sense of the nation to which it belongs, however strong, as to the moral atrocity of the traffic of slaves, and cannot therefore uphold the seizure on that ground; because as the practice, however abominable, was in comparatively recent times justified and even encouraged by the nations of Christendom, it cannot be considered unlawful, until the general sense shall have been unequivocally and authoritatively declared against it. Take, for a second example, the obnoxious right of search in the time of war; when it is once clearly apparent that the right is supported by long-established usage, the question whether it is in accordance with the present sentiments of civilized nations is not to be admitted into the consideration of any particular case. The law in its administration prefers the known and palpable to the merely speculative-deals rather with facts than opinions-and continues to do and affirm what has been done and affirmed before, until turned from its course by a positive convention or by a general consent altering the practice.

To return to the treatise before us-let us see how these conclusions agree with the notions of the author, and the writers whom he quotes. Grotius, though his ideas do not appear to have settled into much precision, makes natural law the basis of the law of nations, but carefully distinguishes the latter as the result of a general concurrence of nations, evidenced by usage, and sanctioned by a sort of federal compact. Hobbes, and after him Puffendorf, consider the law of nature and the law of nations' identical in all but their subject, the one being applicable to individual men, the other to communities or states. Bynkershoek derives the law of nations from reason and usage, ex ratione et usu. "The ancient jurisconsults," he observes, "assert that the law of nations is that which is observed in accordance with the light of reason between nations, if not among all, certainly among the greater part, and those the more civilized"-a definition which, it will be seen, approaches very nearly to the result of our analysis. Lord Stowell, with his usual philosophic accuracy, expresses himself thus: "A great part of the law of nations stands upon the usage and practice of nations. It is introduced indeed by general principles, but it travels with those general principles only to a certain extent, and

if it stops there, you are not at liberty to go further, and say that mere general speculation would bear you out in a further progress." Finally, Mr. Wheaton himself sums up with the following conclusion. "The law of nations, or international law, as understood among civilized Christian nations, may be defined as consisting of those rules of conduct which reason deduces, as consonant to justice, from the nature of the society existing among independent nations; with such definitions and modifications as may be established by general consent." So that (leaving out of consideration particular compacts with which the law is in general no further concerned than in the interpretation and enforcement of them) the result at which all arrive, though by somewhat different roads, is essentially the same.

It has been made a question, whether this code of international principles and practice can be properly designated as a law,1 and much (if we may so speak without irreverence) unprofitable subtlety has been expended in distinguishing a law, properly so called, from that which has borrowed the title by way of metaphor only. To us it seems that every rule or system, the departure from which involves a punishment, may with strict propriety be considered as a law. Thus the law of our nature, which we cannot violate without physical suffering-the laws of society, even down to the capricious codes of fashion and honour, the infraction of which exposes us to shame and mortification, and that most terrible of all punishments, loss of caste-are they not with such sanctions rightly called laws? And what are the sanctions of international law? Are there no punishments in store for its transgression? Have obloquy and indignation no moral force? Are non-intercourse, reprisals, war and invasion: without physical terrors? It is true that there is no supreme authority commanding obedience and chastising transgression, but is there not a controlling power which princes and statesmen feel, however they may refuse to acknowledge it? Where is the monarch so haughty, that, when arraigned at the bar of opinion, ventures to plead to the jurisdiction? Why does the imperial pride of Russia stoop to justify or

1 Bentham and Austin, Prov. of Jurisprudence defined.

explain her acts of aggression? Take away fear and shame; and the rights of nations-the sense of justice--the faith of treaties-would be to her but Lilliputian cords binding the strong man to the ground.

The bases of international law then are equity and usage, but its sanctions are shame and the dread of retribution. "The rule regarding the conduct of sovereign states, considered as related to each other," says the latter of the distinguished jurists to whom we have alluded, "is termed law by its analogy to positive law, being imposed upon nations or sovereigns, not by the positive command of a superior authority, but by opinions generally current among nations. The duties which it imposes are enforced by moral sanctions, by fear on the part of nations, or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking general hostility, and incurring its probable evils, in case they should violate maxims generally received and respected." Mr. Wheaton also, in his preface, speaks with much precision of this law, as consisting of "those general principles which may fairly be considered to have received the assent of most civilized and Christian nations, if not as invariable rules of conduct, at least as rules which they cannot disregard without general obloquy, and the hazard of provoking the hostility of other communities, who may be injured by their violation." "Experience," he adds, "shows that these motives, even in the worst times, do really afford a considerable security for the observance of justice between states, if they do not furnish the perfect sanction annexed by the lawgiver to the observance of the municipal code of any particular state."

The sources from whence the rules of international law are obtained, are stated to be the following.

"1. The rules of conduct which ought to be observed between nations, as deduced by reason from the nature of the society existing among independent states, [that is to say, established maxims of right and equity.]

"2. Text writers of authority, showing what is the approved usage of nations, or the general opinion respecting their mutual conduct, with the definitions and modifications introduced by general consent.

"3. The adjudication of international tribunals, such as boards of arbitration and Courts of prize.

"4. Ordinances of particular states, prescribing rules for the conduct of their commissioned cruizers and prize tribunals.

"5. The history of the wars, negociations, treaties of peace, and other transactions relating to the public intercourse of nations. "6. Treaties of peace, alliance and commerce declaring, modifying or defining the pre-existing law."

With some pertinent observations as to the effect to be assigned to Treaties and Conventions, not only as between the immediate parties, but in some cases as constituting a more general rule, this portion of the work concludes.

We purpose hereafter to continue, though not with equal minuteness, our examination of this valuable compendium, to which the complicated state of European politics at this moment gives, we venture to think, a peculiar interest. HE in whose hands the destinies of nations are placed, alone can foresee how soon the plague of war may visit us. The struggle of contending principles is in full activity. Passion ere long may take the place of reason, and interest or pride ruffle the even course of law and equity. Now is the time clearly to define and steadily to maintain the broad lines of international rights. There are many questions of vital interest to this great maritime nation especially, on which much honest difference of opinion, as well as much angry soreness, exists. These it would be well to settle, or at least discuss, before the necessity for their application arises, and possibly, our humble contributions to so desirable a work may not be altogether without value.

L.

ART. III.-LIFE OF LORD KENYON.

[Continued from Vol. XVII. p. 252.]

In behalf of poor offenders, ignorant and deluded, the tools of more knavish men, the humane sympathies of Lord Kenyon were often forcibly excited. We find a remarkable instance of this in the case of Spence, where his pity for the sorry state of the defendant subdued, in a great degree, the inveterate displeasure which he felt against his crime. He was tried for a publication steeped in sedition of the worst kind. "We must destroy all private property in land. The landholders are like a warlike enemy quartered upon us for the sake of raising contributions, therefore any thing short of a total destruction of the power of these Sampsons will not do; and that must be accomplished not by simple shaving, which leaves the roots of their strength to grow again: no! we must scalp them, or else they will soon recover, and pull our temple of liberty about our ears." The man excited compassion at his trial by his wretched appearance, and the pitiable fanaticism with which he was possessed, for he was honest. He called himself in his defence the unfeed advocate of the disinherited race of Adam. When brought up for judgment, he gave the following simple statement of his treatment in Newgate.

"Perhaps, my Lords, I have entertained too high an opinion of human nature, for I do not find mankind very grateful clients. I have very small encouragement indeed to rush into a prison on various accounts; for in the first place the people without treat me with the contempt due to a lunatic, and the people within treat me as bad or worse than the most notorious felon among them; and what with redeeming and ransoming my toes from being pulled off with a string while in bed, and paying heavy and manifold fees, there is no getting through the various impositions." He was sentenced to a fine of £20 and one year's imprisonment in Shrewsbury gaol; a sentence so lenient (compared with cotemporary sentences in other cases of the sort) as to show that the individual was very properly regarded by Lord Kenyon with compassion. He invariably shielded the working and poorer classes from op