254. It has been commo: to requce ai analytical form. and som- nave operett of it on the principe of ET AL. JOW. ticulars, because a reasoning taunt principle. The fact 1, Nowele.

is founded of 10 prin [ Orain gau** ... sions from more genert

ing is founded on a шerer Tile EL. ALL differentiy.

In al reasoning howeve: DETUTURE' COLL. UNIJN ble of being verlie. SVETIF 1

The defect of this argument is, that the subject of the major premise is not a universal term, and does not comprehend that of the minor premise and conclusion, as a species or individual under it. Both the premises, therefore, may be true, and the conclusion false.

§ 252. The form of the syllogism which has been given in the above examples, admits of variation; but it involves all the principles of syllogistic reasoning, and all other forms which establish legitimate conclusions may, by a slight change, be reduced substantially to this. In analytical reasonings, either of the premises may be suppressed, and the conclusion inferred from the other, the suppressed premise being understood; as,

1. All moral beings ought to be good;

2. Therefore, men ought to be good; or,

1. Men are moral beings;

2. Therefore, men ought to be good

In the first of the above arguments the minor premise is omitted, and in the second the major premise. The argu ments, however, are valid, and the conclusion true, because the omitted premises can be easily supplied, and are com prehended in the real grounds of the conclusion.

§ 253. Another mode of error in analytical reasoning, consists in drawing conclusions not in argeement with the premises The following is an example of this:

1. Whatever is productive of pain is a natural evil;

2. Disgrace is productive of pain;

3. Therefore, we ought not willingly to expose ourselves to disgrace.

In this case the premises are both correct, but the conclusion is not in argument with them. The only proper conclusion from these premises is; therefore disgrace is a natural evil. Substituting that for the erroneous conclusion, the argument stands thus:

1. Whatever produces pain is a natural evil;

2. Disgrace is productive of pain;

3. Therefore disgrace is a natural evil.

If the premises are correct, and bear the proper relation to each other, and the conclusion is drawn in agreement with them, it must be true. If either, or both, the premises are incorrect, or if they do not sustain the proper relation to each other, they do not prove the conclusion.

§ 254. It has been common to reduce all reasoning to the analytical form, and some have objected to the explanation of it on the principle of higher and lower genera, and particulars, because all reasoning cannot be resolved on that principle. The fact is, however, that analytical reasoning is founded on the principle of drawing less general conclusions from more general ones; and that synthetical reasoning is founded on a different principle and must be resolved differently.

In all reasoning, however, particular conclusions are capable of being verified by comparing them with general rules of judgment. Thus we conclude that four quarters of a dollar make a dollar; by observing that the parts are equal to the whole; and we may fortify our conclusions in this and similar cases, by comparing them with the general judgment, that all the parts of any thing are equal to the whole. The analogy between particular and general judgments, has led many, in cases of this kind, to regard the particular judgment as an inference from the general one, on the principle of drawing a conclusion from major and minor premises. But a careful observation of the process of the human mind, in forming such judgments, will show that this is not the case. We judge that four quarters of an apple are equal to the whole, independently of any general judgments respecting the equality of a whole and its parts; and exercise judgments of this kind in regard to particular wholes, previous to forming any general judgments on the subject.

§ 255. Analytical reasoning is of great use in making our knowledge available for practical purposes; and without it we should not be able to have ideas at command to any considerable extent. It is a compendious mode of inferring a large number of less general truths, from more general ones, and of thus extending our knowledge and ideas indefinitely within the limits of all our general conclusions.

The objection sometimes urged against the theory of analytical reasoning as founded in generalization, that it gives us nothing new or valuable, but merely asserts of a class of objects, or a particular object, its place as belonging to some class to which it had been previously referred, is founded in a misapprehension of the nature of ideas. This may be shown by the following example:

1. All God's works are the effect of infinite wisdom and

goodness;

2. The creation of wild animals and insects is a part of God's works;

3. Therefore, the creation of wild animals and insects, is a work of infinite wisdom and goodness.

The major premise in the above argument expresses a judgment which is passed upon God's work, without going into an examination of each particular branch of them, and which is deduced from our most essential ideas of his moral character. The wisdom and goodness of the creation of wild animals and insects, do not clearly appear from our limited knowledge of the actual ends which they accomplish; but we deduce it with perfect clearness from the more general conclusion, that all God's works, whatever they may be, are of this character. The major premises expresses a general truth in which the mind acquiesces on the most substantial grounds, and which serves as a premise from which the particular one is deduced.

§ 256. A misapprehension on this point, and a neglect to distinguish properly between analytical and synthetical reasoning has led a late English writer to propose the following alteration in the form of the syllogism:

1. Attribute A is a mark of attribute B

2. Object D has the attribute A.

3. Therefore object D has the attribute B.

Translated into common language, and applied to the real objects of reasoning, this would read thus:

1. The attributes of virtue are a mark of the attributes of goodness;

2. Truth has the attributes of virtue;

3. Therefore truth has the attributes of goodness.

After the illustrations above given, the erroneousness of this exposition of the syllogism, cannot fail to be apparent. The principle of generalization, and that of inferring the less general from the more general, are matters of universal experience; and are placed beyond all reasonable question or controversy. On these principles the theory of Analytical reasoning has been generally based, ever since the time of Aristotle; and on them it must rest forever. This mode of reasoning is universal. It is pursued by all men, in all stages of life, and in respect to all classes of subjects; and is one of the main instruments for accomplishing the

suolime purposes of reason. All analytical arguments are syllogisms; all syllogisms have major and minor premises; all major premises predicate certain things of their subjects; all minor premises assert that the subject of the conclusion is comprehended in the subject of the major premise; and all conclusions infer that the predicate of the genus belongs to the species, or that of the species to the individual. When a syllogism is rightly constructed, and the conclusion correctly drawn, the truth of that conclusion is as certain as the truth of the premises. The syllogism provides, therefore, for the multiplication of correct ideas, and the extension of our knowledge, as far as propositions can be associated in the relations of major and minor premises. But the association of propositions in these relations corresponds to the perception of objects as generic and particular, which is characteristic, to a great extent, of all our thinking. It is as natural, therefore, to associate each subordinate genus with its higher genus, and to predicate of it all the properties of that genus, as it is to think; and the law of reasoning in this way, is one of the fundamental and universal laws of thought.

Classification of fallacies.

§ 257. The principal fallacies may be classed under the following heads:

1. The fallacy of an erroneous major premise ;

2. The fallacy of an erroneous minor premise;
3. The fallacy of both premises being erroneous;

4. The fallacy of inferring from the major premise, a conclusion concerning a subject not described by the minor premise; and not comprehend in the general object denoted by the subject of the major premise;

5. The fallacy of a conclusion different from that which is expressed by the major premise.

Examples of these fallacies have been given in the preceding illustrations, and may be multiplied indefinitely. They comprehend a vast amount of human errors, and are the occasion of infinite harm, both to the temporal and eternal interests of men.

§ 258. The only purpose of the minor premise, is to restrict us to a subject comprehended in that of the major premise. Our inference is from the major premise to the