actly on the same principle which leads me to expect that the stone which I throw into the air will fall to the ground. When I enter a bookseller's shop to purchase a book, I as fully calculate on his parting with the volume for the customary price, as I presume on the combustion of paper when thrown into the fire. If I attempt to persuade a fellowcreature to refrain from a meditated crime, my advice proceeds on the same assumption, that similar moral effects will follow the moral causes with which they have been hitherto found conjoined. I point out, perhaps, the consequences of the action in rousing the indignation of mankind, and leading them to inflict punishment on the perpetrator; or I endeavour to show the remorse by which it will be pursued in his own breast. And if he were to ask me how I could tell that these effects would follow, I should answer, that they had been found to do so in similar cases. Should he proceed still further in his inquiries, should he request to know how I could tell that the same effects would again attend the same causes, I could merely answer, that the assumption of this uniformity of sequence was a necessary condition of thought, which neither he nor myself could avoid; and that his own questions afforded an instance of it, since they proceeded upon the expectation, not only that his words would reach my ears, as in times past, but that certain ideas and volitions would be excited in my mind as heretofore, the result of which would be an answer to his inquiries.

"It may be objected, however, that our confidence in these cases is not so great as it is in regard to physical events; that there is always more or less of uncertainty in our anticipations; that my correspondent may not be able to read my letter, since he may have lost his memory; that my other friend may have changed his views, and may feel no joy at the accomplishment of his wishes; that the bookseller may refuse to part with his volumes; and that in the last hypothetical case adduced, mankind may no longer feel incensed at those actions which formerly roused their indignation.

“The reply to this objection is not difficult. In all these cases there is no want of faith in the uniformity of causation: our uncertainty by no means relates to the principle itself, but to the point whether all the same causes, and no other, are in operation: and if the event at any time turn out contrary to our expectations, we feel well assured of the presence of some extraordinary cause ·an assurance evidently proceeding on the assumption, that if the causes had been the same, the effects must also have been similar. Thus, if my correspondent is unable to read my letter, if he no longer connects any meaning with the written words, I am convinced that some extraordinary calamity has befallen him. If the bookseller refuse to sell me his volumes, I feel no hesitation in ascribing his conduct to some particular motive not usually at work in his mind: all proving, not that there is a want of uniformity in the sequence of causes and effects, but that there is a different assemblage of causes; that some essential circumstance has been left out, or some unusual one crept into the accustomed combination." p. 220.

That our certainty and uncertainty, in relation to moral, are of the same nature as in relation to physical events, is clearly shown by a perspicuous method of comparison. Physical events are divided into four classes in which the issues are anticipated with different degrees of assurance, while the conviction of the connexion of cause and effect remains unshaken; and voluntary actions are afterwards classified in a similar manner.

1st. Some events are observed to be so invariably connected with others, that when one takes place, we feel perfectly sure that another will follow; as, when lead is about to be put into water, we expect it to sink; when flame is applied to gunpowder, we anticipate an explosion. These consequences will follow if the antecedents be employed; but whether they will be employed, is yet uncertain.

The second class comprehends events whose causes are in actual operation, and which may therefore be confidently predicted; as the eclipses of the sun and moon.

The third includes those phenomena which, being beyond the reach of human foresight, are to us uncertain; as the state of the wind and weather, and a multitude of others. Analogous in point of uncertainty to these are many events connected with those concerning which we feel perfect assurance. For instance, we predict that an elastic ball thrown against a hard floor will rebound; but the precise curve it will describe, and in what part of the floor its motion will cease, must be ascertained by experiment.

In the fourth class are included events which may be predicted in the gross, but not in the detail; such as the regular return of the seasons.

The corresponding classes of voluntary actions are shown to afford corresponding degrees of assurance in our anticipations. We calculate, that if a man be hungry, he will eat; if in danger of fire, that he will attempt to escape, &c. If it be objected that a hungry man may refuse to eat, it is replied, that some motive to abstinence then interferes. In like manner, lead may not sink in water (a lump of cork may buoy it up); but in both cases, the result is influenced by an adventitious circumstance. Again; some voluntary actions may be confidently predicted, their antecedents being in actual operation; as, that speeches will be made in the present session of parliament; that the tradesmen in the next town will shut their shops on Sunday, and so on. The third class is the most numerous, comprehending the majority of the actions of mankind. Like the wind and weather, meteors and water-spouts, those actions of men of which we see not the springs, are uncertain: and the various degrees of uncertainty closely correspond with the analogous class of physical

events.

The correspondence between the events of the fourth class is equally complete. The toil of the husbandman may be anticipated with the return of the spring, though we know not the detail of his labors. Men will eat and sleep, during the next year, we are assured; though at what hours, and with what individual exceptions, we cannot declare.

The illustrations of the doctrine in question in the sixth chapter are so apt and beautiful, that we cannot help making a long extract:

"The principal illustration, however, which I have to adduce on this subject, is the science of political economy, especially as it will afford, at the same time, an opportunity of exhibiting the real basis of this science, which has not, perhaps, been fully understood, even by some of those who have been successful in the discovery and elucidation of its truths.

"The principle which is at the bottom of all the reasonings of political economy, is in fact the uniformity with which visible or assignable circumstances operate on the human will. It is, for example, laid down in books on this subject, that if a community can purchase any commodity on lower terms at one market than another, they will resort to the cheaper market; and on this proposition an economist builds a large superstructure of argument, without the least doubt as to the foundation on which it rests, and confidently predicts what will be the conduct of this or that nation to whom such a choice of markets is offered. The result thus predicted is made up of the actions of individuals, all of whose minds are determined by this assignable circumstance.

"Another principle of political economy is, that where competition is left open, there a certain equality takes place in the profits of the various branches of commerce. If any one branch becomes much more lucrative than the rest, a flow of capital to that department soon restores the equilibrium. This principle is explained by Adam Smith in the case of the builder." (Which passage we must however omit.)

"Now, when Dr. Smith asserts that the trade of a builder, under the circumstances supposed, will draw capital from other trades, he is not stating a physical fact which will take place in consequence of some material attraction, but he is laying down a result which will ensue from the known principles of the human mind, or, in other words, from motives acting on society with certainty and precision. The secession of capital from other trades is not a mechanical effect, like the motion of water to its level, but the consequence of a number of voluntary actions. It is an event which is produced through the medium of the wills of human beings, although we reason upon it with as much certainty as on the tendency of water to an equilibrium.

"In employing such figurative expressions as these, in exalting trade and capital into spontaneous agents, and investing them with certain qualities and tendencies, we are apt to be deceived by our own language, to imagine that we have stated the whole of the truth, and to lose sight of all those mental operations concerned in the result which we so concisely express. Let us reflect for a moment on all the intellectual and moral processes which lie hid under the metaphorical description of the trade of a builder drawing capital from other trades. To produce this result, the fact must transpire that the trade is more than ordinarily lucrative; this circumstance must excite the cupidity or emulation of a number of individuals; these individuals must deliberate on the prudence or propriety of embarking in it; they must resolve upon their measures; they must take steps for borrowing money, or withdraw capital before appropriated to other purposes, and apply it to this; in doing which, they will probably have to enter into bargains, make sales, draw bills, and perform a hundred other voluntary actions; the result of all which operations will be the employment of a greater portion of the labor of the community in building than formerly, and a smaller portion in other pursuits; and all these, with a number of other occurrences, are masked under the phrase of one trade drawing capital from another,