and our acquaintance with their qualities extends no further than the fact of their mutual operation. Their mode of operation is still concealed from us, and while this is the case, we can with no propriety speak of the necessary connexion of causes and effects. Were the nature of the connexion ascertained by us, we might be able to pronounce on the cause of an unprecedented phenomenon, antecedent to experiment; which it is well known is beyond our power. A gardener on the coast of Jersey was surprised to find, one year, that four or five strawberry plants bore fruit of a larger size and finer flavor than had ever been seen in the island, while their neighbours of the same bed were of the ordinary size. In order to account for the appearance, the gardener, who was a sensible man, examined the soil, and endeavoured to remember whether any peculiar mode of culture had been employed on the plants. Unable to detect the cause by reflection, he tried experiments, adding various ingredients to the soil; first one, then another, then a compound of several; but without success. At length he consulted his assistant, and discovered, on inquiry, that his children had deposited bunches of seaweed on the spot where the plants grew. More sea-weed was applied with good effect, and from that time the strawberry beds were annually manured with its ashes; the gardener having had sufficient experience of its efficacy to believe that his trouble would not be in vain; though his total ignorance of the mode in which the sea-weed operated on the fibres and juices of the plants would have made him hesitate (had he been a metaphysican) to declare that its influence was necessary. Our author, while he adopts the term we prefer, appears to assume the truth of that which we reject: believing the uniformity of causation, and necessary connexion of cause and effect, to be interchangeable terms. In this part of the Essay, he avoids the use of the term neces

sary, while he assumes the truth of the signification we ascribe to it. This assumption is consistent with his belief in the instinctive nature of the principle which forms the ground of his argument; but it seems to us to be erroneous.

In the second chapter, the writer points out the fact, (of considerable importance to his object,) that while philosophers have been engaged in laying down the belief of the uniformity of causation as a ground for future expectation, they have neglected the consideration that it applies as well to the past as to the future; and have forgotten to argue that like causes not only will produce, but have produced, like effects.

If the necessary connexion of causes and effects be allowed, and if we admit our belief of this connexion to be instinctive, no proof of the above position is needed. But if not, if the connexion be only uniform, it is obvious that the author is already begging the question which he designs afterwards to present to his readers. From instinct there is no appeal; but how is experience to assure us that like causes have always produced like effects? The author affirms with us that it cannot. It is necessary here to make an extract.

"This assumption of the past uniformity of causation will be apparent on the slightest reflection. To have recourse again to our instance of throwing paper into the fire: it is obvious that I not only expect the paper to be burnt, but I assume that fire has always possessed the property of consuming that substance. As a proof that this assumption is involved in my thoughts, it is only necessary to trace the process of my mind in rejecting a narration at variance with my own experience. Should any one assert, that, at a former period of his life, he had thrown paper into the fire, suffered it to remain for five minutes in the flames, and then taken it out unscorched and unconsumed, I should instantly regard the relation as false, and should think it a sufficient refutation to throw a piece of paper into the fire, and thus prove to the narrator the impossibility of what he had asserted. But

why could not paper have remained in the flames for five minutes unconsumed? Because the experiment before us proves that fire has the property of destroying it. Should any one push his inquiries further, and ask why, because you find that fire has at present this property, do you infer that it has always possessed it? I can only reply, that it is an assumption which I necessarily make. I cannot even think of the past without taking it for granted that the same causes have produced the same effects in every age and every country.”. - p. 202.

Our reasons for doubting the assertion would be that men make mistakes and tell falsehoods every day, while fire has always been known to burn. But, at the same time, there is a kind and degree of testimony which would oblige us to believe the declaration, for reasons to be detailed hereafter, when we come to speak of the legitimate bounds of testimony. Our answer to the second question would be, that our belief that fire has always burned arises from a principle which we have no reason to mistrust, though we would be far from engaging never to renounce our belief. The astronomer, therefore, is justified not only in confidently predicting eclipses many centuries before they happen, but also in particularizing with equal confidence the courses of the heavenly bodies, thousands of years before the date of authentic history.

As the author appears to be himself much impressed with the importance of applying the fact he has labored to establish to past as well as future events, we looked for some striking development of consequences, some illustrations of the history of human nature, some interpretations of past events which would throw light on the philosophy of matter or of mind; something more than hints or assertions of the value of the object presented. But none such did we find in this place. Before we had finished the volume, however, we became aware, that though the author

has carefully avoided the development of the consequences which he desires his readers to infer, he makes this chapter the basis of his reasonings on the legitimate bounds of testimony, which will be examined in their proper place.

From our preceding remarks it will be seen that we agree with the author in the reasonings of his third chapter, which proves that the uniformity of causation cannot be established by experience and testimony.

Their object is

The next three chapters are excellent. to establish and illustrate the fact that the uniformity of causation is justly a basis of action and expectation, with respect to mental as well as physical operations. That this truth is not generally allowed by philosophers appears to us extraordinary in every point of view; and more especially, when we consider that they, as well as all other men, act as if possessed of the conviction we wish them to entertain. If two or three philosophers see a guinea presented to a miser, they all expect him to accept it eagerly; and if he refuses it, they all agree, (whatever may be the difference of their opinions respecting a self-determining power,) in supposing that some motive of extraordinary force influences him in his act of rejection. No one of them would believe that, in any age, a drunkard has refused wine, a school-boy a holiday, a warrior his laurels, or a poet his bays, without an inducement to such rejection. Every wise parent forms some expectation of the results of the discipline he employs in the education of his children. If such results do not appear, he concludes that some influence of which he is unaware is operating and a diligent examination probably displays to him the cause of his failure. He never believes that while all influences tend to render his child's temper amiable, that temper becomes violent or sullen without cause. He inquires into the state of his health, his intercourse with his play-fellows, his treatment in the nursery, &c., and if

all his research is in vain, he concludes that some symptoms of disease will soon appear, or some hidden influence be made manifest. The last supposition to which he would resort is, that his child's state will be for ever unaccountable, and ought not to be deemed surprising, as no cause may exist for the appearances he deplores. We here quote our author with pleasure.

"It has been already remarked, that when we throw a piece of paper into the fire, we do it under the expectation that the paper will be consumed. In like manner, when I write a letter to a friend, I do it under the impression that his intellectual qualities will continue the same as I have hitherto found them; and that the associations established in his mind, between certain words and certain ideas, will be the same as heretofore. I take for granted that the black marks in my letter will continue to introduce into his mind the thoughts which I design to convey, just as I take for granted that lead will sink in water, or snow melt in the sun: and in addressing my arguments to his understanding, I proceed on the assumption of its retaining all its usual powers. This holds in respect not only to individuals, but to mankind at large. The predictions of the astronomer, to which I have already alluded, proceed on the assumption, not only that the heavenly bodies will continue to be governed by the same laws, but that mankind, in after ages, will retain the same faculties as they now possess.

"With regard to the operations of the understanding, the fact will be at once admitted. If there is any difficulty in the matter, it must attach to the question whether the same uniformity of causation is assumed in the case of affections, passions, and volitions. But we shall discern no difference in this respect amongst all these classes of mental phenomena. With regard to all, we unavoidably proceed on the same assumption. When I announce to my friend the accomplishment of some wish long cherished in his heart, I confidently anticipate the joy which my communication will excite; ex