sence, however inferior, in man. That essence is the soul,"

"The philosopher who shall establish even probable grounds for the common opinion of the soul's immortality will be, of all men, the most deserving of the gratitude of his species."- p. 20.

Which opinion, however, he, after an interval of years, believes he "may unhesitatingly retract," having become a materialist, and an advocate for Lawrence on Physiology, and having learned by practice not to set out in an argument with begging the question. The result of the whole of this part of the work is, that the writer overthrows the ancient superstition (as we esteem it) of a separate soul; and not dreaming apparently of any other alternative, adopts with all its difficulties the doctrine of a simultaneous resurrection of the whole human race, excepting of course Christ, Elijah, and probably Moses, and possibly Enoch. As his object is to dwell on the Physical Considerations connected with his various topics, he plunges with his readers into the tossing sea of the ancient metaphysics, where, however some may have found their

"joy

Of youthful sports was on its breast to be

Borne, like its bubbles, onward,"

they have no right to draw others after them without a prospect of bringing them, safe and pleased, to shore; which prospect is not ours at present; so that we shall content ourselves with sympathizing with our author in his evident enjoyment of these invigorating exercises, and with congratulating him on his general acuteness; though his zeal leads him occasionally into temptations to injure the arguments of others by exaggeration, and his own by deficiency

of method in his arrangement. We cannot approve, for instance, of the following method of stating the alternative between the flight of the soul at death, and the resurrection of the body on the day of judgment.

"The question is, an immortal soul? or a resurrection from death? Let us inquire what would be our choice if that gracious Maker should say to us, 'Choose ye! an eternal state of being is assured to you. Will ye enter it at the moment when terminates your mortal career? And breaking away from a social world to which ye are linked by a thousand affectionate ties, will ye adventure, desolate and alone, into the infinitude of the universe, to seek ye know not where, for the Elysium of your hopes, the dwelling-place of those who were dear to you upon earth? Or will ye rest awhile from your labors? Repose in the grave with those whom you loved-mingle your dust with theirs-dissolve away together into apparent nothingness; yet at the appointed time hear my promised summons, and start TOGETHER into renovated existence?' If such were the proposition, few would find a difficulty in making their election. What our gracious Creator, in his benignity, seems to have decided for us, is the distribution we should have anxiously chosen for ourselves." — p. 67.

Not, perhaps, if the alternative had been fairly put; for the soul would not "adventure, desolate and alone," would not be ignorant where to seek, &c., if its separation from the body had been ordained by God. What would Mr. Carmichael think of the following statement of his adversary's argument?

666 Choose ye ! an eternal state of being is promised to you. Will ye make that promise a mockery by falling into a state of virtual annihilation, from which ye shall not be restored for ages of ages; will ye choose corruption in its most loathsome form, and forego all which distinguished you from the clod of the valley, all which made God your God,

and his angels your brethren; or, if there be within you an indestructible germ of being, will ye commit that atom to the winds of heaven, or confound it with the sands of the desert, or plunge it in the deepest caverns of the ocean? —or will ye rather preserve without intermission the dignity of your conscious being, passing with incommunicable rapture from the chamber of mourning, and the bed of disease, to a region of life and love and glory, where blessed spirits are thronging around to greet you, and where, amidst all its newness and splendor, you shall at once recognise your If such were the proposition, few would find a difficulty in making their election," &c.

The faults

Is the one statement more fair than the other? of arrangement by which the author's own argument suffers are inherent in the plan of the work, and are perplexing to his readers, who need every aid which method can give towards understanding the drift of the writer amidst his changes of opinion. One thing, however, is clear; that he vanquishes the immaterialist as far as he attempts it; and that, if his own scheme is surrounded with difficulties nearly as great, he is ready to perceive and admit them.

In the section relating to the nature of superior beings, our author does not go over much of the ground turned up by the Angelic Doctor, though it may seem difficult on such a subject to avoid his traces. Here we have rather a speculation on what our own state and employments shall be here. after, than an inquiry into the actual constitution of angels. This is very well; for in the first case we have a starting point of fact; in the last we have none. Till we have some better evidence of the existence of superior beings than our own presumptions, however strong, we cannot hope to learn much of their nature, and shall only lose time in doubting "whether objects involved in utter darkness are not visible to those beings; and whether their conversation is not audible to each other, even in a void." Does not our author perceive

that in the license of conjecture he has in this instance allowed himself, the doubt itself rests on the assumption that angels have eyes, lungs, and ears?

On the eternally interesting topic of Providence, general or particular, our author writes in a way to perpetuate the interest and beauty of the theme; but is he sure that we must wait till we join the brotherhood of superior beings before we can solve its difficulties? Do they not arise from the assumption that Time is a condition of being to which Deity itself is subject? Our own intellectual progression here undoubtedly causes a gradual change in our relation to Time, and thereby enables us to obtain some notion of the mode in which we shall, when further improved, perceive a general and particular Providence to be the same thing. The difficulties of this subject appear to us to be so evidently soluble, that in a few generations they will probably be heard of no more. We speak not here of the designs of Providence, but merely of the perplexities attending the doctrinal division of Providence into general and particular.

Our author well exposes the absurdities which have arisen from the changes of meaning which the word spirit has undergone, from the ancient times when it signified etherealized matter, as well as that which is not matter at all, to the present day, when the term is commonly used in close argument with more precision. He supposes that all beings except the Supreme who have been called spiritual are organized, and that it is therefore rational to speculate on the conditions of their existence; which he does with some acuteness, and a great deal of eloquence. We have been doubting which of two passages to extract; a speculation on the powers of superior beings, or a defence of the inquiry, on the ground that no truth can be dangerous. We conclude to give both.

"Is it inconsistent with reason to suppose that Omnipotence could bring into existence an ORGANIZED being, endowed with more numerous and excellent faculties than man, and framed of more pure and imperishable materials — that such a being, though privileged from the inspection of senses like ours, is open to the observation of such beings as himself— that his enjoyments must be great in proportion to his capacity for happiness; and his desire of knowledge commensurate with his powers to attain it-that the wonders of nature cannot be disregarded by him, if scrutinized with enthusiasm by subordinate creatures like us. If we follow after truth till our limited faculties fail us, will he not maintain the pursuit to the verge of creation? If such be his passion, will God deny him the power to indulge it? To believe that in the wide extent of this universe no creature exists with such passions and such powers, is almost to believe that this universe was created in vain a menagerie indeed for rational creatures to fatten and breed in; but not the magnificent temple of God, worthy to be viewed from every aspect, examined in every detail, and studied in its beautiful and stupendous proportions. Is it not rational then to presume that such creatures exist, animated with such propensities, and endowed with such powerful means to accomplish their purposes? The speed of a comet may indeed fall short of their necessities; but they may be gifted with the velocity of light. But will that velocity suffice them?—It will scarcely transport them from one fixed star to another, though the distance be no greater than from Sirius to the Sun, in a shorter period than six of our years- nor would it convey them to the most distant star of our own Galaxy in less than 3000. But in travelling with the incessant speed of light to the most distant nebula, whose radiance has entered the telescope of Herschel, upwards of 30,000 years would scarcely determine their journey. Even those superior beings could scarcely afford out of eternity, to a single purpose, so vast an expenditure of time. Their swiftness must therefore be incomparably greater than the swiftness of light, — the greatest