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species or genus. Every affirmation, therefore, is an instance of classification comprehending an individual under a species, and a simple affirmation is the symbol of a single thought; consquently thought regards an object as an individual, and as of some class of individuals.

§ 154. Sentences which are not simple affirmations, but which express causes and effects, require a different analysis. Of these the following may serve as examples: The house decays. The house denotes a unit; decays denotes a change or effect of which that unit is the subject. In this case the entire thought consists of house, not comprehended under a genus, but being the subject of a change expressed by decays. House is one thing, decays is another, and the sentence is an affirmative judgment, not that house is a part of decays, but is the subject of decays. In this kind of sentences we do not think of things as individuals and species, but as causes and effects.

A good man loves his duty. A good man denotes an individual; loves denotes a state of which that individual is the subject, and duty an object of that state. A good man is viewed as a subjective cause, his duty as the objective cause, and loves as the effect. In this case there is no comprehension of individuals under a species; and no ideas of objects as having individual and generic properties; but an idea of one object as a subjective cause; of another, as an objective cause; and of another, as an effect of their joint conditionality.

§ 155. We thus arrive at two independent modes of thinking; one of which regards all objects as particular and generic; and the other regards all objects as causes and effects; or as subjects and objects, and their states or conditions. It has been common to resolve these two kinds of sentences in the same way, and to view them as only different modes of generalization. But the method given above is evidently the true one; and thoughts of things, as causes and effects, are just as original, and simple states of mind, as thoughts of things as units of one order, and parts of units of other orders, or as individuals and species. Spoken language consists of combinations of sounds; and and written language of combinations of words expressive of ideas. We commence associating sounds and ideas as soon as we begin to understand conversation; and we commence associating words and ideas as soon as we learn to

read. In respect to words in frequent use this association is intimate and uniform, and things are seldom thought of without accompanying thoughts of their names; and names seldom thought of, without accompanying thoughts of the things which they represent.

§ 156. The exact manner in which language expresses ideas is surprising, but not strange. Ideas are the pattern after which language has been made; and the copy has been thousands and thousands of times compared with the original and corrected by it. Besides the general conformity of language to the general laws and modes of thought, we observe a particular conformity of the language of different persons to their particular habits of thought. Those who think clearly, speak and write clearly; those who think loosely, speak and write loosely; and almost all varieties in men's modes of thought are represented in their modes of expression.

Every man's writings not only represent the general modes of thought common to the human mind; but the particular varieties of them which characterize individuals. To such an extent is this the case, that we imperceptibly acquire by studying the writings of original and powerful thinkers, their peculiar habits of thought.

§ 157. While language generally assists our thinking, it is in some respects a disadvantage; and all rapid and powerful thinking relates to things directly without any intervention of words. The mind goes from thought to thought, and from object to object, without any respect to words, and the suggestion of the appropriate words for expressing our thoughts depends on the thoughts. The main object of attention to public speakers is thoughts; the same is true of writers. Language follows the thoughts, and is chiefly suggested by them; but it not unfrequently happens while thoughts suggest thoughts directly, and language indirectly, that the language accompanying an existing thought suggests another thought which would not otherwise have occurred; and that, others still; and thus turns the course of our thoughts into new channels.

§ 158. Thoughts ought to be associated with words for purposes of expression, for our own future use, and for that of others. This association ought to be so intimate, that when we wish to express our thoughts, the appropriate words will be instantly suggested. Otherwise, thoughts may

occupy the mind exclusively, without words. The association of thoughts in trains, together with appropriate words for expressing them as they occur in all rapid and powerful extemporaneous speaking are truly wonderful. The gradual progress which the mind makes, both in learning to think consecutively and rapidly, and to express its thoughts without interrupting them, and diverting its attention from their objects, are among the most surprising and extraordinary of all the human powers. Some learn to do this to a much greater extent than others. Most may learn it to a sufficient extent to answer well all the practical purposes of such powers, if they begin in season, and prosecute the attainment of this capacity in a proper manner. It requires to be prosecuted both by study and practice.

CHAPTER XI.

THEORY OF COMMON AND PROPER NAMES, AND OF IDEAS OF SPECIES AND GENERA.

§ 159. Language may be considered in two points of view; first, as a collection of symbols representing ideas; secondly, as a collection of symbols representing things which are the objects of ideas. As ideas are the intellectual symbols of things, language in representing ideas must of course denote the things to which ideas relate. Man denotes the creature man, according to the idea which is formed of him by the human mind; time denotes the thing time; space, the thing space; and virtue and vice denote virtue and vice. The great end of thinking is to bring us into intelligent relations to the objects of thought; that of language is the expression of thought. The thoughts which it expresses, are ideas of objects. Having been formed to represent ideas, and as far as possible to correspond to all the shades and objects of thought, and having been gradually improved and modified by the judgment of millions and of ages, it is brought to a degree of perfection among civilized and enlightened nations, which is truly astonishing.

A single word is applied to denote a thing, as a unit of any particular kind, as a man, an animal, a mineral, an idea;

and all the properties of objects are so many things of other kinds denoted by other words. In representing things by words, two methods are conceivable; first, that of having different symbols to denote every thing; secondly, that of having different symbols to denote the different kinds of things, and repeating and combining them so as to make them have a due correspondence to the things which they represent. A language that should have different symbols to represent every thing, and admit no common names, would not correspond to things, or ideas of things, in representing them as species and genera. But things exist as species and genera; and ideas relate to them, considered as possessing generic properties; language, therefore, must recognize these facts by a system of common names, to denote similar objects and common properties.

160. Most objects of thought are more or less complex, and possess properties which belong to them in common with other objects. Every conceivable quantity possesses elements which are common to it, and all other quantities; and every conceivable cause possesses elements which are common to it, and all other causes. Nouns, both common and proper, denote things as the direct and principal objects of thought. The same is true of pronouns. Adjectives denote the qualities or properties of things; as, virtue is good; goodness is a quality of virtue. In the first of these sentences, good expresses a quality of virtue, common to it and other objects; in the second, goodness denotes a thing which is the principal object of thought. A comnon noun is applicable to different objects, and denotes them as the subjects of the same properties. All common names are descriptive of the objects which they denote, and describe them as possessing certain properties common to them and other objects. The same is true of all generic appellatives which express the qualities of objects. In this respect common nouns and adjectives agree. Ideas of abstract qualities, such as whiteness, sweetness, goodness, and the like, have as valid objects as any other class of ideas; and words which denote such objects, refer to them as individual objects, and as possessing generic properties of different orders.

161. The relation of subjects to their operations and states of being, are denoted by verbs; as, I love, he loves, they love, men love; I think, he thinks, men think. The states and operations denoted by verbs, are similar to those

of nouns, except that they are considered with direct relation to their subjects. I love, denotes the action love considered in its relation to the person I, as a state or act of that person. The noun love, denotes the action or state of love, without respect to the person who exercises it. Verbs agree with their corresponding nouns in the generic character of the states and operations which they express. Their peculiar office, however, is to express causality. In the expression, I love, he loves, men love; love is expressed not as a thing considered absolutely, nor mainly as a thing possessing generic properties of any particular order, but as the state or effect of causes denoted by the words I, he, and men. When we wish to express these states of a subject as things of different generic orders, we represent them by nouns; but when we wish to express them in their fundamental relations, as the states or operations of subjective causes, we represent them by verbs. Verbs, nouns, and pronouns, correspond, therefore, to the leading categories of reality and quantity; verbs, expressing states and operations as effects of subjective causes; and nouns, denoting both causes and effects considered as the subjects of particular and generic properties. The relation of active verbs to their objects, is similar to that of all verbs to their subjects; the object being a concurring objective cause to the effect; as, good men love goodness; wise men love wisdom.

§ 162. All ideas of the properties of objects, have respect to them as identical in successive periods of time, and as diverse from other properties. This is true of the resistances, attractions, and other phenomena of material objects. The same objects are known as the subjects of several different properties, and different objects as the subjects of similar properties. This, is the case with different particles of matter, different bodies, different minds, and different ideal objects.

We observe one body, and ascertain several of its properties; and then observe another, and ascertain several of its properties. We then compare the properties of the two, and ascertain their relation to each other, as similar or dissimilar. Those which are similar, we call by similar names, and those which are different, by different names. A particular phenomenon of one body, we call attraction; similar phenomena of others, we call by the same name. So of repulsion and other phenomena. That which is the sub

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