ceding laws, and considerations, it is evident that the state of our feelings is, to a certain extent, under our own control. It is indeed true, that no man can instantly change his feelings by a mere volition to do so. But the end can be accomplished eventually, by his habitually directing his attention to those entities and truths, calculated to produce the desired feelings. We are, therefore, justly held responsible by our moral governor for the character of our feelings. Nor is the case different with what is often termed the habitual state of our feelings and affections. As every feeling is individual and transient, as it continues only as long as our minds dwell on the entity or idea which excited it, and as it must, in every instance, be excited anew by the appropriate entity, or our knowledge of it, it follows that by the state of our feelings or affections, must be meant our susceptibility for feelings from any particular entities. This susceptibility is permanent, being a part of our original constitution, and is either increased or diminished according as it is more or less frequently and designedly exercised towards any given object. It would have enhanced the value of the work, and rendered it still better adapted for the purpose of instruction in colleges, if the author had introduced separate notices of the more prominent feelings, and illustrated them by such facts as are copiously at hand. He seems to have thought it sufficient to sketch the prominent outlines—the filling up and coloring he has left to the viva voce instructor, or perhaps he may intend to employ his leisure in performing it, and give the results in future editions.

The third and last part yet claims our attention. We take it up with the feeling that it would require much space to do it justice. Had the author done nothing else, his account of the active operations would entitle him to the praise which we have accorded and give, to his contributions to metaphysics, the claim of originality and depth. We challenge, for this part of the work, no ordinary interest. It is interesting to the man of letters, to the metaphysician, to the orator, to the theologian, and to the expounder, in the sacred desk, of the Gospel of the Son of God.

The difference between active operations and other mental states is described in such a manner as to render it perfectly clear. They are, indeed, sufficiently discriminated by the single feature, that "knowledge and feeling are inward ef

fects produced from without; the active operations are outward effects caused from within." It would, perhaps, have been better, it certainly appears to us that it would better have covered the ground occupied by active operations as described by him, if the author, whose language we have quoted, had said, active operations are effects originated within. The views of the author do not require that the effects should be external, unless he consider ideas external, and in a former part of the work, he does express the opinion, which is perhaps not better than the old notion of ideas being images of objects, that they are something different from the mind.

The active operations are in number five-inspection, arrangement, modification, mental direction of our physical action, and the process of communicating our ideas to others.

Attention is not considered "entitled to the rank of a distinct active process, but is defined the energy of the soul exerted in some active operation." The process of inspection embraces what has in former systems been attributed to the faculties of perception, consciousness, conception, judgment in moral as well intellectual and physical cases, voluntary recollection, analytic reasoning and conscience. Arrangement is defined "that active operation of the soul by which we select some from the mass, either of external entities themselves, or of our mental representatives of them, and place them, as wholes or units, in a particular order, with a view to a specific purpose."

This is the operation by which induction is made, classes, orders, genera and species are formed-by which we arrange in logical order our ideas on the various subjects of discussion, and form syllogisms. We are pleased with the various items presented under this head. They may admit of some improvement, but, on the whole, will, we think, be found satisfactory. Modification is the third active operation of the mind and is defined, "that active operation of the soul, by which we take some from among our mental representatives of real entities, and bring them into such forms, or combinations as do not correspond to realities; that is, make arbitrary substantive and composite entities out of them." The definition sufficiently explains the propriety of such a classification, and the precise function which it subserves.

The remarks under this head, on a priori knowledge, are deserving of attention, a knowledge which is not the result

of external influence, but intuitively presented to the mind. Admitting the ingenuity of our author's reasoning, we incline to the opinion that no better account can be given of these ideas than that they do, under certain given circumstances, suggest themselves to the mind. The speculations of philosophers may have gone to an extreme in the reference of ideas to an internal source, but we cannot yet give in our adhesion to the prominence which is given in this work to the maxim, "Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius in sensu." We believe that the sensuous metaphysics have led to extravagant and dangerous theories. Have they not produced the idealism of Hume and Berkeley on the one hand, and the materialism and atheism of the French philosophers on the other? Did not the critical philosophy in Germany, and its various modifications, as they appear in the Scotch metaphysicians, in Cousin in France, and in Upham, of our own country, arrest the downward tendency of the sensuous system, and rescue morality and religion from threatened ruin? While we make these remarks, we cannot refrain from an expression of the opinion, that if Professor Schmucker had, during the sixteen years in which he has been laboring on this work, paid some attention to the productions of others, his views would have been more comprehensive. By looking at the advances made by metaphysics in other hands,-and we believe that real, substantial advances have been made-he would have been enabled to rectify his own views and given additional value to his system. We are not Kantians, we do not profess to have studied his works. We are not certain that we should be able to comprehend them; but if we have at all appreciated his views, as they have been presented to us by others, they contain a considerable amount of valuable matter, and have particularly, in this, been of eminent service, that they have directed the attention to the fact, that there is knowledge in man that is not derived from the senses. This seems to have been entirely lost sight of by the followers of Locke-although we may not charge him directly with a similar omission, and the consequences have been frightful, and have been arrested solely, humanly speaking, by a sounder philosophy.

To avoid extending our reflections too far, it will be necessary for us to pass over several instructive sections, and to touch slightly upon what remains. The occurrence of active oper

ations is ascribed to the nature of the soul, which, by its constitution is active. To the question, Why does the soul, at any given time, engage in one of the active operations rather than another, it is said, "Every individual will unhesitatingly reply, that these operations are engaged in, in one of two ways: either from deliberate choice, or from habit." The mode of occurrence in the active operations is then said to be two-fold:-1. Voluntary; 2. Spontaneous. The whole subject of the freedom of the will is discussed in a very satisfactory manner, and the account of the constitutional inclinations by which we are influenced, presents the whole matter in a novel light, and renders this part of the work particularly instructive. It enables us to solve the manifestations of man's moral structure, and shows clearly the source of the light and shade of human character. We do not know that we are prepared to adopt the author's philosophy in regard to habitual actions. The facility of performance, does not appear to us to exclude the precursory agency. Does not the author's view, though contrary to his expressed opinion, in regard to spontaneous actions, place them beyond the region of responsibility-at least to a considerable extent?

If, in any action of conformity, or non-conformity to the law of God, the self-determining power of the will is wanting, does it not cease to be praise or blame-worthy? How much better are spontaneous actions of the mind than necessary actions? In all cases, in which the will determines the action, we must suppose renewed effort to be necessary, however slight may be our consciousness of it.

The style of this work, as we have incidentally mentioned, is chaste, perspicuous, and adapted to the subject. It cannot be said of the metaphysics of Dr. Schmucker, as was said of Dr. Brown's, that they are too poetical. The language is precise, and as before stated metaphysical, that is, suited to discussions of this nature. We may mention with most decided approbation the religious aspects of the work. It is Christian metaphysics, and in this respect will take its place by the side of the admirable treatises of Professor Upham. It is the work of a theologian, and in looking at the human mind, he could hardly fail to perceive the theological bearings of his discoveries, and perceiving, to make them known. If we have given high praise to this system of mental philosophy, it has not been indiscriminate. We have endeavored to

give our impressions honestly. We have no sympathy with that criticism which praises, or blames, without reference to truth. Truth should be our guide always, and to this every thing should be sacrificed.

We leave this work with sincere respect for the abilities of the author, gratitude for his labors, which have been brought to so successful an issue, with the sincere wish that he may secure such a reward as a Christian man should desire, and with the determination to make use of his labors, in our future efforts to teach ingenuous youth the philosophy of the noblest part of God's creation,-the immortal mind of immortal man.

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ARTICLE IX.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON PANTHEISM.

Translated from the Revue Théologique, by the Junior Editor.

We have heard incessantly, for some years, that Pantheism threatens to become the dominant system of philosophy, and we are pointed to all the evils, as already pressing on us, which are accumulated on those enervated persons, who have fallen asleep in that base and dangerous doctrine. The apprehensions on this subject seem to us exaggerated. That system may be adopted happily, by some solitary thoughtful, secluded from the noise and bustle of the world, and conversant rather with books than with men, it may even, if you please, gather around it some adepts, and become the banner of a whole sect, as has sometimes happened; but do you suppose that it can effect anything in the world, in the midst of real life, in a moment, and among the people, where everything turns to a frightful positivism, to a disgusting utilitarianism. It is deplorable, indeed, not to be preserved from excess and from an ultra error, and one that is fatal; but the sad spectacle which society presents, ought to make us fear less the ingress of pantheistic doctrines, than the scepticism and egoism which menace the foundations of society.