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other classes, and complex sensations may be resolved into simple ones; but simple sensations are ultimate objects of thought, and ultimate facts in experience, which can be known only by being felt, and which can be described only by being referred to their appropriate agents, organs, objects, and uses. To understand colors, we must see; to understand sounds, we must hear; and to understand the other sensations, we must experience them. But having had experience of any class of sensations in some degree, we may attain ideas of other classes and other varieties of them, by reasoning.

The different classes of sensations form one beautiful and harmonious system of things, to be observed, considered and reasoned from. With them, knowledge, not opinion, merely commences. We feel pain, henceforth pain becomes a fact in our experience, and an object of our knowledge. We know both that there is such a thing, and that we have felt it, and may feel it again. We experience the sensations of color, and henceforth understand that there are such things as colors. So of all the other sensations. In reasoning from our sensations we may fall into errors; but the sensations themselves, from which our reasoning commences, are matters of the utmost certainty.

§ 5. How the mind is affected in sensations, or what the nature of the mind is, other than that of a being capable of sensations and ideas, it does not fall within the purpose of this chapter to inquire, and it may not be possible fully to determine. We confine our views for the present, to sensations considered simply as ultimate facts in the experience of sentient beings, and as certain states of the mind.

The first sensation in the experience of a sentient being, is the commencement of intellectual life. With it consciousness begins; and from it the acquisition of knowledge and the play of imagination commences. Sensation after sensation follows, drawing after it thought after thought; and introducing the rational mind to a knowledge of itself and of the external world; and launching it forth on broad oceans of experiment in the pursuit of boundless good.

§ 6. Sensations may be considered as possessing quality and quantity. The quality of sensations is that which is peculiar to them as a generic class of mental phenomena; and which distinguishes each class of sensations from others. It is therefore incapable of definition, and can only be de

MORAL CHARACTER OF GOD.

252

ness. 372. Existence of natural evil.

373. Existence of

sin. 374. Relation of God to the sins of his creatures.
375. Punishment of sin. Its nature and ends. 376. Final
condition of the lost. Doctrine that God is love.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

PHILOSOPHY OF WAKEFULNESS AND SLEEP.

§ 377. Wakefulness and sleep. 378. Wakefulness. 379. Physical conditions attendant on sleep. 380. Nature and causes of sleep. Lethargy. 381. Time requisite for sleep. 382. Manner in which sleep oocurs. 383. Refreshment in sleep. 384. Unnecessary sleep. 385. Voluntary control of sleep and wakefulness.

CHAPTER XXIX.

PHILOSOPHY OF DREAMS.

§ 385. Dreams. 387. Causes of dreams.

388. Conceptions and

judgments, how mistaken for perceptions. 389. Theory of
dreams. 390. Prophetic dreams.

CHAPTER XXX.

PHILOSOPHY OF SOMNAMBULISM.

391. Somnambulism. 392. Its more aggravated forms. 393. Relation of somnambulism to insanity, and its leading phenomena. 394. Mesmeric sleep. 395. Mode of its production. 396. Peculiar element of somnambulism. 397. Its resemblance to other paroxysmal desires. Clairvoyance.

CHAPTER XXXI.

PHILOSOPHY OF INSANITY.

398. Species of insanity, melancholy and hypocondriacism. 399. Monomania. 400. Mania. 401. Nature of insanity. 402. Cure. 403. Derangement of the affections, and other phenomena of insanity. 406. Generalization of mental derangement.

CHAPTER XXXII.

NATURE AND OFFICE OF REASON.

407. Faculty of reasoning. 408. Demand for reasoning. 409. Reason of animals; of men. 410. Common sense. 411. Reasoning on common affairs. 412. Improvement of this faculty. 413. Conscience. 414. Discoveries and Philosophical genius.

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276

280

287

293

PART THIRD.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE EMOTIONS, AFFECTIONS AND WILL.

CHAPTER I.

ORIGIN, NATURE, AND OFFICE OF EMOTIONS.

415. Emotions. 417. Emotions compared with sensations. 418. Power of experiencing emotions. 421. Mode of exercising and improving the capacity of experiencing emotions. 422. Effect of association. 423. Complex emotions. 424. Illustration of the emotions. 425. Variety and ends of the emotions.

CHAPTER II.

PRINCIPAL VARIETIES OF THE EMOTIONS.

427. Principal orders of emotions. 428. Emotions relating to the beautiful. 429. Beauty of visible objects. 430. Relation of beauty to love. 431. Emotions relating to the sublime. 432. Mirth. 433. Emotions relating to novelty. 434. Triteness. 435. Emotions relating to happiness. 436. Emotions relating to intentional benefits and injuries; regret.

CHAPTER III.

THE AFFECTIONS.

437. Basis of the affections. 438. Conditionality of affections. 439. Moral character. 440. Love and hatred. 441. Pleasurable nature of love, and painful nature of hatred. 442. Nature of hatred. 443. Self-love. 444. Selfishness. 445. Domestic and social affections. 446. Love of God. 447. Capacity of the affections subject to modification. 448. Hope and fear. 449. Nature universality and objects of hope and fear.

CHAPTER IV.

PHILOSOPHY OF DESIRES.

450. Nature of desires. 451. Co-existence of desires. 452. Relation of desires to ideas. 453. Desires of knowledge. 454. Desires of wealth. 455. Desires of esteem. 456.

Desires of power. 457. Desires of superiority. 458.

Desires of continued existence. 459. Desires of happi-
ness to others. 460. Desires of unhappiness to others.
461. Limitations of the desire of unhappiness to others.

301

309

315

328

CHAPTER V.

IS MISERY IN ANY CASE AN OBJECT OF DELIGHT?

462. Objects of pleasure and pain. 463. Punishment of children. 464. Punishment of malefactors. 465. Revenge and retaliation. 467. Growth of revenge. 468. Conclusion. 469. Practical consequences. 470. Doctrine of the Scriptures. 471. True nature of revenge.

CHAPTER VI.

NATURE AND EXERCISES OF THE WILL.

§ 472. The will. 473. Choices. 474. Rational nature of choices. 475. Effect of immoderate appetites and affections on choices. 476. Moral character of choices. 477. Purposes. 478. Conditions of purposes. 479. Necessity of correct judgments. 480. Office and moral character of purposes. 481. Volitions. 482. Voluntary corporeal action. 483. Voluntary mental exercises. 484. Relation of volitions to desires.

CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL LAWS OF THE WILL.

$485. Influence of choices. 486. Mutual influence of the will and other mental faculties. 487. Limitation of the capacity of willing. 488. Office of good and evil. 489. Disagreement of the will with general judgments. Will of animals. 490. Free actions. 491. Necessary actions.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONDITIONALITY OF THE WILL.

492. Dependence of the will on ideas of possible good or
evil. 493. Proof from experience. 494. The only possi-
ble incitements to choice. 495. Proof of the dependence
of choices. 496. Motives. 497. Supposed testimony of
consciousness; necessity. 498. Authorship of sin. 499.
Tyranny. 500. fatalism. 501. Conclusion. 502. Influ-
ence of the greatest perceived good. 503. Scripture evi-
dence. 504. Absurdity of the contrary hypothesis. 505.
Prevalence of the true faith. 506. Inconsistency of skep-
ticism. 507. Foreknowledge of actions. 508. Progress

of truth.

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346

359

365

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