Nature affords at least a glimm'ring light; VARIATIONS. Between ver. 25 and 26 were these lines, fince omitted by the author: Many are fpoil'd by that pedantic throng, Who with great pains teach youth to reafon wrong. By ftrange transfufion to improve the mind, Draw off the fense we have, to pour in new; COMMENTARY. of Judgment, and the accidents occafioning thofe mifcarriages before objected to it. He owns, that the feeds of Judgment are indeed fown in the minds of moft men, but by ill culture, as it fprings up, it generally runs wild: either on the one hand, by FALSE LEARNING, which pedants call Philology; or by FALSE REASONING, which Philofophers call School learning: Or, on the other, by FALSE WIT, which is not regulated by fenfe; or by FALSE POLITENESS, which is folely regulated by the fashion. Both these forts, who have each their Judgment thus doubly depraved, the poet observes, are naturally turned to cenfure and abufe; only with this difference, that the NOTES. VER. 25. So by falfe learning]" Plus fine doctrina prudentia, quam fine prudentia valet doctrina." Quint. "P. In fearch of wit these lofe their common fenfe, COMMENTARY. Dunce always affects to be on the reafoning, and the Fool on the laughing fide.-And thus, at the fame time, our author proves the truth of his introductory observation, that the number of bad Critics is vaftly fuperior to that of bad Poets. VER. 36. Some have at firft for Wits, etc.] The poet having enumerated, in this account of the nature of Judgment and its NOTES. VER. 28. In Search of wit thefe lofe their common fenfe,] This obfervation is extremely juft. Search of Wit is not only the occafion, but the efficient caufe of the lofs of common fenfe. For Wit confifting in chufing out, and fetting together fuch Ideas from whofe affemblage pleasant pictures may be drawn on the Fancy; the Judgment thro' an habitual fearch of Wit, lofes, by degrees, its faculty of feeing the true relation of things; in which confists the exercise of common fenfe. VER. 32. All fools have fill an itching to deride, And fain would be upon the laughing fide.] The fentiment is juft. And if Hobbes's account of Laughter be true, that it arifes from a filly pride, we fee the reafon of it. The expreffion too is fine; it alludes to the condition of Idiots and natural fools, who are observed to be ever on the grin. Some neither can for Wits nor Critics pass, COMMENTARY. various depravations, the feveral forts of bad critics, and ranked them into two general Claffes; as the firft fort, namely the men fpoiled by falfe learning, are but few in comparison of the other, and likewife come lefs within his main view (which is poetical Criticifm) but keep groveling at the bottom amongst words and fyllables, he thought it enough for his purpose here, juft to have mentioned them, propofing to do them right hereafter. But the men fpoiled by falfe tafte are innumerable; and These are his proper concern: He therefore, [from ver. 35 to 46.] fub-divides them again into the two claffes of the volatile and heavy: He defcribes, in few words, the quick progrefs of the One thro' Criticifm, from falfe wit, to plain folly, where they end; and the fixed station of the Other be tween the confines of both; who under the name of Witlings, have neither end nor measure. A kind of half-formed creature from the equivocal generation of vivacity and dulness, like thofe on the banks of Nile, from heat and mud. NOTES. VER: 43. Their generation's fo equivocal:] It is fufficient that a principle of philofophy has been generally received, whether it be true or falfe, to justify a poet's use of it to fet off his wit. But, to recommend his argument he should be cautious how he uses any but the true. For falfehood, when It is fet too near the truth, will tarnish what it should brighten up. Befides, the analogy between natural and moral truth makes the principles of true Philosophy the fittest for this ufe. Our Poet has been pretty careful in observing this rule. To tell 'em, would a hundred tongues require, Be fure yourself and your own reach to know, COMMENTARY. VER. 46. But you who feek, etc.] Our Author having thus far, by way of INTRODUCTION, explained the nature, ufe, and abufe of Criticism, in a figurative defcription of the qualities and characters of Critics, proceeds now to deliver the precepts of the art. The first of which, from ver. 45 to 68. is, that he who fets up for a Critic fhould previously examine his own ftrength, and fee how far he is qualified for the exercife of his profeffion. He puts him in a way to make this discovery, in that admirable direction given ver. 51. AND MARK THAT POINT WHERE SENSE AND DULNESS. MEET. He had fhewn above, that Judgment, without Tafe or Genius, is equally incapable of making a Critic or a Poet: In whatfoever fubject then the Critic's Tafte no longer accompanies his Judgment, there he may be affured he is going out of his depth. This our Author finely calls, that point where fenfe and dulnefs meet. And immediately adds the REASON of his precept; the Author of Nature having fo conftituted the mental faculties, that one of them can never greatly excel, but at the expence of another. From this ftate of coordination in the mental faculties, and the influence and effects they have upon one another, the Poet draws this CONSEQUENCE, that no one Genius can excell in more than one Art or Science. The confequence fhews the neceffity of the precept, juft as the premiffes, from which the confequence is drawn, fhew the reasonableness of it. 55 Nature to all things fix'd the limits fit, NOTES. 60 VER. 51. And mark that point where fenfe and dulnefs meet.] Befides the peculiar fenfe explained above in the comment, the words have ftill a more general meaning, and caution us against going on, when our Ideas begin to grow obfcure: as we are then most apt to do; tho' that obfcurity is an admonition that we should leave off; for it arises either from our small acquaintance with the fubject, or the incomprehenfibility of its nature. In which circumstances a Genius will always write as fadly as a Dunce. An observation well worth the attention of all profound writers. VER. 56. Thus in the foul while memory prevails, The folid pow'r of understanding fails; The memory's foft figures melt away.] These obfervations are collected from an intimate knowledge of human nature. The cause of that languor and heaviness in the understanding, which is almost infeparable from a very strong and tenacious memory, feems to be a want of the proper exercife of that faculty; the understanding being, in a great meafure, unactive, while the memory is cultivating. As to the other appearance, the decay of memory by the vigorous ex |