ESSAY IX.

OF DIFFERENCE IN OPINION.

SECT. I.

ONE of the best practical rules of morality that

ever was delivered, is that of putting ourselves in the place of another, before we act or decide any thing refpecting him.

It is by this means only that we can form an adequate idea of his pleasures and pains. The nature of a being, the first principle of whofe exiftence is fenfation, neceffarily obliges us to refer every thing to ourselves; and, but for the practice here recommended, we should be in danger of looking upon the concerns of others with inadvertance, confequently with indifference.

Nor is this voluntary tranfgreffion lefs neceffary, to enable us to do juftice to other men's motives and opinions, than to their feelings.

We obferve one mode of conduct to be that which, under certain given circumftances, as mere fpectators, we should determine to be most confiftent with our notions of propriety. The first impulfe of every human being, is, to regard a different conduct with

impatience and refentment, and to afcribe it, when pursued by our neighbour, to a wilful perverfeness, choofing, with open eyes and an enlightened judgment, the proceeding leaft compatible with reafon.

The most effectual method for avoiding this mifinterpretation of our neighbour's conduct, is to put ourfelves in his place, to recollect his former habits and prejudices, and to conjure up in our minds the allurements, the impulfes and the difficulties to which he was fubject.

Perhaps it is more easy for us to make due allowances for, or, more accurately speaking, to form a just notion of, our neighbour's motives and actions, than of his opinions.

In actions it is not difficult to understand, that a man may be hurried away by the pressure of circumftances. The paffion may be ftrong; the temptation may be great; there may be no time for deliberation.

Thefe confiderations do not apply, or apply with a greatly diminished force, to the cafe of a man's forming his judgement upon a fpeculative queftion. Time for deliberation may, fooner or later, always be obtained. Paffion indeed may incline him to one fide rather than the other; but not with the impetuofity, with which from time to time it incites us to action. Temptation there may be; but of fo fober and methodical a fort, that we do not eafily believe, that

its march can go undetected, or that the mind of the man who does not furmount it, can poffefs any con

-fiderable share of integrity or good faith.

X

No fentiment therefore is more prevalent, than that which leads men to ascribe the variations of opinion which fubfift in the world, to dishonesty and perverfenefs. It is thus that a Papist judges of a Proteftant, and a Protestant of a Papift; fuch is the decifion" of the Hanoverian upon the Jacobite, and the Jacobite upon the Hanoverian ; fuch the notion formed by the friend of establishments concerning the republican, and by the republican concerning the friend of establishThe chain of evidence by which every one of thefe parties is determined, appears, to the adherent of that party, fo clear and fatisfactory, that he hef tates not to pronounce, that perverfeness of will only could refift it.

ments.

This fort of uncharitableness was to be expected under the prefent condition of human intellect. No character is more rare than that of a man who can do juftice to his antagonist's argument; and, till this is done, it must be equally difficult to do justice to an antagonist's integrity. Afk a man, who has been the auditor of an argument, or who has recently read a book, adverfe to his own habits of thinking, to reftate the reasonings of the adverfary. You will find him betraying the cause he undertakes to explain, in every point. He exhibits nothing but a miferable deformity, in which the moft vigilant adversary could fcarcely recognife his image. Nor is there any dif honesty in this. He tells you as much as he underftood. Since therefore he understands nothing of the adversary but his oppofition, it is no wonder that he is virulent in his invective against him.

The ordinary ftrain of partifans, are like the two knights, of whom we are told that, in coming in oppofite directions to a head fixed on a pole in a crossway, of which one fide was gold, and the other filver, they immediately fell to tilting; the right-hand champion ftoutly maintained that the head was gold and the other as indignantly rejoining that it was filver. Not one difputant in tenever gives himfelf the trouble to pafs over to his adverfary's pofition; and, of thofe that do, many take fo short and timid a glance, and with an organ fo clouded with prejudice, that, for any benefit they receive, they might as well have remained eternally upon the fame spot.

There is fcarcely a queftion in the world, that does not admit of two plaufible ftatements. There is fcarcely a ftory that can be told, of which one fide is not good, till the other is related. When both fides have been heard, the ordinary refult to a careful and strict obferver, is, much contention of evidence, much obícurity, and much fcepticifm. He that is fmitten with fo ardent a love of truth, as continually to fear left error fhould pass upon him under fome fpecious difguife, will find himfelf ultimately reduced to a nice weighing of evidence, and a fubtle obfervation as to which fcale preponderates upon almoft every important question. Such a man will exprefs neither aftonishment nor unbelief, when he is told that another perfon, of uncommon purity of motives, has been led to draw a different conclufion.

It would be difficult to confer a greater benefit tupon mankind, than would be conferred by him, who should

perfuade them to a difcarding of mutual bigotry, and induce them to give credit to each other for their common differences of opinion. Such a perfuafion would effect an almost univerfal rout of the angry paffions. Perfecution and profecution for opinion would rarely venture abroad in the world. Much of family diffenfon, much of that which generates alienation in the kindest bosoms, much even of the wars which have hitherto defolated mankind, would be fwept away for ever from the face of the earth. There is nothing about which men quarrel more obftinately and irreconcilably, than difference of opinion. There is nothing that engenders a profounder and more invete rate hate.

If this fubject were once understood, we should then look only to the confequences of opinions. We should no more think of hating a man for being an atheist ora republican, though these opinions were exactly oppofite to our own, than for having the plague. We should pity him; and regret the neceffity, if neceffity there were, for taking precautions against him. the mean time there is this difference, between a man holding erroneous opinions, and a man infected with contagious diftemper. Miftaken opinions are perhaps never a fource of tumult and disorder unless the perfons who hold them are perfecuted*, or placed under circumstances of iniquitous oppreffion +. The remedy

As at the period of the Reformation.

In

+ As in the period preceding the French Revolution, where the general oppreffion of all orders of men, gave a tumultuous activity to the principle of innovation.