GRAMMAR ON ITS TRUE BASIS. THE four Works, forming Mr. SMART'S THEORETICAL and PRACTICAL ENGLISH GRAMMAR, may be had separately, or variously bound together. Separately, cloth, cut. 1. THE ACCIDENCE, 1s. Variously bound together, cloth, cut. 5. ACCIDENCE and PRINCIPLES, 4s. 6. MANUAL and KEY, 3s. 7. ACCIDENCE and MANUAL, 3s. 8. ACCIDENCE, PRINCIPLES, and MANUAL, 6s. Ed. Also in two vols. 7s. cloth, 8s. roan. 9. Vol. 1. ACCIDENCE, MANUAL, and KEY. PRINTED BY W. CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD-STREET. A MANUAL OF LOGIC: BEING ONE OF TWO SEQUELS TO "GRAMMAR ON ITS 66 By B. H. SMART, 66 AUTHOR OF BEGINNINGS OF A NEW SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS;" A MANUAL 66 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF ELOCUTION;" &c. LONDON: 1849. PREFACE. THIS Manual of Logic is humble in its size, and form of publication; but in its principles it pretends to originality, and in its purpose to interfere with doctrines that have been advocated by some of the profoundest teachers of our kind. I wish, therefore, in this preface, to excuse such presumption as this very statement carries with it, and to soften, as well as I can, the prejudice which I may raise by making it. First, then, for my pretensions to originality. I think I have the good fortune to start, in this work, with a few self-evident, or nearly self-evident principles, which have been overlooked by all who have gone before me in this department of learning. What they are, and how they affect the kind of instruction here proposed, will appear on an examination of the work; but I may as well indicate them at present, in order that the critical examiner may be prepared to trace their effect in the detail which follows. In the first place, I think it all but selfevident, if not quite so, that every single word competently used, is the sign of knowledge, and that, in calling it the sign of an idea, we either mean the same thing, or we have no distinct, definite meaning in so using the term idea. Secondly, it appears to me another self-evident truth, that every act of the natural understanding which increases or which develops our knowledge, involves three things,-the thing newly-known or newly-recognized; the thing or things in some relation to it, by being aware of which relation, it is newly, or better known; and the knowledge itself; which knowledge it is the privilege of our species to entertain separately, (apart, abstractly,) so as to be applicable to other things hypothetically, in order, by inquiry, to push our knowledge further. If to others, as to myself, this statement should not convey a self-evident truth, I believe the obstruction to be no other than will be removed by the examples, furnished in various places throughout this work. Thirdly, it appears also self-evident to me, and, with less difficulty than attends the previous statement, will I think, appear evident to others, that words which join to make sense, lose their separate (their more abstract) meaning, in a meaning which they unite to signify; so that the longest expression which can be formed. by words that, in this manner, make sense, are but as one single word, with reference to the sense which is thus attained and signified. Such are the principles,-few, simple, and selfevident, or very nearly so,-which have nevertheless been overlooked, or at least, not considered up to their full weight, by those who have formed systems of logic, especially by Aristotle and his followers; by those who, in any past days, have |