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ple, uniform, of particular tones, so that the different accords may be appropriately produced, and of particular definite measures or times. An ear and throat for music are to some extent natural endowments, but to a considerable extent, they are subject to cultivation, especially in early life. A musical ear requires good powers of hearing, and capacities to distinguish differences of tone and time readily, and to appreciate accords and discords. These capacities often exist, however, undeveloped and unknown, both to the possessor and others.

§ 42. Sounds, in serving as symbols of ideas, and elements of vocal language, are of the greatest conceivable importance, and the capacity to produce and distinguish them for this purpose, is one of our noblest faculties. The adaptation of different sounds, and different successions of sounds, to express particular emotions and passions, is one of the most wonderful achievements of Creative wisdom and goodness. That in all this, the mind is acted upon simply by vibrations of natural objects communicated to it by the air, through the ear, is truly wonderful.

Taste.

§ 43. The principal organ of taste is the tongue. The internal surfaces of the lips and cheeks, however, are supposed to share this susceptibility in some degree. The nerve of taste of the fifth pair terminates on the surface of the tongue in the form of small tubercles, beginning at the point, and extending to the throat. Several other nerves are distributed to the interior parts of the mouth, and probably concur in producing sensations of taste. The salivary glands facilitate the exercise of taste by the secretion of saliva, which serves as a solvent of solid bodies. When the mouth becomes dry, taste is not easily exercised.

§ 44. Bodies capable of producing sensations of taste are called sapid, and tastes are sensations produced by sapid bodies. In order to be fully tasted, substances must be retained some little time in the mouth; and when swallowed or rejected immediately, are not fully tasted. Tastes, like other sensations, are states of mind produced by means of the organ adapted to this purpose, but like other sensations, they are usually referred to the substances by which they are produced, and are the occasion of corresponding proper

ties being attributed to those substances. The principal varieties of tastes are those of sweetness, bitterness, sourness, and the like; and substances which produce them are conceived of as sweet, bitter, or sour. Sweetness, however, is not in the object which produces this class of sensations, but in the mind alone. All that belongs to the object is the capacity of producing this class of sensations. The same is true of objects conceived of as bitter, sour, and of other tastes. Tastes assist us in judging of the quality of our food and drink, and contribute by the agreeableness of those usually produced by proper articles of food and drink, to secure our taking such supplies as are needful for the preservation of our lives and health.

Smell.

$45. The organ of smell is the interior surface of the nostrils and other cavities connected with them. The olfactory nerve terminates in these cavities, and is divided into numerous filaments, and distributed abundantly to the upper portions of them. Smell is the effect of particles of matter contained in the air, and drawn through the nostrils on its way to the lungs. The nostrils are generally moistened with their nasal mucus, which arrests particles of matter contained in the air as they pass over it, and retains them till their effect on the organ of smell is produced. Sensations of smell are analogous to those of taste, and in many cases assist us in ascertaining the quality of our food, previous to tasting it, and in ascertaining the quality of the air.

PART SECOND.

PHILOSOPHY OF IDEAS.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE AND CLASSIFICATION OF IDEAS.

$46. Ideas are perceptions of objects, real or supposed. Ideas of bodies, minds, actions, qualities, relations, time and space, quantity and number, are of this descsiption. The subjects which exercise ideas are minds; and the conditions of their exercise are sensations, other ideas, emotions, affections, desires, and acts of will. The first condition of the exercise of ideas in this life, is that of sensations which are the occasion of all our perceptions of material objects. Without sensations, the attainment of the first idea would be impossible. Thinking commences with sensations as points to reason from; and having commenced, is capable of proceeding, both from sensations and from previous ideas. Ideas agree with sensations in being states of mind, and also in occupying time; but they differ from them in not possessing intensity, in the manner of their occurrence, and in the purposes which they answer. sations are more or less intense; ideas are not intensive; sensations are produced by organic impressions on the body; ideas, by sensations and other exercises; sensations serve as means of knowledge and conception; ideas constitute knowledge and conceptions. In the order of their occurrence, sensations are first and subordinate; ideas, second and superior. Had we been created incapable of sensations, and in other respects as we now are, we never could have had ideas. The sphere of ideas begins where that of sensation ends, and is bounded on the other side by the sphere of the emotions, affections, desires, and will, occupying an intermediate position between sensations and the emotions.

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§ 47. Ideas are described by some as the representations or images of things. This cannot be true. It is inconceivable that the immense diversity of things which are objects of ideas, should have any proper represensations or images of them in the mind. Ideas, therefore, do not represent things, but merely correspond to them as signs to things signified. Ideas of numbers are states of mind corresponding to numbers; those of bodies are states of mind corresponding to bodies; and those of minds, are states of mind corresponding to minds. The same is true of others. All ideas are states of mind corresponding to their objects.

Farther than this, in respect to the essence of ideas, we have no means of judging. To the eye of superior intelligences, they may be known as certain states of spiritual substances, and may be objects of direct perception as such, but they are known to us only as ideas, and are objects of our perception only by means of consciousness taking note of our own ideas; and visible or audible signs indicating the ideas of others.

Considered without respect to their objects as being real or supposed, ideas are denominated conceptions; considered with respect to the grounds from which they are inferred, they are denominated judgments; considered with respect to their objects, they are denominated truths and errors; and considered with respect to the mind, as possessing and exercising them at will, they are denominated knowledge and opinions, and also thoughts and notions.

Classification of Ideas.

§ 48. One of the first things to be done in the investigation of ideas, is to divide and classify them properly. Any essential mistake on this point is liable to involve us in the greatest errors, and to produce the utmost confusion of ideas. It is our business in classifying ideas, to observe them accurately, and to take account of their real properties, without adding to them or subtracting from them. Every addition and subtraction by which we misconceive of different classes of ideas, will contribute to vitiate all our conclusions respecting them. Ideas are classified, like other objects, according to their agreements and disagreements. As far as they agree, they are to be referred to the same classes; as far as they disagree, they are to be referred to different classes.

Ideas all agree in the properties by which they are distinguished from sensations and other mental exercises; but they are the subjects of considerable diversities in other respects.

$49. The highest generic division of ideas is that which resolves them into two classes, according as their objects. are real or imaginary. All ideas of real objects may be referred to one class, and those whose objects are in some degree imaginary, to another. Ideas of real objects are denominated truths; those of imaginary objects, errors and imaginations. Truths are of two kinds; particular, and general. Particular truths relate to particular objects; general truths, to classes of objects. Particular truths correspond to particular objects; general truths, to classes of objects.

Ideas of imaginary objects may be divided into errors and imaginations. Errors are of two kinds, embracing, 1. Ideas which are simply false; 2. Such as are absurd. Ideas are simply false, when they relate to objects which are not real, but which are conceivable, and not inconsistent with absolute universal truths. Any error in history or chronology is simply false, when the event to which it refers is conceivable. The idea that a whole is greater or less than the sum of all its parts, is absurd, because it is contrary to the absolute universal truth that the whole is equal to the sum of all its parts.

§ 50. Ideas of sensations, of ideas, and of other mental states, at the time of having those states, are denominated acts of consciousness; and we are said to be conscious of their objects. Thus we have the sensations of touch, and are conscious of touch; we have sensations of pain, and are conscious of pain; we form ideas of external objects, and are conscious of ideas; we form ideas of spiritual objects, and are conscious of them; and we feel emotions of pleasure or pain, and are conscious of them. The objects of consciousness are sensations, ideas, and other mental exercises occurring at the time; and acts of consciousness are ideas of those objects depending directly upon them. We perceive external objects by means of sensations, but we perceive sensations directly, without the intervention of any other state of mind.

Those ideas which occur agreeably to some principle of association or suggestion on account of having been enter

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