7. It may be said, perhaps, that the epithet is used in a plain sense, when applied to objects of sensation; and in a figurative one, when applied to objects of intellect: but no such distinction exists in fact; for, when applied to objects of sight or hearing, it is, in most instances, applied to qualities purely intellectual; such as composition, proportion, expression, fitness, &c. which perpetually distinguish the beautiful from the ugly in the same species; though often totally changed when applied to another species, and sometimes, when applied to a different class in the same species; of both which instances will be given in the sequel. It is true that all epithets, employed to distinguish qualities perceivable only by intellect, were originally applied to objects of sense for as such objects are the primary subjects of thought and observation, the primary words in all languages belong to them; and are therefore applied transitively, though not always figuratively, to objects of intellect or imagination. That expression only is properly figurative which employs the image or idea of one thing to illustrate another: but when we speak of the beauty of virtue, we mean the pleasing result of well-balanced and duly proportioned affections; and, when we speak of the beauty of the human form, we mean the pleasing result of well-balanced and duly proportioned

limbs and features. In both instances the word is equally applied to the results of proportion, without reference to any other image; and though, in the one, the general subject be mental, and in the other corporeal, the particular object, in both, is an abstract idea, and consequently, purely intellectual; nor is the expression more figurative in the one than in the other*. If we speak, indeed, of any individual human form, the idea is not abstract; but then it is complex: and of the ideas that compose it, those of colour only are immediately derived from the sense of sight; the others being entirely the results of mental operation, employing the evidence of other senses; as has been abundantly shewn by Locke, Reid, and other metaphysical writers; and as will be further explained in the course of this inquiry.

8. I admit, however, that the word Beauty entirely changes its meaning with every complete or generic change of its application: that is, accordingly as it is applied to objects of the

* Η συμμετρία των μελων μετα της ευχροίας το καλλας ποιει το owμatos. Gregor. Nyssen. orat. de anima.

Καλλος εσι το εν τη συνθέσει των μελων ευαρμοσον, επανθεσαν αυτῷ την χαριν εχον. Basil. Cas. in xliv.

Καλλος ψυχης το κατ' αρετην συμμετρον. Id. in Isai. c. v. Καλος κάγαθος-τελεως σπουδαίος, επι γαρ της αρετης το καλο nai ayadov deyeo. Aristot. Six. μεν. lib. ii. c. ix.

senses, the imagination, or the understanding; for, though these faculties are so mixed and compounded in their operations, in the complicated mind of civilized man, that it is extremely difficult to discriminate them accurately; yet the pleasures of each, though mixed in their effects, are utterly distinct in their causes.

9. Perfect beauty, indeed, taking perfect in its most strict, and beauty in its most comprehensive signification, ought to be equally pleasing to all; but of this instances are scarcely to be found: for, as to taking them, or, indeed, any examples for illustration, from the other sex of our own species, it is extremely fallacious; as there can be little doubt that all male animals think the females of their own species the most beautiful productions of Nature. At least, we know this to be the case among the different varieties of men, whose respective ideas of the beauty of their females are as widely different as those of man, and any other animal, can be. The sable Africans view with pity and contempt the marked deformity of the Europeans; whose mouths are compressed, their noses pinched, their cheeks shrunk, their hair rendered lank and flimsy; their bodies lengthened and emaciated, and their skins unnaturally bleached by shade and seclusion, and the baneful influence of a cold

humid climate*. Were they to draw an image of female perfection, or a goddess of love and beauty, she would have a broad flat nose, high cheeks, woolly hair, a jet black skin, and squat thick form, with breasts reaching to her navel. To us imagination can scarcely present a more disgusting mass of deformity; but perhaps at Tomboctoo the fairest nymph of St. James's, who, while she treads the mazes of the dance, displays her light and slender form through transparent folds of muslin, might make the

See Park's Journey to the Niger. A Birman describing a very ugly race of people to Captain Symes, the English ambassador, mentioned white teeth as a principal characteristic of their ugliness; the inhabitants of that empire, like those of many other countries of the East, staining their teeth black.-Voyage to Ava, c. x. p. 264.

Mr. Hearne, who resided more than twenty years among the nations of the frozen regions of North America, says, "Ask a northern Indian what is beauty, he will answer, a broad flat face, small eyes, high cheek bones, three or four black lines across each cheek, a low forehead, a large broad chin, a clumsy hook nose, a tawny hide, and breasts hanging down to the belt."

The same people were so far from thinking the whiteness of an European skin at all conducive to beauty, that it only excited in them the disgusting idea of dead flesh sodden in water till all the blood and juices were extracted.-Journey from Hudson's Bay to the Northern Ocean, &c. p. 88 and 122.

See various other opposite opinions on this subject, cited by Buffon, Hist. Nat. t. ii. p. 555.

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same impression; and who shall decide which party is right, or which is wrong; or whether the black or white model be, according to the laws of nature, the most perfect specimen of a perfect woman? The late great physiologist, John Hunter, used to maintain (and I think he proved it), that the African black was the true original man, and all the others only different varieties derived from him, and more or less debased or improved. If so, what more infallible criterion can there be for judging of the natural taste and inclination of mankind, than the unsophisticated sentiments of the most natural and original of the species? We can neither weigh nor measure the results of feeling or sentiment; and can only judge whether they are just and natural, or corrupt and artificial, by comparing them with the general laws of nature; that is, with the general deductions, which we make from the particular operations of nature, which fall under our observation for of the real laws of nature we know nothing; these deductions amounting to no more than rules of analogy of our own forming; by which, we judge of the future by the past, and form opinions of things, which we do not know, by things which we do.

10. It was, probably, from observing this marked difference, and even direct opposition of tastes, in matters which affect the primary