tial to the Juftnefs of Thought, which does not always require fo much Symmetry and fo much Sporting. 'Tis fufficient that a Thought be true in all the Extent of it, and has the fame Face on what Side fo ever you regard it. This juft Way of Thinking is not the Portion of every one; it requires a right Understanding, a found Judgement, and fomething of the Genius of Homer, whofe Thoughts and Words, as Ariftotle obferves, were always proportion'd to the Subject he treats of, and who, for that Reason, is loft to us in the laft English Translation.

BALZAC, who is not fo correct in his Thoughts as Voiture, tho' he is more fo in his Elocution and Stile, thinks however very juftly fometimes, as, where he fays of Montagne, He is a Guide out of the Way, but he leads one into Countries more agreeable than thofe he promis'd us. C'est un Guide qui egare,&c. Further,tho' in whatever kind we write, we ought always to think juftly, yet we ought to do fo more in fome Kinds than in others. Elegy, for Example, and Tragedy, demand more exact Truth than Epigram and Madrigal. There are in Profe certain comick and merry Subjects, where this Exactnefs is not fo neceffary; there are others grave and ferious, where 'tis of abfolute Neceffity: Such are all moral Difcourfes. Yet there are feveral Books of Morality, wherein we meet with many falfe Thoughts. As this for Instance: All Kinds of Writing pleafe us only from the fecret Corruption of our Hearts; when we meet with the fublime, the noble and free Air in a Difcourfe, the Pleasure arifes from our own Vanity, which is fond of Grandeur and Independance. Can any Thing be more falfe, than to impute to the Corruption of the Heart, that which is the Effect of good Taste and Difcernment? Well written Pieces please Men of Sense, because they are regular, and whatever is perfect in its Kind, generally gives Content. Vanity has no more Share in the Pleasure we take in reading Virgil and Cicero, than it has in the Pleafure we find in looking on excellent Pictures, or in hearing excellent Mufick, The most humble Man is delighted with thofe Beauties as well as another, if he understands and taftes them. When I read the holy Scripture, which is at the fame Time fo fimple and fo fublime, is it the Conceit of my own Dignity, or the Corruption of my Heart, which caufes the Delight I take in it? Is it not rather the Simplicity and Majefty of the divine Word, which make an Impreffion; and may we not in fome wife fay the fame of the great Mafters in Poetry and Eloquence? How vain is it to imagine that we love D 4

the

the Grandour and Facility of their Stile only out of Pride, and a Defire of Independance? The fame Author, who has been held in great Admiration, has more fuch Thoughts as that above-cited. Every Man endeavours to occupy as much Place as he can in his own Imagination, and all Men push forward and aggrandize themfelves only to encrease the Idea they have form'd of themselves in their own Mind. This is the End of all their ambitious Lefigns. Alexander and Cæfar had no other View than this in all the Battles they fought; and fhould one be ask'd why the grand Signicr caus'd lately one hundred thousand Men to perish at Candia, one might with Certainty reply, that it was only to add the Title of Conqueror to the interiour Image he had of himself. The Grand Signior might befiege Candia, and never once have thought of that interior Image. He was defirous to be Mafter of a Place, which was commodious for him, or of revenging himself of the Venetians, who had dar'd to declare War against him. He might be willing to augment his Reputation; that is, the Opinion People had of his Power and Greatnefs. Now the Opinion that is had of us does not refide in our felves, but in the Perfons who esteem us, which Reflection relates as much to Alexander and Cæfar as to the Grand Signior. Further, had the Thought been true in Part, it could not be fo in the full Extent of it. In Effect, how many Villains, to acquire Efteem, and to raise themselves, have appear'd honeft, difinterested and virtuous! They know in their Hearts what they are; they do themfelves Juftice; and 'tis the least of their Care to occupy as much Place as they can in their own Imagination, to make the Ufe of a Phrafe fo new and fo elegant. Inftead of endeavouring to augment in their own Mind the Opinion they have there form'd of themselves, they think only of making an advantagious Impreffion on other Mens Minds of that Probity which they have not, and which they do not defire to have. Paf cal fays, Men would willingly be Cowards to have the Reputation of being valiant.

THE above-cited Author again :

WHEN the Ignorant behold the great Libraries, which one may pretty rightly term the Magazine of Mens Fancies, they imagine that a Man would be very happy, or at least very learned, if he knew all that's contain'd in fuch a huge Heap of Volumes, which they look upon as Treasures of Light. But they judge wrong; fuppofe all the Contents were united

in one Man's Head, it would not be the better regulated, nor the wifer, 'twou'd all only obfcure his Light, and encreaje his Confufion. By this way of arguing Ignorance is better than profound Learning; and the more illiterate a Man is, the more his Idea's will be diftinct and clear. The Argument according to his Conclufion is juft, but the Principle is falfe. It is not true that the feveral Parts of Knowledge, which are acquir'd by reading, produce of themselves Confufion and Obfcurity. Thofe ill Effects come only from the ill Difpofition of Mens Understandings. One learned Man is an Abyfs of Literature; but an Abyss may be call'd a Chaos, where all Languages and all Sciences are jumbled together, fo little methodical and clear is his Understanding. Another learned Man, on the contrary, has in his Head an infinite Number of Species plac'd in good Order, and he difcourfes clearly upon every one of them. If a Man's Head is good and well temper'd, if he knows the Contents of fo many Books, that he might be call'd a living Library, (as Origen was) he would not be the more confus'd and obfcure in his Difcourfes, but he might be the more wife and the more regular in his Conduct, if he made a good Ufe of his Lights.

THESE Examples fhew the Weakness of thofe moral Thoughts which are not true. For I fay nothing of thofe Maxims which have any Thing falfe in them: fuch do not deferve the Name of Maxims, whofe only End is to regulate the Manners, and be a Guide to Reafon. Historical Reflections are of no more Value when they are falfe. It were to be wifh'd, that the Authors of two great Histories of England, publifh'd in our Time, had understood fomething of this Matter. Truth, fays Pere Bouhours, is the Soul of Hiftory, and fhould be the Rule in whatever the Hiftorian writes; but it ought to fhine moft in his Reflections; and nothing is more irregular than to think falfely on Events which are true. Plutarch, who had a right Understanding,condemns the famous Thought of an Hitorian on the Burning of Diana's Temple at Ephefus: We are not to wonder that fo magnificent a Building was burnt the very Night that Alexander was born, because the Goddefs who affifted his Mother Olympias, was fo bufy'd about her Midwifery, that she could not attend to put out the Fire. Cicero indeed was mightily pleas'd with this Thought of Timeus the Hiftorian, Concinna ut multa Timæus, qui cum in Hiftoria dixiffet, qua nocte natus Alexander effet,

eadem

De Natur, Deor.

Lib. 2.

eadem Diane Ephefiæ templum deflagraviffe: adjunxit, minime ideje mirandum,quod Diana,cum in partu Olympiadis adeffe voluiffet, abfuiffet domo. Here's Plutarch against Cicero, and Father Bouhours owns he does not very well understand what Cicero meant by it, unless he look'd upon Timaus's Thought as the Imagination of a Poet, and not as the Reflection of an Hiftorian, which cannot be, because he commends it as a pretty Thought in his Hiftory. Cicero naturally lov'd Raillery and Jeits, infomuch, that Quintilian tells us, he fometimes made very dull ones, and it is probable he was taken with the Pleafantry of the Thought, without examining it further; whereas Plutarch, who was ferious and critical, confider'd only what it had in it that was false; yet as fevere as he was, he could not help falling into as great an Error as he blam'd in Timeus, by adding, The Reflection of the Hiftorian is fo cold, that 'twas enough to put out the Fire. This Thought of Plutarch is more falfe and more cold than that of Timeus, and there's no Way of bringing him off, but by faying he had a Mind to divert himself, even in the Place where he was fpeaking gravely; but I fear this will hardly do; and 'tis a mortifying Circumftance in Criticism, that one of the greatest Criticks of the Antients, as Plutarch was, fhould make fuch a Blunder himfelf, when he was cenfuring another Man for blundering. I have heard it faid, that Kitcat's Mutton Pies were ordered to be bak'd with Durfey's Works under 'em, by the Founder of the Club; and that upon their complaining the Pies were never bak'd enough, Christopher Kat, the Paftry-Cook, fwore, Durfey's Works were fo cold, that the Dough could not bake for them; but to fay a Thought was fo cold, as to put out the Fire of London, or even St. Paul's Church, has fomething in it fo extravagant, as to fhew us Antiquity it felf is not infallible. The best Excufe for both Cicero and Plutarch is, that what pleases one Man does not infallibly please another, as will be prov'd by an Example taken from the Moderns, two Authors of the French Academy. Balzac, the greatest Master of the French Eloquence, could not bear this Saying of Pompey, which is quoted with Applaufe in the Spectator, No. 507. It is neceffary for me to go, but it is not neceflary for me to live. Plut. in Pomp. Here's an Apparence of fomething finely faid, cries Balzac, which however, if

nar

narrowly look'd into, deftroys it felf, and implies a meer Contradiction; for to go, he must live, and confequently the one is as necessary as the other. The Spectator's Tranf lation of it fpoils this Remark, It is neceffary for me to fail, and not to go. Now to fail, it was not neceffary for him to live; for his Corpfe might have been tranfported in the Ship, as well dead as alive; but to go, it was neceffary for him to live. La Mothe le Vayer differs directly from Balzac: He thinks Pompey's Saying is excellent, as full of Reafon and Senfe, as of Refolution and Courage. Pere Bouhours is of the fame Opinion; he fees no Contradiction in it, but much of the Sentiments of a true Roman. He declares, that to execute the Orders of the Senate, he values his Life lefs than his Honour; I am, he would fay, indifpenfably oblig'd to do my Duty, tho' it cafts me my Life; and I must not spare it at the Expence of my Ho'tis neceffary that I obey and embark, as dangerous as it may be in fuch tempestuous Weather. It is not neceffary that I preferve my felf, nor that I live.

nour;

Where's the Contradiction? he has no Regard to any Thing but the proper phyfical Sense, in saying, To go, he must live, and the one was as nece Jary as the other; that Senfe is the Moral which includes the Obligation and Duty.

ALEXANDER fays, in the Quintius Curtius of Vaugelas, j'aime mieux combattre que de vivre, &c. I had rather fight than live; and Titus in the Berenice of Racine;

Mais il ne s'agit plus de vivre, il faut regner.
The Matter now is not to live, but reign.

Both thefe Expreffions are like that of Pompey, and no Critick has pretended yet to cenfure them. And we read in the before-mentioned Spectator, that one of the Fathers carry'd this Point fo high, as to declare, He would not tell a Lye, tho' he were fure to gain Heaven by it; which is Extravagance it felf,. in Comparison with what Pompey faid, and the Thought equally falfe and daring.

To continue the learned Jefuit's Obfervations on hiftorical Reflections. If we examine the greatest Part of those that are in certain Hiftories, fuch as the English ones lately hinted at, we fhall find the Falfe in them prevail abundantly, fuch as this Thought in

Strada de Bell. Belg. Dec. 2. Lib. 3. Hiftorical Reflections, Adeo non ex vano obfervatum cure