent powers, on the broad and sublime scale of the entire material universe. Does this resolution of the creature into the Creator, militate against any of the Divine attributes of wisdom and goodness? Not any. Does it conflict with the Scriptures? Not at all.

§ 296. But does the hypothesis that God produces all the phenomena of matter without any intervention of other substances prove that there is no such thing as matter? By no means. It only proves that on this supposition the phenomena of matter are manifestations of God, and that in these phenomena God is present and revealed in respect to the lowest known department of his infinite powers. Each body and each particle of matter, according to this theory, is a thing, constituted by a continual exercise of Divine power exerting the forces, which, according to the other theory, a second cause is supposed to exert. God, therefore, is in the thing and beyond it; and the sense in which he is in it, is in no degree derogatory to his Divine majesty, but the reverse. It makes creation an exhibition of God, and one which reveals him as the immediate, sole, and absolute cause of all the operations in the material world. We still therefore have a valid and real external world; and what we do not have on the other theory, we have a world revealing God as present, and operating, in all material objects, from floating atoms, to rolling oceans, and extended continents; and according to this theory we still have things, each of which is a separate part of creation, exercising valid powers, but the sole subjective cause revealed in all these things and operating in all, is God.

§ 297. But, how is it with sensations and ideas? Can God produce them without subjective causes different from himself? Is every sensation and every idea, an exercise of the Divine mind, and does it belong directly to the ultimate cause of all things, or do these exercises belong to agents