veloped to the same extent. The whole experience of childhood and youth, and nearly all the pursuits of life, require the constant and vigorous exercise of judgment in determining from sensations the nature of material objects. Hence, powers of external perception are universally developed to a very high degree. Material things are continual objects of attention, and the power of observing and studying them with effect, obtains a proportionable development. But with the power of consciousness, the case is far different. Just in proportion as the attention is directed to objects without, and to mental phenomena considered only as symbols of such objects, it is withdrawn from objects within, and from mental exercises considered in any other relations, than those which they sustain to the external world. Hence, in the case of the great mass of men, the Faculty of consciousness is far less fully developed, than that of external perception. § 75. This imperfect development of the Faculty of consciousness in the case of most men is one of the principal impediments to the progress of Mental and Moral Science. Men whose other intellectual powers are fully developed, are so little practiced in observing their own thoughts and feelings, as to be utterly incapable of analyzing them correctly and determining their elements. The power of consciousness is the common property of all, but in the case of most, it slumbers in perpetual quietude and infancy. This is an error of injurious consequence, and leads to a defect of character which it belongs to wise and good men to remedy. The general system of education ought to be modified so as to meet the emergency which is thus created, and bring forward future generations to possess a completeness and perfection of intellectual character not heretofore generally attained. This is entirely practicable. All that is requisite for its accomplishment is to have the sciences of mind and morals systematically studied and taught, and to have pupils early and faithfully drilled in the art of thinking of their own thoughts and feelings. The same kind of discipline is requisite for this purpose which is requisite to develop capacities of mathematical or general reasoning, and will produce corresponding results.

tangible objects, that we seldom think of the sensations; and in our ordinary trains of thought, we seldom think of our thoughts, or have any distinct consciousness of them. They are present to our minds. If our attention is called to them, we think of them; otherwise they are suffered in multitudes of cases to pass without the least notice.

The idea that thoughts must be objects of actual consciousness, because they are in the mind, is without foundation in reason, and is contrary to facts in human experience. The representation of consciousness, therefore, as a necessary effect of sensations and ideas, is erroneous. Actual consciousness is not necessary in all the cases in which it is possible, any more than actual perceptions or any other class of actual judgments are always necessary, when they are possible. Consciousness is, to some extent, voluntary and not necessary. Some degree of the exercise of this power is universal, but the highest and most perfect exercises of it are restricted to few.

§ 73. We are conscious of mental exercises, not of the mind itself. Consciousness gives us no more knowledge of the mind, than sensations do of matter; and a knowledge of ourselves is not the immediate effect of consciousness, but of judgment. What is called by some self-consciousness, is self-judgment. We are conscious of pain, pleasure, and other sensations, also of ideas, affections, and acts of will. This consciousness is an intuitive knowledge of those mental exercises, and of nothing more. Having sensations, ideas, affections, and other mental exercises, we naturally begin to compare them with one another, and to reason from them. The effects of this reasoning are ideas both of ourselves, and of external objects. Ideas of ourselves are not given in acts of consciousness, as some suppose, but are inferred from them. In this respect they are analogous to ideas of external objects, which are inferred from sensations, but are not given in them. From sensations we commence our reasonsngs respecting material objects; from consciousness of sensations and of other mental exercises, we commence our reasonings respecting spiritual objects. The whole theory of the natural world is built on sensations; and the whole theory of the spiritual world, on consciousness.

§ 74. The mind's natural capacity for the exercise of consciousness, is similar to that for the exercise of judgment in the perception of material objects, but it is not usually de

veloped to the same extent. The whole experience of childhood and youth, and nearly all the pursuits of life, require the constant and vigorous exercise of judgment in determining from sensations the nature of material objects. Hence, powers of external perception are universally developed to a very high degree. Material things are continual objects of attention, and the power of observing and studying them with effect, obtains a proportionable development. But with the power of consciousness, the case is far different. Just in proportion as the attention is directed to objects without, and to mental phenomena considered only as symbols of such objects, it is withdrawn from objects within, and from mental exercises considered in any other relations, than those which they sustain to the external world. Hence, in the case of the great mass of men, the Faculty of consciousness is far less fully developed, than that of external perception. §75. This imperfect development of the Faculty of consciousness in the case of most men is one of the principal impediments to the progress of Mental and Moral Science. Men whose other intellectual powers are fully developed, are so little practiced in observing their own thoughts and feelings, as to be utterly incapable of analyzing them correctly and determining their elements. The power of consciousness is the common property of all, but in the case of most, it slumbers in perpetual quietude and infancy. This is an error of injurious consequence, and leads to a defect of character which it belongs to wise and good men to remedy. The general system of education ought to be modified so as to meet the emergency which is thus created, and bring forward future generations to possess a completeness and perfection of intellectual character not heretofore generally attained. This is entirely practicable. All that is requisite for its accomplishment is to have the sciences of mind and morals systematically studied and taught, and to have pupils early and faithfully drilled in the art of thinking of their own thoughts and feelings. The same kind of discipline is requisite for this purpose which is requisite to develop capacities of mathematical or general reasoning, and will produce corresponding results.

tangible objects, that we seldom think of the sensations; and in our ordinary trains of thought, we seldom think of our thoughts, or have any distinct consciousness of them. They are present to our minds. If our attention is called to them, we think of them; otherwise they are suffered in multitudes of cases to pass without the least notice.

The idea that thoughts must be objects of actual consciousness, because they are in the mind, is without foundation in reason, and is contrary to facts in human experience. The representation of consciousness, therefore, as a necessary effect of sensations and ideas, is erroneous. Actual consciousness is not necessary in all the cases in which it is possible, any more than actual perceptions or any other class of actual judgments are always necessary, when they are possible. Consciousness is, to some extent, voluntary and not necessary. Some degree of the exercise of this power is universal, but the highest and most perfect exercises of it are restricted to few.

§ 73. We are conscious of mental exercises, not of the mind itself. Consciousness gives us no more knowledge of the mind, than sensations do of matter; and a knowledge of ourselves is not the immediate effect of consciousness, but of judgment. What is called by some self-consciousness, is self-judgment. We are conscious of pain, pleasure, and other sensations, also of ideas, affections, and acts of will. This consciousness is an intuitive knowledge of those mental exercises, and of nothing more. Having sensations, ideas, affections, and other mental exercises, we naturally begin to compare them with one another, and to reason from them. The effects of this reasoning are ideas both of ourselves, and of external objects. Ideas of ourselves are not given in acts of consciousness, as some suppose, but are inferred from them. In this respect they are analogous to ideas of external objects, which are inferred from sensations, but are not given in them. From sensations we commence our reasonsngs respecting material objects; from consciousness of sensations and of other mental exercises, we commence our reasonings respecting spiritual objects. The whole theory of the natural world is built on sensations; and the whole theory of the spiritual world, on consciousness.

§ 74. The mind's natural capacity for the exercise of consciousness, is similar to that for the exercise of judgment in the perception of material objects, but it is not usually de

veloped to the same extent. The whole experience of childhood and youth, and nearly all the pursuits of life, require the constant and vigorous exercise of judgment in determining from sensations the nature of material objects. Hence, powers of external perception are universally developed to a very high degree. Material things are continual objects of attention, and the power of observing and studying them with effect, obtains a proportionable development. But with the power of consciousness, the case is far different. Just in proportion as the attention is directed to objects without, and to mental phenomena considered only as symbols of such objects, it is withdrawn from objects within, and from mental exercises considered in any other relations, than those which they sustain to the external world. Hence, in the case of the great mass of men, the Faculty of consciousness is far less fully developed, than that of external perception. § 75. This imperfect development of the Faculty of consciousness in the case of most men is one of the principal impediments to the progress of Mental and Moral Science. Men whose other intellectual powers are fully developed, are so little practiced in observing their own thoughts and feelings, as to be utterly incapable of analyzing them correctly and determining their elements. The power of consciousness is the common property of all, but in the case of most, it slumbers in perpetual quietude and infancy. This is an error of injurious consequence, and leads to a defect of character which it belongs to wise and good men to remedy. The general system of education ought to be modified so as to meet the emergency which is thus created, and bring forward future generations to possess a completeness and perfection of intellectual character not heretofore generally attained. This is entirely practicable. All that is requisite for its accomplishment is to have the sciences of mind and morals systematically studied and taught, and to have pupils early and faithfully drilled in the art of thinking of their own thoughts and feelings. The same kind of discipline is requisite for this purpose which is requisite to develop capacities of mathematical or general reasoning, and will produce corresponding results.