Nor lofe, for that malignant dull delight,
The gen'rous pleasure to be charm'd with wit.
But in fuch lays as neither ebb, nor flow,
Correctly cold and regularly low,
That fhunning faults, one quiet tenor keep;
We cannot blame indeed-but we may sleep.
In Wit, as Nature, what affects our hearts
Is not th' exactnefs of peculiar parts;
'Tis not a lip, or eye, we beauty call,
But the joint force and full result of all.

240

245

Thus when we view fome well-proportion'd dome, (The world's just wonder, and ev'n thine, O Rome!) No fingle parts unequally furprize,

All comes united to th' admiring eyes;

250

No monftrous height, or breadth, or length ap

pear;

The Whole at once is bold, and regular.

Whoever thinks a faultlefs piece to fee, Thinks what ne'er was, nor is, nor e'er shall be. In ev'ry work regard the writer's End,

255

Since none can compass more than they intend;
And if the means be juft, the conduct true,
Applaufe, in fpight of trivial faults, is due.
As men of breeding, fometimes men of wit,
T'avoid great errors, must the lefs commit: 260
Neglect the rules each verbal Critic lays,
For not to know fome trifles, is a praise.
Moft Critics, fond of some subservient art,
Still make the Whole depend upon a Part:

They talk of principles, but notions prize,
And all to one lov'd Folly facrifice.

265

Once on a time, La Mancha's Knight, they say, A certain Bard encount'ring on the way, Difcours'd in terms as juft, with looks as fage, As e'er could Dennis, of the Grecian stage; Concluding all were defp'rate fots and fools, Who durft depart from Aristotle's rules. Our Author happy in a judge fo nice,

270

275

Produc'd his Play, and begg'd the Knight's advice;
Made him obferve the fubject, and the plot,
The manners, paffions, unities; what not?
All which, exact to rule, were brought about,
Were but a combat in the lifts left out.

"What! leave the Combat out?" exclaims the Knight.

Yes, or we must renounce the Stagirite.

"Not fo by Heav'n (he answers in a rage)

66

280

Knights, fquires, and steeds, muft enter on the

stage."

So vaft a throng the stage can ne'er contain. “Then build a new, or act it in a plain."

Thus Critics, of lefs judgment than caprice, 285 Curious not knowing, not exact but nice,

VER. 285. Thus Critics of lefs judgment than caprice,

Curious not knowing, not exact but nice.] In these two lines the poet finely defcribes the way in which bad writers are wont to imitate the qualities of good ones. As true Judgment generally draws men out of popular opinions, fo he who cannot

Form fhort Ideas; and offend in arts
(As most in manners) by a love to parts.

Some to Conceit alone their tafte confine,
And glitt'ring thoughts ftruck out at ev'ry line; 290
Pleas'd with a work where nothing's just or fit;
One glaring Chaos and wild heap of wit.
Poets like painters, thus, unskill'd to trace
The naked nature and the living grace,

295

With gold and jewels cover ev'ry part,
And hide with ornaments their want of art.
True Wit is Nature to advantage drefs'd,
What oft was thought, but ne'er so well express'd;

get from the croud by the affiftance of this guide, willingly follows Caprice, which will be sure to lead him into fingularities. Again, true Knowledge is the art of treasuring up only that which, from its ufe in life, is worthy of being lodged in the memory. But Curiofity confifts in a vain attention to every thing out of the way, and which, for its ufeleffness the world leaft regards. Laftly, Exactness is the juft proportion of parts to one another, and their harmony in the whole: But he who has not extent of capacity for the exercise of this quality, contents himself with Nicety, which is a bufying one's self about points and fyllables.

VER. 297. True Wit is Nature to advantage dress'd, etc.] This definition is very exact. Mr. Locke had defined Wit to confift" in the affemblage of ideas, and putting thofe together, "with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any re"femblance or congruity, whereby to make up pleasant pictures "and agreeable vifions in the fancy." But that great Philofopher, in feparating Wit from Judgment, as he does in this

300

Something, whose truth convinc'd at fight we find,
That gives us back the image of our mind.
As fhades more sweetly recommend the light,
So modeft plainnefs fets off fprightly wit.

For works may have more wit than does 'em good,
As bodies perifh thro' excess of blood.

305

Others for Language all their care express, And value books, as women men, for Dress: Their praise is ftill,—the Style is excellent : The Sense, they humbly take upon content. Words are like leaves; and where they most abound, Much fruit of fense beneath is rarely found.

310

place, has given us (and he could therefore give us no other) only an account of Wit in general: In which false Wit, though not every species of it, is included. Aftriking Image therefore of Nature is, as Mr. Locke obferves, certainly Wit: But this image may firike on feveral other accounts, as well as for its truth and beauty; and the Philofopher has explained the manner how. But it never becomes that Wit which is the ornament of true Poefy, whose end is to represent Nature, but when it drees that Nature to advantage, and prefents her to us in the brightest and most amiable light. And to know when the Fancy has done its office truly, the poet fubjoins this admirable Teft, viz. When we perceive that it gives us back the image of our mind. When it does that, we may be fure it plays no tricks with us: For this image is the creature of the Judgment; and whenever Wit corresponds with Judgment, we may fafely pronounce it to be true.

"Naturam intueamur, hanc fequamur: id facillime accipi“unt animi quod agnofcunt.” Quintil, lib. viii. c. 3.

Falfe eloquence, like the prifmatic glass,
Its gaudy colours fpreads on ev'ry place;
The face of Nature we no more survey,
All glares alike, without diftinction gay:
But true Expreffion, like th' unchanging Sun,315
Clears, and improves whate'er it shines upon,
It gilds all objects, but it alters none.
Expreffion is the dress of thought, and still
Appears more decent, as more suitable;
A vile conceit in pompous words exprefs'd
Is like a clown in regal purple drefs'd:
For diff'rent ftyles with diff'rent fubjects fort,
As feveral garbs with country, town, and court.
Some by old words to fame have made pretence,
Ancients in phrafe, meer moderns in their sense;

320

VER. 311. Falfe eloquence, like the prifmatic glass, etc.] This fimile is beautiful. For the falfe colouring, given to objects by the prifmatic glass, is owing to its untwifting, by its obliquities, thofe threads of light, which Nature had put together in order to fpread over its works an ingenious and fimple candour, that fhould not hide, but only heighten the native complexion of the objects. And falfe Eloquence is nothing else but the straining and divaricating the parts of true expression; and then daubing them over with what the Rhetoricians very properly term coLOURS; in lieu of that candid light, now loft, which was reflected from them in their natural ftate while fincere and entire.

VER. 324. Some by old words, etc.] "Abolita et abrogata retinere, infolentiæ cujufdam eft, et frivolæ in parvis jactan"tie." Quint. lib. i. c. 6.