3. But as self is an object that cannot be termed either external or internal, the faculty by which I have knowledge of myself, is a sense that cannot properly be termed either internal or external.

4. By the eye we perceive figure, colour, motion, &c. by the ear we perceive the different qualities of sound, high, low, loud, soft: by touch we perceive rough, smooth, hot, cold, &c.: by taste we perceive sweet, sour, bitter, &c.: by smell we perceive fragrant, fetid, &c. These qualities partake the common nature of all qualities, that they are not capable of an independent existence, but must belong to some being of which they are properties or attributes. A being with respect to its properțies or attributes is termed a subject or substratum. Every substratum of visible qualities, is termed substance; and of tangible qualities, body.

5. Substance and sound are perceived as existing at a distance from the organ; often at a conşiderable distance. But smell, touch and taste, are perceived as existing at the organ of sense.

6. The objects of external sense are various.Substances are perceived by the eye: bodies by the touch. Sounds, tastes, and smells, passing com- . monly under the name of secondary qualities, require more explanation than there is room for here. All the objects of internal sense are attributes: witness deliberation, reasoning, resolution, willing, consenting, which are internal actions. Passions and emotions, which are internal agitations, are also attributes. With regard to the former, I am conscious of being active; with regard to the latter, I am conscious of being passive.

for to feel is certainly not to act, but the effect of being acted upon; the feeling pleasure is the effect produced in my mind when a beautiful object is presented. Perception accordingly is not an action, but an effect produced in the mind. Sensation is another effect: it is the pleasure I feel upon perceiving what is agreeable.

7. Again, we are conscious of internal action as in the head: of passions and emotions as in the heart.

8. Many actions may be exerted internally, and many effects produced of which we are unconscious: when we investigate the ultimate cause of the motion of the blood, and of other internal motions upon which life depends, it is the most probable opinion that some internal power is the cause: and if so, we are unconscious of the operations of that power. But consciousness being implied in the very meaning of deliberating, reasoning, resolving, willing, consenting, such operations cannot escape our knowledge. The same is the case of passions and emotions; for no internal agitation is denominated a passion or emotion, but what we are

conscious of.

9. The mind is not always the same; by turns it is cheerful, melancholy, calm, peevish, &c. These differences may not improperly be denominated

tones.

10. Perception and sensation are commonly reckoned synonimous terms, signifying that internal act by which external objects are made known to us But they ought to be distinguished. Perceiving is a general term for hearing, seeing, tasting, touching, smelling; and therefore perception signifies every internal act by which we are made acquainted with external objects: thus we are said to perceive a certain animal, a certain colour, sound, taste, smell, &c. Sensation properly signifies that internal act by which we are made conscious of pleasure or pain felt at the organ of sense: thus we have a sensation of the pleasure arising from warmth, from a fragrant smell, from a sweet taste : and of the pain arising from a wound, from a fetid smell, from a disagreeable taste. In perception, my attention is directed to the external object: in

sensation, it is directed to the pleasure or pain I feel.

The terms perception and sensation are sometimes employed to signify the objects of perception and sensation. Perception in that sense is a general term for every external thing we perceive; and sensation a general term for every pleasure and pain felt at the organ of sense.

11. Conception is different from perception. The latter includes a conviction of the reality of its object; the former does not; for I can conceive the most extravagant stories told in a romance, without having any conviction of their reality. Conception differs also from imagination. By the power of fancy I can imagine a golden mountain, or an ebony ship with sails and ropes of silk. When I describe a picture of that kind to another, the idea he forms of it is termed a conception. Imagination is active, conception is passive.

12. Feeling, beside denoting one of the external senses, is a general term, signifying that internal act by which we are made conscious of our pleasures and our pains; for it is not limited, as sensation is, to any one sort. Thus feeling being the genus of which sensation is a species, their meaning is the same when applied to pleasure and pain felt at the organ of sense and accordingly we say indifferently, "I feel pleasure from heat, and pain from cold," or, "I have a sensation of pleasure from heat, and "of pain from cold." But the meaning of feeling, as is said, is much more extensive: It is proper to say, I feel pleasure in a sumptuous building, in love, in friendship; and pain in losing a child, in revenge, in envy sensation is not properly applied to any of these.

The term feeling is frequently used in a less proper sense, to signify what we feel or are conscious of; and in that sense it is a general term for all

our passions and emotions, and for all our other pleasures and pains.

13. That we cannot perceive an external object till an impression is made upon our body, is probable from reason, and is ascertained by experience. But it is not necessary that we be made sensible of the impression: in touching, in tasting, and in smelling, we are sensible of the impression: but not in seeing and hearing. We know indeed from experiments, that before we perceive a visible object, its image is spread upon the retina tunica; and that before we perceive a sound, an impression is made upon the drum of the ear: but we are not conscious either of the organic image or of the organic impression; nor are we conscious of any other operation preparatory to the act of perception: all we can say is, that we see that river, or hear that trumpet.

*

14. Objects once perceived may be recalled to the mind by the power of memory. When I recal an object of sight in that manner, it appears to me precisely the same as in the original survey, only less distinct. For example, having seen yesterday a spreading oak growing on the brink of a river, I endeavour to recal these objects to my mind. How is this operation performed? Do I endeavour to form in my mind a picture of them or a representa. tive image? Not so. I transport myself ideally to the place where I saw the tree and river yesterday: upon which I have a perception of these objects,

*Yet a singular opinion that impressions are the only objects of percep tion, has been espoused by some philosophers of no mean rank; not attend. ing to the foregoing peculiarity in the senses of seeing and hearing, that we perceive objects without being conscious of an organic impression, or of any impression. See the Treatise upon Human Nature: where we find the following passage, book I. p. iv. sect. 2. "Properly speaking, it is not our "body we perceive when we regard our limbs and members; so that the "ascribing a real and corporeal existence to these impressions, or to their ob "jects, is an act of the mind as difficult to explain," &c.

similar in all respects to the perception I had when I viewed them with my eyes, only less distinct. And in this recollection, I am not conscious of a picture or representative image, more than in the original survey; the perception is of the tree and river themselves, as at first. I confirm this by another experiment. After attentively surveying a fine statue, I close my eyes. What follows? The same object continues, without any difference but that it is less distinct than formerly. This indistinct secondary perception of an object, is termed an idea. And therefore the

* This experiment, which every one may reiterate till entire satisfaction be obtained, is of greater importance than at first view may appear; for it strikes at the root of a celebrated doctrine, which for more than two thousand years has misled many philosophers. This doctrine, as delivered by Aristotle is in substance, "That of every object of thought there must be in "the mind some form, phantasm, or species; that things sensible are per"ceived and remembered by means of sensible phantasms, and things intel"ligible by intelligible phantasms; and that these phantasms have the form "of the object without the matter, as the impression of a seal upon wax has "the form of a seal without its matter." The followers of Aristotle add, "That the sensible and intelligible forms of things, are sent forth from the "things themselves, and make impressions upon the passive intellect, which "impressions are perceived by the active intellect" This notion differs very little from that of Epicurus, which is, "That all things send forth constantly and in every direction, slender ghosts, or films of themselves, (lenuia "simulacra, as expressed by his commentator Lucretius;) which striking upon the mind, are the means of perception, dreaming," &c. Des Cartes, bent to oppose Aristotle, rejects the doctrine of sensible and intelligible phantasms; maintaining, however, the same doctrine in effect, namely, That we perceive nothing external but by means of some image either in the brain or in the mind: and these images he terms ideas. According to these philosophers, we perceive nothing immediately but phantasms or ideas: and from these we infer, by reasoning, the existence of external objects. Locke, adopting this doctrine, employs almost the whole of his book about ideas. He holds, that we cannot perceive, remember, nor imagine, any thing, but by having an idea or image of it in the mind. He agrees with Des Cartes, that we can have no knowledge of things external, but what we acquire by reasoning upon their ideas or images in the mind; taking it for granted, that we are conscious of these ideas or images, and of nothing else. Those who talk the most intelligibly explain the doctrine thus: When I see in a mirror a man standing behind me, the immediate object of my sight is his image, without which I could not see him: in like manner, when I see a tree or a house, there must be an image of these objects in my brain or in my mind: which image is the immediate object of my perception; and by means of that image I perceive the external object.