too, must have been the product of the first and rudest ages, if indeed it can be considered as a human invention at all.

Think of the circumstances of mankind when Languages began to be formed. They were a wandering scattered race ; no society among them except families; and the family society too very imperfect, as their method of living by hunting or pasturage must have separated them frequently from one another. In this situation, when so much divided, and their inter course so rare, How could any one set of sounds, or words, be generally agreed on as the signs of their ideas? Supposing that a few, whom chance or necessity threw together agreed by some means upon certain signs, yet by what authority could these be propogated among other tribes or families, so as to spread and grow up into a Language? One would think, that in order to any Language fixing and extending itself, men must have been previously gathered together in considerable numbers: society must have been already far advanced; and yet, on the other hand, there seems to have been an absolute necessity for Speech, previous to the formation of Society. For, by what bond could any multitude of men be kept together, or be made to join in the prosecution of any common interest, until once, by the intervention of Speech, they could commu nicate their wants and intentions to each other? So that, either how society could form itself, previously to Language ; or how words could rise into a Language, previously to Society formed, seem to be points attended with equal difficulty. And when we consider farther, that curious analogy which prevails in the construction of almost all Languages, and that deep and subtile logic on which they are founded, difficulties increase so much upon us, on all hands, that there seems to be no small reason for referring the first origin of all Language to divine" teaching or inspiration

But supposing Language to have a Divine original, we cannot, however, suppose, that a perfect system of it was all at once given to man. Itis much more natural to think, that God-taught our first parents only such Language as suited their present occasions; leaving them, as he did in other things, to enlarge and improve it as their future necessities should require. Consequently, those first rudiments of Speech must have been

poor and narrow, and we are at full liberty to enquire in what manner, and by what steps, Language advanced to the state in which we now find it. The history which I am to give of this progress, will suggest several things, both curious int themselves, and useful in our future disquisitions.

If we should suppose a period before any words were invented or known, it is clear, that men could have no other method of communicating to others what they felt, than by the cries of passion accompanied with such motions and gestures as were farther expressive of passion. For these are the only signs which nature teaches all men, and which are understood by all. One who saw another going into some place where he himself had been frightened, or exposed to danger, and who sought to warn his neighbour of the danger, could contrive no other way of doing so, than by uttering those cries, and making those gestures, which are the signs of fear: just as two men, at this day, would endeavour to make themselves be understood by each other, who should be thrown together on a desolate island, ignorant of one another's Language. Those exclamations, therefore, which by grammarians are called Interjections, uttered in a strong and passionate manner, were, beyond doubt, the first elements or beginnings of Speech.

When more enlarged communication became necessary, and names began to be assigned to objects, in what manner can we suppose men to have proceeded in this assignation of names, or invention of words? Undoubtedly, by imitating, as much as they could, the nature of the object which they named, by the sound of the name which they gave to it. As a painter who would present grass, must employ green colour; so, in the beginnings of Language, one giving a name to any thing harsh and boisterous, would of course employ a harsh or boisterous sound. He could not do otherwise, if he meant to excite in the hearer the idea of that thing which he sought to name. To suppose words invented, or names given, to things, in a manner purely arbitrary, without any ground or reason, is to suppose an effect without a cause. There must have always been some motive which led to the assignation of one name rather than another; and we can conceive no motive which would more universally operate upon men in their first efforts

towards Language, than a desire to paint by Speech, the objects which they named, in a manner more or less complete, according as the vocal organs had it in their power to effect this imitation.

• Wherever objects were to be named, in which sound, noise, or motion were concerned, the imitation by words was abundantly obvious. Nothing was more natural, than to imitate, by the sound of the voice, the quality of the sound or noise which any external object made; and to form its name ac cordingly. Thus, in all Languages, we find a multitude of words that are evidently constructed upon this principle. A certain bird is termed the Cuckoo, from the sound which it emits. When one sort of wind is said to whistle, and another to roar; when a serpent is said to hiss; a fly to buz, and falling timber to crash; when a stream is said to flow, and hail to rat tle; the analogy between the word and the thing signified is plainly discernible.

In the names of objects which address the sight only, where neither noise nor motion are concerned, and still more in the terms appropriated to moral ideas, this analogy appears to fail. Many learned men, however, have been of opinion, that though in such cases, it becomes more obscure, yet it is not altogether lost; but that throughout the radical words of all Languages, there may be traced some degree of correspondence with the object signified. With regard to moral and intellectual ideas, they remark, that, in every Language, the terms significant of them," are derived from the names of sensible objects to which they are conceived to be analogous; and with regard to sensible objects pertaining merely to sight, they remark, that their most distinguishing qualities have certain radical sounds appropriated to the expression of them, in a great variety of Languages. Stability, for instance, fluidity, hollowness, smoothness, gentleness, violence, &c. they imagine to be painted by the sound of certain letters or syllables, which have some relation to those different states of visible objects, on account of an obscure resemblance which the organs of voice are capable of assuming to such external qualities. By this natural mechanism, they

L

imagine all Languages to have been at first constructed, and the roots of their capital words formed.*

As far as this system is founded in truth, Language appears to be not altogether arbitrary in its origin. Among the ancient Stoic and Platonic Philosophers, it was a question much agitat ed, "Utrum nomina rerum sint naturâ, an impositione ?"Qures

; by which they meant, Whether words were merely conventional symbols; of the rise of which no account could be given, except the pleasure of the first inventors of Language? or, Whether there was some principle in nature that led to the assignation of particular names to particular objects; and those of the Platonic school favoured the latter opinion?†

The Author who has carried his speculations on this subject the farthest, is the President Des Brosses, in his "Traite de la Formation Mechanique des "Langues." Some of the radical letters or syllables which he supposes to carry this expressive power in most known Languages are, St, to signify the stability or rest; Fl, to denote fluency; Cl, a gentle descent: R, what relates to rapid motion; C, to cavity or hollowness, &c. A century before his time, Dr. Wallis, in his Grammar of the English Language, had taken notice of these significant roots, and represented it as a peculiar excellency of our Tongue, that, beyond all others, it expressed the nature of the objects which it named, by employing sounds sharper, softer, weaker, stronger, more obscure, or more stridulous, according as the idea which is to be suggested requires. He gives various examples. Thus, words, formed upon St, always denote firmness and strength, analogous to the Latin sto ; as stand, stay, staff, stop, stout, steady, stake, stamp, stallion, stately, &c. Words beginning with Str, intimate violence force and energy, analogous to the Greek orgovvμi ; as, strive, strength, strike, stripe, stress, struggle, stride, stretch strip, &c. Thr, implies forcible motion; as throw, throb, thrust, through, threaten, thraldom. Wr, obloquy or distortion; as, wry, wrest, wreath, wrestle, wring, wrong, wrangle, wrath, wrack, &c, Sw, silent, agitation, or lateral motion; as, sway, swing, swerve, sweep, swim. Sl, a gentle fall or less observable motion; as, slide, slip, sly, slit, slow, slack, sling. Sp, dissipation or expansion; as, spread, sprout, sprinkle, split, spill, spring. Terminationa in ash, indicate something acting nimbly and sharply; as, crash, gash, rasħi, flash, lash, slash. Terminations in ush, something acting more obtusely and dully; as, crush, brush, hush, gush, blush. The learned Author produces a great many more examples of the same kind, which seem to leave no doubt, that the analogies of sound have had some influence on the formation of words. At the same time, in all speculations of this kind, there is so much room for fancy to operate, that they ought to be adopted with much caution in forming any general theory.

Vid. Plat. in Cratylo. «Nomina verbaque non posita fortuito, sed qua"dam vi & ratione naturæ facta esse, P. Nigidius in Grammaticis Commen"tariis docet; rem sane in philosophiæ dissertationibus celebrem. In cam "rem multa argumenta dicit, cur videri possint verba esse naturalia, magis "quam arbitraria. Vos, iniquit, cum dicimus, motu quodam oris conveniente, "cum ipsius verbi demonstratione utimur, & labias sensim primores emovemus, ac spiritum atque anintam porro versum, & ad cos quibus consçrme

$

This principle, however, of a natural relation between words and objects, can only be applied to Language in its most sim ple and primitive state. Though in every Tongue, some remains of it, as I have shewn above, can be traced, it were ut terly in vain to search for it throughout the whole construction of any modern Language. As the multitude of terms increase in every nation, and the immense field of Language is filled up, words, by a thousand fanciful and irregular methods of deriva→ tion and composition, come to deviate widely from the primitive character of their roots, and to lose all analogy or resemblance in sound to the things signified. In this state we now find Language. Words, as we now employ them, taken in the general, may be considered as symbols, not as imitations; as-arbitrary, or instituted, not natural signs of ideas. But there can be no doubt, I think, that Language, the nearer we remount to its rise among men, will be found to partake more of a natural expression. As it could be originally formed on nothing but imitation, it would, in its primitive state, be more picturesque; much more barren indeed, and narrow in the circle of its terms, than now; but so far as it went, more expressive by sound of the thing signified. This, then, may be assumed as one character of the first state, or beginnings, of Language, among every savage tribe.

A second character of Language, in its early state, is drawn from the manner in which words were at first pronounced, or uttered, by men. Interjections, I shewed, or passionate exclamations, were the first elements of Speech. Men laboured to communicate their feelings to one another, by those expressive cries and gestures which nature taught them. After words, or names of objects, began to be invented, this mode of speaking, by natural signs, could not be all at once disused. For Language, in its infancy, must have been extremely barren'; and there certainly was a period among all rude nations, when conversation was carried on by a very few words, intermixed ".cinamur intendimus. At contra cum dicimus Nos, neque profuso intento$. que flatu vocis, neque projectis labiis pronunciamus; sed et spiritum et labias "quasi intra nosmet ipsos coërcemus. Hoc fit idem et in eo quod dicimus, 5. tu & ego & mibi & tibi. Nam sicuti cum adnuimus & abnuimus, motus quo"dam illo vel capitis, vel oculorem, a natura rei quam significat, non abhorret, "ita in his vocibus quasi gestus quidam oris & spiritus naturalis est. Eadem ra→ tio est in Græcis quoque vocibus quam esse in nostris animadvertimus."

A. GELLIUS, Noct. Atticæ, lib. x. cap. 4