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of that age, Mr. Mather was a sincere believer in the reality of witchcraft; and that the witch, on due and proper conviction, was worthy of death. He had no concern in getting up cases of witchcraft, in Boston, or Salem, or anywhere else; nor when they occurred, did he rejoice in them; but they were to him, as they were to most others at that day, events of solemn and painful interest. In regard to the cases at Salem, he was not in favor, at the first, of legal proceedings, put preferred that the bewitched persons should be separated, and that religious means should be used for their recovery. And when judicial proceedings had been instituted, he was opposed to the admission of "the spectral evidence," or any other evidence which could be regarded as resting on the devil's authority. He privately wrote to the judges, beseeching them not to proceed on such evidence, and drew up cautions and restrictions, in the advices of the ministers, which, had they been duly regarded, would probably have saved the lives of all the accused. Nevertheless, believing the judges to be sincerely intent on doing right, he did not think it his duty to oppose and vilify them, though he disapproved of some of their proceedings. After the executions were past, at the command of Gov. Phipps, he prepared and published a volume, containing, with other things, an attested history of the trials of some of the principal witches.

Such are, in brief, the facts, in relation to Mr. Mather's opinions and doings, with reference to the subject of witchcraft; and for one I find little to censure, which may not be resolved into the peculiarity of his natural disposition, and the solemn belief which, in common with most at that day, he cherished, as to the reality of diabolical agency in the case. I would not, of course, undertake to defend every word he uttered, and every action he performed, during the whole of this perplexing business; but, forgive him the wrong of his belief, (if it be a wrong,) and admit him to have been sincere and honest in his convictions; and I see little in what he did which does not, at least, appear consistent, and which, if it cannot be fully justified, may not readily be excused.

[To be continued.*]

We regret that we cannot include in the present article the author's consideration of other objections against Cotton Mather, which to us is the most interesting portion of his vindication of the character of that New-England Father. But the lack of space compels us to defer it. EDS.

SECOND SERIES, VOL. VII. NO. I.

13

ARTICLE V.

REMARKS IN REPLY TO THE QUESTIONS OF " INQUIRER."

By Rev. Leonard Woods, D. D. Prof. of Theology, Theol. Sem. Andover, Mass.

[Continued from Vol. VI. p. 383.]

In the last number of the Repository, I made several remarks in relation to what has appeared to be a very difficult point; namely, if wrong affections and desires arise in the mind spontaneously, or, of their own accord, whether we previously choose them or not, then how are we culpable for them? In regard to this question I have one thing further to say, which does, I think, by itself, settle the matter at once. We are, without doubt, under perfect obligation to obey the first and great command, and the second, which is like unto it. Now if, in conformity with these commands, we love God with all the heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, and our neighbor as ourselves, wrong affections will be excluded. There will be no place for them, because the mind will be occupied and filled with those which are holy. In the pure and holy mind of Jesus no sinful emotions were ever found. Now it is very clear, that we must be blameworthy and inexcusable for those wrong mental acts which take place in consequence of our neglecting a great and obvious duty. If our loving God and man as we ought would keep all right in the movements of our hearts, and would effectually exclude all improper feelings; we are most certainly answerable not only for neglecting that primary duty, but for all those improper feelings which rush into the mind in consequence of our neglect. Is not a man answerable for the noxious weeds which grow in his garden, when he might have prevented them by preoccupying the ground. with useful plants?

Inquirer signifies that desires after forbidden objects, burning unawares in the minds of men, may be evidences of their "having been very wicked, or their having inherited a constitution greatly vitiated." But he sees not "how they can be proof of

present wickedness, provided they are immediately resisted, and never fostered or indulged." Here it is important to keep in mind what was said in the last number of the Repository, that there are two classes of desires ;-those which are of an inferior kind, belonging particularly to our animal nature, and those which are of a moral or spiritual nature.

Take as an instance of the first kind, a desire for strong drink. This is generally the effect of the frequent use of such drink, though it sometimes comes from a vitiated constitution In regard to such a desire or appetite as this, it is very clear that, in itself, separate from circumstances, it has not a moral nature, and that it may exist without involving any guilt. But if a man, with the requisite information as to consequences, does any thing to form the appetite, or to indulge and continue it, he becomes culpable ;-culpable for doing that which he knows to be hurtful to the body and the soul; just as he would be for using any other poison, or for voluntarily forming an appetite for it. The guilt does not lie in the bodily appetite, or the bodily act of indulging it, but in the intention or choice of the mind to indulge it, when the consequence is known.

The other class of affections and desires are, in their own nature, moral or spiritual. They have a direct and necessary relation to moral law, and cannot exist without being praiseworthy or blameworthy. Such is love to God, and enmity against him. If such an object as God is presented before the mind of a rational being, loving will be a holy and praiseworthy act, an act of obedience, and hating will be sinful, an act of disobedience. You will say, he must have requisite knowledge, before he can be accountable. I admit that he must have some knowledge or discernment of the object. But as soon as the object is before his mind, and he discerns it, he has sufficient knowledge to render him accountable for the acts he puts forth towards it. Is it said, he cannot be accountable for the first act of love or hatred, but only for continuing it, and for fostering and indulging it? I reply; if the goodness or badness of the affection or mental act lies in its nature, it must belong to the first act as well as to the second. If the first act of love to God is not in itself right and praiseworthy, how can the second be? And if the first act of enmity is not in itself wrong, how can the second be? The moral law requires love and forbids enmity. And when we put forth the first act of love, do we not as really obey the law, as when we repeat the act? If obedi

ence does not begin with the first act of love; it must be because love is not morally good in its own nature, but only on account of the circumstance of its being repeated. But I ask again, how can it be praiseworthy to repeat an act, unless the act is right? So on the other hand, when we put forth the first act of enmity, do we not disobey the law as really as when we put forth the second act? If not, it must be because the law does not forbid the first act of enmity, but only the repetition of it. And then the question comes up, why the law forbids the repetition of an act, while it allows the act in the first instance. Must it not be,because the act has nothing wrong in its own nature?

As the result of our inquiries, do we not find, that one class of affections and desires are, in themselves, of a moral nature, and that he who exercises them is always praiseworthy or blameworthy? If a man loves God and man, whether it is the first act of love, or the second, and whatever the circumstances, he has holiness. But in regard to the other class of affections above mentioned, is it not evident, that they are not of a moral nature in themselves, and that it is merely the consideration of consequences, which gives a moral aspect to our conduct respecting them?

Inquirer refers to the case of our Saviour's temptations, and says: "If he had no desires or emotions like our own on such occasions," (i. e. when he was tempted,) " then how was he tempted in all points, as we are? If he had such emotions, and these emotions are, as Dr. Woods says, sins of the deepest die, then how was he tempted, and yet remained without sin ?"

It is very difficult for me to reply as I should wish, to such a statement as this, because it is difficult to speak of the feelings and character of Christ with becoming reverence. I will, however, venture to offer a few suggestions.

The Scripture does indeed say, that Jesus was in all points tempted as we are. But where does it say, that he had the same emotions and desires with us? Saying this would, in my apprehension, be utterly incompatible with the spotless purity and holiness of Christ.

The word temptation is sometimes used to denote that irregular desire of the depraved heart, which leads to actual transgression; as in James 1: 14: "Every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed." never tempted in this way. to which he was subjected.

Jesus was This is not the kind of temptation All other men are by nature sin

ners; born in such a state, that they must be born again to prepare them for the kingdom of heaven. From the first, their moral affections are corrupt; their moral nature is depraved. They have no holiness. And the actings of their minds, so far as they are of a moral nature, are all sinful. And as to those emotions and desires which do not directly relate to moral objects, and which are not, in themselves, either morally good or evil, I cannot but think they are all affected, all tainted by the moral disorder of the heart. Even the natural affections, the corporeal and social emotions, desires and instincts, which are faultless and pure when the heart is pure, even these become irregular and faulty, by dwelling in a depraved heart. The evil pervades the whole man. There is no soundness in him. He is corrupt to the very centre of his being. And " to them that are defiled, nothing is pure." How can any thing in a heart that is "desperately wicked," be what it would be in a heart perfectly undefiled? In this respect, Jesus was exceedingly unlike all other men. He had human nature; but his human nature was uncorrupt. From the first he was holy, harmless, undefiled. He never existed in any other state. He never needed to be born again. And he never had a single thought, emotion or desire, which varied, in the least, from the rule of righteousness. He was indeed tempted. But how? Not by any irregular inclination, any lust, any solicitation to sin within his own mind. He said to his disciples: "Ye are they that have followed me in my temptations." What were his temptations? Let the story of his life answer. "He suffered, being tempted." All his sufferings were temptations, or trials. The original word, rendered tempt, signifies to try, to put to the proof, in order to ascertain the disposition or character of any one. All the sufferings of Christ tried him, as the furnace tries the gold. They showed what he was. The opposition and enmity of the Jews, the ingratitude and obduracy of those for whose benefit he came into the world, and all the evils he endured from time to time, especially in the closing scene of his life, were temptations or trials, and made it manifest that he was without sin. If men are corrupt, trials will be likely to show it. If they are holy, trials will make that manifest. Any one who carefully attends to the word of God, will be satisfied, that the temptations spoken of, generally refer to the afflictions or sufferings of life. In this sense Christ was tempted or tried as we are. He endured all that variety of suf

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