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CHAPTER VIII.

NATURE AND USES OF KNOWLEDGE.

§ 120. Having determined the nature of judgments, we now proceed to the examination of knowledge. Judgments are divided into two classes, simple judgments and knowledge. Knowledge consists of judgments made familiar and easy by exercise, and has the same elements as simple judgments, except that their exercise is made easy by use and familiarity.

The habitual exercise of judgments leads to knowledge. Judgments and knowledge are used to a considerable extent to denote the same class of ideas; but they are most frequently distinguished from each other, and knowledge is most usually restricted to denote a particular classof judgments. Judgments that are formed and instantly dismissed, seldom or never to be recalled, are not usually reckoned as any part of our knowledge; while those that are often repeated, so as to become familiar and be capable of being repeated with ease on all suitable occasions, are uniformly distinguished by the title of Knowledge. Thus, a knowledge of Arithmetic or English Grammar, consists of ideas in respect to the principles and practice of those arts, which have been made familiar by repetition, so that they are easily suggested on all occasions which render them necessary.

§ 121. The ideas which constitute knowledge are generally distinguished from simple judgments by the title of cognitions. Knowledge is divided into Arts, Sciences, Professions, Trades and Pursuits of various kinds. The number of Arts and Sciences has been greatly increased in modern times, and is continually increasing; and at the same time the boundaries of each science are being continually enlarged. The attainment of knowledge commences in early infancy, and is prosecuted, to a greater or less extent, by most men, till the decline of the human faculties.

The effect of repeating ideas of judgment, and retaining them for a time in the mind, is to establish an increased aptitude to receive them. This aptitude to receive particular ideas depending on repetition, is in proportion to the

number of repetitions and the length of time during which the repeated ideas are distinctly entertained. Early exercise in forming habits of unremitted attention, and in disciplining the mind to think and acquire knowledge, tend powerfully to increase its facility of making these acquisitions. The principal modes of acquiring knowledge are by study and practice. It may, in most cases, be acquired, to a considerable extent, by study without practice, and to some extent by practice without study; but the most effectual means of acquiring it are by study and practice combined.

§ 122. The progress of different persons with the same application in the acquisition of knowledge, is very unequal; owing, partly, to different natural abilities, but still more to different habits of attention, arrangement, classification, and association of ideas, and different modes of application. With equal powers of learning, very different degrees of progress are often made, solely by different modes of application. Regular and systematic modes of application have decided advantages over irregular ones. The principal art of learning rapidly, is to learn thoroughly from the first. Some commence with learning a great number of principles and rules imperfectly, intending to perfect the knowledge of them as they advance. This is almost always injudicious. It is especially so in studying the elements and principles of any science. In the study of the liberal arts, persons are often so anxious to advance as to be strongly tempted to hurry over important principles without understanding them, and still more without making them familiar. The effect of this may be great apparent progress, but little real progress. It is a great disadvantage to go over a rich field of knowledge and not become possessed of its stores.

The multiplication and extension of the sciences in modern times present strong temptations to superficial scholarship. In their eagerness to learn every thing, persons sometimes fail to learn any thing properly. But it is much better to learn a few sciences thoroughly, than to understand many imperfectly. Perfect knowledge improves the mind, and greatly enlarges its powers. Imperfect knowledge accomplishes this object in a far less degree, if at all, and answers imperfectly any other useful purposes. The field of knowledge is so extensive, that persons must restrict themselves to limited portions of it. To explore the whole is impossible. It is the part of wisdom to select those por

tions of it which are most important for us, and to explore them thoroughly.

§ 123. The increased knowledge of modern times, and the increased facilities for the attainment of knowledge, are effecting great changes in human affairs. The branches of knowledge most important to be generally known are, Religion, Morality, the sciences and arts which belong to common schools, and some profession, trade or honest business, by which a person may, if need be, earn a comfortable support for himself and family. To this extent every human being ought to be well informed.

The acquisition of knowledge to any great extent is laborious, and requires much effort and self-denial. It requires many years to be devoted to study, and many sacrifices of pleasure to be made. But while it costs labors and sacrifices, it affords pleasure, both in the enjoyment of its objects and in its beneficial uses. The rational pursuit of knowledge is one of the highest and noblest of human pursuits, and is rewarded in the case of the advanced student both with distinguished pleasures and honors.

124. It is often said, that knowledge ought to be pursued mainly for its own sake, and for the pleasures which it affords, independently of any beneficial uses to which it is capable of being applied. But this is not true. Knowledge is not a suitable end of human actions; it is only a means to other nobler ends. The principal value of knowledge, like that of money, and other objects, consists in the uses to which it is capable of being applied. Mere knowledge is of little worth. Knowledge well used is of the greatest value. Knowledge ought to be loved and prized for the objects of delight which it reveals, for the enlargement of intellectual powers which it involves, and for all its beneficial uses both with respect to ourselves and others.

The diversities of character in respect to the facility and pleasure of acquiring knowledge, are objects of general remark. One has a taste for study, and loves it; another has no taste for it. One advances with ease and rapidity; another, with difficulty, and slowly. One learns mathematics easily, and with delight, and every thing else with difficulty, and with proportionably diminished satisfaction. Another has a decided taste for the study of languages, and cares little for any other department of knowledge. The taste of others incline them to chemistry and

the natural sciences, and in them alone they study with any considerable success. The reasons of these peculiarities are perhaps in some little degree natural, but they are chiefly accidental, depending in most cases on early impressions and early habits. Tastes for particular studies, like tastes for tobacco, come by use. Whatever study is properly entered upon by a young mind, and made the object of its frequent attention, will become to it an object of proportionable interest, and of preference to most other studies. Friendship for arts and sciences has an origin, in most cases, analogous to that for our fellow men. The arts that we are most familiar with, other things being the same, we love best.

§ 125. Knowledge is not permanent and imperishable. Like other things which have a beginning, it may have an end. What is learned and understood at one period of life, may be nearly or perhaps entirely lost at another. preserve knowledge, it must be kept in use.

To The moment

it ceases to be used, it begins to be impaired; and the longer that disuse continues, the more imperfect will it become, till at last it is nearly or entirely lost. Hence it often occurs, that persons who study particular arts and sciences in their youth, lose their knowledge of them in more advanced periods of life, to such a degree, as to be under the necessity of learning them again, if they have occasion to use them. The revival of past knowledge in such cases however, is generally much easier than the attainment of knowledge at first. The mind having familiarized itself with particular judgments once, seems never to lose altogether an increased facility for the attainment of those ideas again; and it often happens, that in learning anew a science or art which appeared to have been entirely forgotten, the parts which were difficult at first, become easy, and the progress of the student, which was slow and toilsome at first, becomes rapid and delightful. Knowledge is capable of being lost through the effect of paralysis and other diseases. In a few cases this loss has been sustained, while the powers of acquiring knowledge have been left unimpaired; and individuals have been obliged to commence anew the learning of their letters, after having once climbed to considerable elevations on the hill of science. Such occurrences, however, are rare, and the general rule is, that what is thoroughly learned once, is learned for life,

from others by the quality and perfection of their knowledge, still more than by its amount. Extensive knowledge is desirable and ought to be the object of continual pursuit, but perfection of knowledge, as far as it is attainable by created beings, is far the most desirable, and ought to be the object of proportionably the greatest regard. It is of vastly more use to know some things perfectly, than to know many things imperfectly. Perfection of knowledge ought to be earnestly pursued in the mechanical arts, in all branches of business and all departments of industry and learning, and especially in the departments of morality and religion.

130. In the accomplishment of our destinies we are thrown entirely upon our judgment and knowledge. Without any assistance from previous knowledge we may in many cases on an emergency, apprehend by a successful exercise of judgment the objects which we need to perceive in order to understand our duty and interest. But we cannot be sure of being able to do this. Even if we inform ourselves most accurately and most extensively we shall be liable sometimes to err. How then is it possible for us, without accurate knowledge to apprehend on all occasions the objects which it is our duty and interest to perceive, and according to which we ought to regulate our conduct! Knowledge of a few things puts the mind in intelligent correspondence with a few things; knowledge of many things puts the mind in intelligent correspondence with many things.

§ 131. We cannot have every part of an extensive fund of knowledge always in exercise, and it will often happen that what was necessary in one stage of life will cease to be necessary in others. Knowledge that we have no occasion to use, and are not likely to have in future, we may leave unexercised. That which is of some use to us at the time, or is likely to be of some use to us in future, we ought both to obtain and preserve. Here is an essential demand for the exercise of wisdom. We have not merely to determine what objects of our existing knowledge we will pursue, and what we will avoid; but we have to determine what knowledge we will obtain, with a view to the better prosecution of our duties and interests. We have to decide in a measure what we will know before knowing it, and with a view to benefits of which we cannot at the time form any definite conceptions.

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