voluntary means. The main regulations for the universities were effected by the ministry of De Theux, 1835; but the organisation of intermediate instruction (that is, between the Ecoles Primaires and the universities) was postponed, as involving some delicate party interests, until 1850; and even then was not concluded in a way satisfactory to the Catholic clergy.

In 1838, it seemed as if Holland and B. were likely to engage in war once more. According to the twenty-four articles' of the 'Definitive Treaty,' B. was under obligation to give up Limbourg and a part of Luxembourg during the above-mentioned year. This it now refused to do, and put its army on a war-footing; but its obstinacy finally gave way to the unanimous decision of the five great powers.

After 1840, the opposition of the Catholic to the Liberal party became more and more decided. The elections of June 8, 1841, were attended with great excitement, and it was a significant fact, that the liberal candidates re-elected were everywhere returned by large majorities, while in the principal towns where Catholics were returned, only small majorities appeared. Meantime, however, commerce progressed under a wise and liberal policy.

In July 1845, the liberal Van de Weyer, at the head of a new administration, endeavoured to confirm the so-called 'union' of Catholics and Liberals. But he had scarcely asserted the prerogative of the civil power in matters pertaining to the question of education in the intermediate schools, when he was forsaken by his colleagues, who acted under the influence of the Catholic priesthood. In March 1846, a purely Catholic ministry was formed under the presidency of De Theux. This was an anachronism, for the elections of 1845 had secured a victory

for the Liberals.

The elections of 1847 at last brought to a close the system of government in subservience to the church. A new liberal ministry was formed by Rogier and others, whose programme of policy promised the maintenance of the independent civil authority in all its subordinate functionaries; a budget favourable to the public with regard to duties on provisions; and measures to promote the interests of agriculture. The institution of numer ous agricultural and commercial schools, normal ateliers, popular libraries, and other means used for raising the working-classes, were followed by most beneficial results. The revolutionary tempest of 1848, however, menaced the tranquillity of the country; but the king, at the outbreak of the catastrophe in France, promptly declared himself ready to retain or to surrender the crown of B. according to the decision of the people. This frank and ready declaration had a successful result in strengthening the party of order, while it disarmed

even those most disaffected to the crown.

In July 1848, the result of the elections was found to be a great strengthening of the liberalconstitutional party. In November 1849, a new commercial treaty for ten years was concluded with France, and the duration of the treaty with

the German Zollverein was lengthened. In the session of 1850, the educational question was at last disposed of. During the last decade, the Liberal party has, on the whole, steadily increased in

numbers and influence. The most recent elections incontestably prove this, the Liberals being nearly two to one, and their majorities coming from the principal towns in the kingdom.

Nothomb's Travaux Publics en Belgium (Bruss. 1839); Statistique de la B., by the same author (1848); Juste, Histoire de B. (3d ed., Bruss. 1850); Popliment, La B. depuis l'an 1830 (Bruss. 1850).

BELGORO'D (Russian, Bejelgorod, 'White Town'), a town of 12,000 inhabitants, in the Russian government of Koursk. It is situated on the Donetz, in lat. 50° 40′ N., long. 36° 35′ E. B., which derives its name from a chalk-hill in the vicinity, is divided into two-the old and the new towns. It is built chiefly of wood, is an archbishop's see, has numerous churches, two monasteries, manufactories of leather, soap, &c., and carries on a considerable trade in wax, bristles, and hemp. Three important fairs are held here during the year.

BELGRA'DE, the ancient Singidunum, styled by the Turks Darol-Jihad, the House of the Holy fortified and commercial town, capital of Servia. It War,' and in German, Weissenburg, is an important is situated at the confluence of the rivers Save and Danube. The name B. is derived from the Slavonic bielo, 'white,' and grad or grod, a 'fort' or 'town.' B. contains about 30,000 inhabitants, and is divided into four parts-the fortress, a very strong place, which, situated on the tongue of land between the rivers, commands the Danube; the Water Town, also well protected by walls and ditches, on the north; the Raitzen Town on the west; and the Palanka on the south and east of the citadel. B. contains fourteen mosques, of which the principal one is in the citadel. Here the pasha, of three horse-tails,' has his residence. Vessels navigating the Danube anchor between the three islands above Belgrade. B. has manufactories of arms, cutlery, saddlery, silk goods, carpets, &c., and is the seat of the trade between Turkey and Austria. The of the chief Servian authorities. It is the entrepôt position of B. has made it the chief point of comand the key to Hungary on the south-east. It has munication between Constantinople and Vienna, consequently been the scene of many hard contests. The Greeks held it until 1073, when it was captured After this, it by the Hungarian king, Salomon. Bosnians, and Servians, and these last proprietors passed through the hands of Greeks, Bulgarians, sold it, in the beginning of the 15th c., to the Emperor Sigismund. In 1442, it was unsuccessfully besieged by the Turks, with a large and vain outlay of time and money; and when stormed (July 14, of Hunyades and Capistrano. In 1522, it was 1456), was retaken from the Turks by the heroism carried by the Sultan Soliman II. In 1688, it was stormed and taken by Maximilian, Elector of Bavaria; but in 1690 was recaptured by the Turks, when the Christian garrison had been reduced to 500 men. In 1693, B. was vainly besieged by the Duke of Croy; and in 1717, the citadel surrendered to Prince Eugene, after he had defeated an army of 200,000 Turks, with a loss to them of 20,000 men. But in 1739, B. again changed owners, the Turks the treaty then signed, the fortifications were demolobtaining it without a shot. In conformity with under General Laudon; but by the treaty of peace, ished. In 1789, it was again taken by the Austrians 1791, was restored to the Turks, and-excepting a temporary possession of 7 years, from 1806 to 1813, by the insurgent Servians-has, since that time, remained in subjection to Turkey. By the peace of tain in B. a garrison of 3000 men. During the Adrianople (1829), the Porte was allowed to mainCrimean war, the defences were strengthened, and the garrison largely increased.

BE'LIAL, or, more accurately, Belial, a Hebrew word, signifying idle, wicked, or unprofitable. The scripture phrase, therefore, 'Sons of B.,' was originally, in all probability, a mere Hebrew figurative expression denoting worthless or dissolute persons. At a later period, the idea of evil which the word embodies, seems to have been elaborated into a

personality, and B. is supposed by some to correspond to the Pluto of the Greeks.

BELIEF. This is a word sufficiently intelligible in common speech; but, nevertheless, various subtle problems and protracted controversies have been connected with it. A brief account of the chief of these may be here given.

1. It has been a matter of no small difficulty with mental philosophers, to give an exact rendering of the state of mind so denominated, or to specify the exact import, test, or criterion of the act of believing. It is easy enough to comprehend what is meant by an idea or a notion, as when we speak of having the idea of a rose, its shape, colour, odour, &c. ; but when we make the further step of affirming our belief in the sweetness of the rose, it is not so easy to describe the exact change that has come over the mind in so doing. In all belief, there must be something intellectual, something thought of, or conceived by the mind; and hence there has been a disposition to recognise the believing function as one of the properties of our intelligence. We believe that the sun will rise and the tides flow to-morrow: here are undoubtedly implied intellectual conceptions of the sun, his rising, and of to-morrow; of the sea, its movements, and so on. But the question comes, what is the difference between conceptions believed in as these are, and conceptions quite as clear and intelligible that are not believed? as the notion that the fluctuation of the sea on the shores of Britain is the same as on the shores of Italy. It is not to the purpose to say, that in the one case we have knowledge and evidence, and not in the other; for what is wanted is to define the change that comes over us, when what is a mere notion or supposition passes into a conviction; when a day-dream or hypothesis comes to take rank as truth.

To answer this inquiry, we must bring in a reference to action; for although belief connects itself with our intelligence, as now mentioned, it has action for its root and ultimate criterion. Coming up to the edge of a frozen lake, and looking at the thickness of the ice, we believe that it will bear to be trodden on, and accordingly walk across it. The meaning or purport of the believing state here is, that we do not hesitate to trust our safety to the fact believed. The measure of our confidence is the measure of our readiness to act upon our conviction. If the frozen lake lie between us and our destination, we feel elated by the certainty of arriving there, which we should not under a weak or imperfect trust in the goodness of the ice. Belief, therefore, although embodied in ideas, or intellectual conceptions, is in reality a moral power, operating on our conduct, and affecting our happiness or misery. Belief in coming good cheers us almost as much as if it were already come; a like strength of conviction of approaching evil is to the same degree depressing; 'the devils believe, and tremble.' These two tests-readiness to act according to what we believe, and influence on the mental tone -effectually separate the state in question from mere notions, fancies, or suppositions, unaccompanied with credence. We have firm confidence in the food we eat being able to nourish us; we exert ourselves to procure that food, and when we feel hungry, and see it before us, we have the mental elation arising from a near and certain prospect of relief and gratification. If there be anything that we work languidly to procure, and feel little elated by being near or possessing, our conviction is proved to be feeble as to the utility of that thing, or as to the pleasure we shall derive from it. So, in employing means to compass ends, as when we sow that we may reap, work that we may obtain abundance, study that we may be informed-we have a

certain confidence in the connection between the means and the ends; in other words, we are energetically urged to use those means, and having done so, we have the feeling as if the end were already attained.

Even in cases the furthest removed in appearance from any action of ours, there is no other criterion. We believe a great many truths respecting the world, in the shape of general propositions, scientific statements, affirmations on testimony, &c., which are so much beyond our own little sphere, that we can rarely have any occasion to involve them in our own procedure, or to feel any hopeful elation on their account. We likewise give credit to innumerable events of past history, although the greater number of them have never any consequences as regards ourselves. Yet, notwithstanding such remoteness of interest, the tests now mentioned must apply; otherwise, there is no real conviction in any one instance.

There is a distinction, first characterised by Aristotle, between potentiality and actuality (posse and esse), which truly represents two different states of mind of real occurrence. Besides the actual doing of a thing, we know what it is to be in a state of preparedness to act, before the emergency has arisen, or while it is still at a distance and uncertain. The thirsty traveller, not knowing of a spring where he may drink, is debarred from the act that his condition prompts him to, but he is in an attitude of mind that we call being ready for action the moment the opportunity arrives. We all carry about us a number of unexecuted resolutions, some of them perhaps remaining so to the last, for want of the occasion. They are not, on that account, to be set aside as having no part in our nature; they are genuine phases of our activity. So it is with many things believed in by us, without any actual prospect of grounding actions, or staking our welfare, upon such things. When we say we believe that the circumference of the globe is 25,000 miles, if not repeating an empty sound, or indulging an idle con ception, we give it out that if any occasion arise for acting on this fact, we are ready to do so. If we were about to circumnavigate the earth, we should commit ourselves to this reckoning. Should there be any hesitation on the point when the time for action came, the professed belief would be shewn to be hollow, no matter how often we heard the statement, or repeated it, with acquiescence. The genuineness of conviction is notoriously open to question, until an opportunity of proceeding upon it occurs. Very often we deceive ourselves and others on the point whether we are in full potentiality or preparedness in some matter of truth or falsehood. There is a very large amount of blind acquiescence in, or tacit acceptance of, propositions which never become the subject of any real or practical stake. These beliefs falsely so called confuse the line of demarcation between mere intellectual notions and states of credence or conviction. Of this nature is the acceptance given by the mass of mankind to the statements they are accustomed to hear from the better informed class respecting the facts of science and the transactions of history. They do not dispute those statements; and yet they might be little disposed to commit their serious interests to such facts. So with regard to the religious creed handed down from parent to child. Some are found believing, in the full import of the term; others, opposing no negative in any way, yet never perform any actions, or entertain either hopes or fears, as a consequence of their supposed acceptance of the religion of their fathers; their belief, accordingly, must be set down as a nonentity.

2. There is considerable interest attached to the

inquiry into the sources or operating causes of this efficacious attribute of our active nature. What are the influences that determine us to adopt some notions as grounds of action and elements of hope or depression, in preference to others? The common answer to this question is the possession of evidence, of which two kinds are reckoned by some schools -namely, experience and intuition; while others recognise experience alone, and reject the intuitive as a sufficient foundation of belief.

As regards the actual sources of men's convictions, it is undeniable that many things are credited without any reference to experience. The existence of superstitions is an example. So the partialities arising out of our likings to particular persons, and the undue depreciation of the merits of those whom we dislike, present instances equally removed from the criterion of experience. It is evident, therefore, that men do not abide by that criterion, even granting that they ought to do so. Accordingly, it is one of the tasks of the mental philosopher to specify the portions of our constitution that give birth to false, mistaken, or unfounded beliefs; and in so doing he indicates, first, certain intuitive impulses connected with our active nature; and secondly, our various feelings, or emotions. Whether the intuitive be a source of authentic beliefs, may be a matter of doubt; there is no doubt as to its being a genuine source of real convictions. We have a decided tendency from the first to believe that the present state of things will continue, and that the absent resembles the present. He that has always seen water liquid, cannot at first be convinced that it is ever or anywhere solid. We have always a great difficulty in surmounting the primitive impulse to consider other men's minds as exactly like our own. It is the tendency of the uncultured human being to overgeneralise; and experience comes as a corrective, often very painful to submit to. Then, again, as regards the emotions, it is found that every one of these, if at all strong, is liable to blind us to the realities of the world. Fear is a notable example. Under a fright, a man will believe in the approach of the direst calamities. Superstition is, for the most part, the offspring of men's fears. The effect of a strong emotion is to exclude from the mind every fact or consideration except those in keeping with itself. Intense vanity so lords it over the current of the thoughts and the course of the observations, as to present to one's mind only the very best side of the character. A fit of self-abasement and remorse will work the contrary effect.

It is plain enough, therefore, that we are very often in the wrong, by trusting to our intuitive tendencies, and as often so under our emotions; while we are as ready to act, and to derive comfort or the opposite, under false beliefs, as under the very soundest that we can ever arrive at. The practice of life points to experience as the check to wrong believing. If we find on trial that another man's feelings differ very much from ours in the same circumstances, we stand corrected, and are perhaps wiser in future. So, in science, experiment is the ultimate canon of truth. There prevails, notwithstanding, in one school of philosophy, comprising the majority of metaphysical philosophers both in this country and in Germany and France, the opinion that experience is not the only source even of sound or true beliefs. There are those who contend for an à priori origin of scientific first principles; such, for example, as the axioms of mathematics. Things that are equal to the same thing are equal to one another,' is one of the class about which this dispute reigns. There is also a doctrine current that the law of causation has an authority derived from intuition. Another class of beliefs relates to matters altogether

beyond experience; such is the metaphysical doctrine of the infinite. These various convictions-d priori, as they are called, being grounded solely in the internal impulses of the human mind—are all open to one common remark. It must be conceded that some intuitive beliefs are unsound, seeing that we are obliged to reject a greater or less number because of their being flatly contradicted by our experience. But if any have to be rejected in this way, why may not all be; and what criterion, apart from experience, can be set up for discriminating those that we are to retain? Man undoubtedly has boundless longings; and the doctrine of the infinite corresponds in a manner to these. But in actual life we find very few of our desires fully gratified, not even those most honourable to the human mind, such as curiosity, the passion for self-improvement, and the desire of doing good. How, then, are we to ascertain which of the longings carries with it its own necessary fulfilment? Moreover, the intuitive tendencies are exceedingly various in men; and all cannot be equally true.

Testimony, which is properly reckoned one of the sources of belief, is, in its operation, partly founded on an intuitive tendency, and partly on experience. We at first believe whatever we are told; the primitive phase of our nature is credulity; the experience that we soon attain to of untrue statements puts us on our guard, and we learn to receive testimony under some circumstances, and from some persons, and not in all cases indiscriminately.

3. Responsibility for Belief.-A lengthened controversy arose some time ago, on the saying of Lord Brougham, that man is no longer accountable to man for his belief, over which he has himself no control.' Reduced to precise terms, the meaning of this assertion is: a man's belief being involuntary, he is not punishable for it. The question therefore arises, how far is belief a voluntary function? for it is known that the will does to some extent influence it.

What a man shall see when he opens his eyes is not in his own power; but the opening of the eyes is a voluntary act. So, after listening to a train of arguments on a certain dispute, we might be irresistibly inclined to one side; but, supposing us to live in a country where the adhesion to that side is criminal, and punished severely, we should very likely be deterred from hearing or reading anything in its favour. To this extent, the adoption of a belief is voluntary. The application of strong motives of the nature of reward or punishment is sufficient to cause one creed to prevail rather than another, as we see in those countries and in those ages where there has been no toleration of dissent from the established religion. The mass of the people have been in this way so fenced in from knowing any other opinions, that they have become conscientiously attached to the creed of their education.

When the question is asked, therefore, whether punishment can control men's beliefs, and not their professions merely, all history answers in the affirmative, as regards religious and political creeds, on which the majority of mankind, being insufficient judges of themselves, are led by tradition and by education. But in matters of daily practice, where the simplest can judge as well as the wisest, the case is altered. No severity of threat could bring a man into the state of believing that his night's rest was hurtful to him; he might be overawed into saying that it was so, but he would never act out his forced affirmation, and therefore he would shew that he did not believe it.

If the sentence of Lord Brougham is held to imply that all beliefs are beyond the power of external

motives, and therefore that rewards and punishments can go no further than making outward conformity, we must pronounce it erroneous. For granting that motives cannot have a direct efficacy on the state of a man's convictions which cannot be conceded in all cases-yet the indirect influence is so great as to produce the unanimity of whole nations for centuries in some one creed. But if it is only meant, that such indirect means ought not to be applied to sway men's convictions, this is merely a way of affirming the right of free thought and inquiry to all mankind, and the iniquity of employing force on such a matter. On the subject of Belief generally, see Bain on the Emotions and the Will.

BELISA'RIUS (in Slavonic, Beli-tzar, 'White Prince'). This heroic and loyal soldier, to whom the Emperor Justinian was principally indebted for the glory of his reign, was born at Germania, in Illyria, about 505 A. D. He first assumed a conspicuous position when he was appointed to the command of the eastern army of the empire, stationed on the confines of Persia, where, in 530 A. D., he gained a victory over a Persian army nearly twice large as his own. The historian Procopius was at this time secretary to Belisarius. In the following year, when the Persians had penetrated into Syria, intending to attack Antioch, B. being compelled by the impatience of his troops to offer battle at Callinicum, a town at the junction of the rivers Bilecha and Euphrates, was defeated, and in consequence recalled. This petulant injustice, however, did not weaken that principle of duty which ever controlled and inspired the great soldier. He still remained the firm supporter of his sovereign. In Constantinople, the strife of the two parties, styled respectively the green' and 'the blue,' had endangered the authority and even the life of Justinian; already a new emperor, Hypatius, had been elected, when B., at the head of the life-guards, attacked and slew, in the race-course, 30,000 of the green or anti-loyalist party, and thus restored tranquillity. Previous to this, he had married a wealthy but profligate lady, Antonina, whom he loved with the same blind uxoriousness that Marcus Aurelius exhibited towards Faustina. The only points in his history which are not edifying, are those in which he yielded to her noxious solicitations. The military career of B. may be divided into two great epochs: the war against the Vandals in Africa, and the war against the Goths in Italy, which again subdivides itself into two campaigns, with an interval of four years between them. The first of these epochs was commenced by Justinian sending B., in 533 A. D., with an army of 15,000 men into Africa, in order to recover the provinces there held by the Vandal king, Gelimer. After achieving two victories, B. made the king a prisoner, seized his treasures, and after conquering Sardinia, Corsica, and the Balearic Isles, he brought him to Constantinople, where he appeared in a triumphal procession of the conqueror the first that a subject had enjoyed since the days of Tiberius. The African Vandals never recovered from this overthrow. Medals were struck in B.'s honour; and on the 1st January 535, he was invested with the dignity of consul," and granted a second triumph, according to the old republican style. The second war was occasioned by the divisions existing in the royal family of the Ostrogoths, which induced Justinian to attempt to wrest Italy from the hands of the barbarians. In 535, B. conquered Sicily; and in the autumn of 536, he crossed over to Lower Italy, where all the cities submitted to him except Naples, which he carried by storm. On the 10th of December, he entered Rome, having made an amicable arrangement with

the inhabitants. As he found his forces not strong enough to contend with the Goths in open field, he allowed himself to be enclosed and besieged in Rome: after the defence had lasted a year, the Goths raised the siege. In 538, Narses had been sent with a reinforcement for the army in Italy; but some misunderstanding occurring between the two generals, they were prevented from relieving Milan, which in 539 was carried and devastated by Braias, nephew of the Gothic king, Vitiges. Consequently, Narses was recalled from Italy; and B., now placed at the head of both armies, refused to assent to a treaty proposed to King Vitiges by Justinian's ambassadors. Vitiges had persuaded the Persian king, Chosroes, to invade the eastern Roman territory. B. now drove the Goths back to Ravenna, which he captured in 540, along with Vitiges himself. But before he could complete his conquest of the Goths, he was recalled by Justinian to Constantinople, where he soon appeared, bringing with him the king Vitiges, several Gothic chieftains, and the royal treasures. In 541-542, he was engaged in a campaign against the Persians, who had captured Antioch; but was again recalled, on account of slanderous representations made to the emperor, and the enterprise necessarily proved indecisive. His second great struggle with the Ostrogoths now begins. In 544, the barbarians, under Totila, again invaded and reconquered Italy. B. was sent against them, but with an insufficient army. He, however, maintained his ground for five years, harassing the enemy by his skilful movements, and even succeeded so far as to regain possession of Rome. But, in spite of his repeated entreaties, no reinforcements were sent to him; and in September 548, he gave up the command, his rival, Narses, being appointed in his place. After ten years of retirement, B. once more came forward at the head of an army hastily collected, and overthrew the Bulgarians, who had threatened Constantinople. Here this faithful servant, who at Ravenna had, in a spirit of noble loyalty unknown to the warriors in those selfish and ambitious times, refused the crown of Italy offered to him by the Goths, was at length accused of a conspiracy against Justinian, and imprisoned, December 563; but according to Malala and Theophanes, Justinian became convinced of B.'s innocence, and restored him, after six months, to all his honours. He died March 564.

The biography of B. has been treated with great licence by writers of fiction, especially by Marmontel, who has represented the hero as cruelly deprived of sight, and reduced to beg for his bread in the streets of Constantinople. Tzetzes, a writer of the 12th c., states that, during his half-year's imprisonment, B. suspended a bag from the window of his cell, and exclaimed to those who passed by: 'Give an obolus to B., who rose by merit, and was cast down by envy!' but no writer contemporary with B. mentions this circumstance. Lord Mahon, in his Life of Belisarius (Lond. 1829), endeavours, but without success, to confirm the tradition, or rather the fiction, of B. being deprived of sight and reduced to mendicancy. This fiction supplies the subject of a fine picture by the French painter Gérard.

In figure, B. was tall and majestic; in disposition, humane and generous; pure in his morals, temperate in his habits, a valiant soldier, a skilful general, and above all, possessed by a sublime spirit of loyalty to his sovereign.

BELI'ZE. See BALIZE.

BELL. Bells are usually formed of a composition of copper and tin, called bell-metal. When the proper proportions of the two metals are fused together,

the compound is poured into a mould. Authorities differ as to the best proportions of the copper and tin. Some give 80 parts of copper to 20 of tin, or 4 to 1; others state the proportions as being 3 to 1. In the reign of Henry III. of England, it would seem to have been 2 to 1; and the small bronze bells discovered by Mr Layard in the palace of Nimroud, are found to contain 10 of copper to 1 of tin. Hand-bells are often made of brass, antimony alloyed with tin, German silver,

Queen Mary's silver-gilt Hand-bell.

real silver, and gold. The notion that in old times silver was mixed with bell-metal to sweeten the tone, is a mistake. Silver, in any quantity, would injure the tone. The quality of a bell depends not only on the composition of the metal it is made of, but very much also on its shape, and on the proportions between its height, width, and thickness; for which the bell-founder has rules derived from experience, and confirmed by science. The pitch of a bell is higher the smaller it is. For a peal of four bells to give the pure chord of ground tone (key-note), third, fifth, and octave, the diameters require to be as 30, 24, 20, 15, and the weights as 80, 41, 24, 10. A less quantity of metal than is due to the calibre of the bell though giving the same note, produces a meagre harsh sound; and the real or fancied superiority in dignity of tone of some old bells, is ascribed to a greater weight of metal having been allowed for the same note than modern economy would dictate. Bells have been cast of steel, some of which have had a tone nearly equal in fineness to that of the best bell-metal, but deficient in length, having less vibration. Some have also been cast of glass, with a considerable thickness of the material; and these give an extremely fine sound, but are too brittle to stand the continued use of a clapper.

From a remote antiquity, cymbals and handbells were used in religious ceremonies. In Egypt, it is certain that the feast of Osiris was announced by ringing bells; Aaron, and other Jewish highpriests, wore golden bells attached to their vestments; and in Athens, the priests of Cybele used bells in their rites. The Greeks employed them (koda) in camps and garrison; and the Romans announced the hour of bathing and of business by the tintinnabulum. The introduction of bells into Christian churches is usually ascribed to Paulinus, Bishop of Nola in Campania (400 A.D.); but there is no evidence of their existence for a century later. That they were first made in Campania, is inferred from the name given to them-campana; hence campanile, the bell-tower. Their use in churches and monasteries soon spread through Christendom. They were introduced into France about 550; and

Benedict, Abbot of Wearmouth, brought one from Italy for his church about 680. Pope Sabinian (600) ordained that every hour should be announced by sound of bell, that the people might be warned of the approach of the hora canonica, or hours of devotion. Bells came into use in the East in the 9th c., and in Switzerland and Germany in the 11th. Most of the bells first used in Western Christendom seem to have been hand-bells. Several examples, some of them, it is believed, as old as the 6th c., are still preserved in Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. They are made of thin plates of hammered iron, bent into a four-sided form, fastened with rivets, and brazed or bronzed. Perhaps the most remarkable is that which is said to have belonged to St Patrick, called the Clog-an-eadhachta Phatraic, or The bell of Patrick's Will.' It is 6 inches high, 5 inches broad, and 4 inches deep, and is kept in a case or shrine of brass, enriched with gems and with gold and silver filigree, and made (as an inscription in Irish shews) between the years 1091 and 1105. The bell itself is believed to be mentioned in the Annals of Ulster as early as the year 552. Engravings as well of the bell as of its shrine, with a history of both, by the Rev. Dr Reeves of Lusk, were published at Belfast (where the relic is preserved) in 1850. Some of the Scotch bells, of the same primitive type, are figured and described in the Illustrated Cata logue of the Archaeological Museum at Edinburgh in 1856 (Edin. 1859). The four-sided bell of St Gall, an Irish missionary, who died about 646, is still shewn

in the monastery of the city which bears his name in Switzerland. Church-bells were suspended either in the steeples or church-towers, or in special belltowers. They were long of comparatively small size: the bell which a king presented to the church of Orleans in the 11th c., and which was remarkable in its age, weighed only 2600 pounds. In the 13th c., much larger bells began to be cast, but it was not until the 15th c. that they reached really considerable dimensions. The bell 'Jacqueline' of Paris, cast in 1400, weighed 15,000 pounds; another Paris bell, cast in 1472, weighed 25,000; the famous bell of Rouen, cast in 1501, weighed 36,364 pounds. The largest bell in the world is the Great Bell or Monarch of Moscow, above 21 feet in height and diameter, and weighing 193 tons. It was cast in 1734, but fell down during a fire in 1737, was injured, and remained sunk in the earth till 1837, when it was raised, and now forms the dome of a chapel made by excavating the space below it. Another Moscow bell, cast in 1819, weighs 80 tons. The Great Bell at Pekin, 14 feet high, with a diameter of 13 feet, weighs 53 tons; those of Olmütz, Rouen, and Vienna, nearly 18 tons; that first cast for the New Palace at Westminster (but cracked),