Dr. Cudworth preferred to imagine that He first animated it with an indistinct living principle, — a sort of half-life, so that it became more plastic to His hands, and more obedient to His behest, than it would have been in its original inert and passive state. The supposition is an unnecessary one, as Omnipotence needs no such aid in executing its purposes; and as it is defended by neither argument nor analogy, it may be rejected as a mere dream. 5. Dissatisfied with all these doctrines, Lord Monboddo attempted to revive what he calls the ancient theory of mind. Every particle of matter he supposes to be animated with different minds. Thus, there is one, which he calls the elemental mind, that is the source of the cohesion of bodies; another is the cause of their gravitation; and so on. Even in the case of the motion that follows impulse, he holds that the impulse is only the occasion of the motion; the continuance of the motion is attributable to a mind excited by the impulse, because continued motion implies continued activity. Thus, also, the planets are endowed with minds which guide and impel them in their revolutions round the sun; only these planetary minds are void of intelligence, being mere principles of activity. This theory is open to the same objection as the former one, that it is a mere dream, unsupported even by probability. But both are instructive as showing the difficulty of conceiving principles to be inherent in matter which would account for its phenomena; the agency of mind must, somehow, be called in. 6. The last supposition is that of the philosophers who maintain that the universe is a machine formed and put in motion by the Deity. In this hypothesis, Descartes and Leibnitz agreed, notwithstanding the wide diversity of their systems in other respects. But a machine needs a continuous motive power; it needs the expansive force of steam, the weight of falling water, the elasticity of steel, or some other force; and if this be intermitted, the action stops. A machine is not a contrivance for creating power, but only for using it, for applying it in one direction or another, or to one or another purpose. Now, it has been shown that matter has no force of its own. What, then, keeps the machine of the universe in action? It must be the continuous and immediate action of the Deity; and this is the very theory of immediate divine agency which we advocate, except that we throw away the idle and baseless hypothesis, that Omnipotence works through machinery, instead of accomplishing its purposes directly and at once. CHAPTER VIII. INFERENCES FROM THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF THE PHENOMENA OF THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE. Summary of the last chapter. In the last chapter, the phenomena of the physical universe, so far as they show change, diversity, and activity, which are not attributable to human power and will, were held to prove the immediate and omnipresent action of the Deity. The argument was, that these phenomena afford incontestable evidence of power exerted, or efficient causation, and there is no source of such power within our knowledge, and none, in fact, that is conceivable, except in personal agency; and in this case, the power being commensurate with the extent and duration of all things, it must be ascribed to the Infinite Creator. This reasoning was carried out in reference to two of the most comprehensive classes of such events, those, namely, which are ascribed to gravitation and to life; the phenomena under the former head being the most simple, uniform, and frequent in their occurrence, while those coming under the latter are most complex, varied, and multiform; so that any conclusion established respecting both these classes must hold true of all intermediate ones. In regard to the former, it was shown that what are called forces in mechanical science, are only metaphorical expressions for the mode or order in which certain events succeed each other, or are mere fictions for the convenience of the mathematician, like the abstractions and hypotheses with which the geometer begins his work; both attraction and the tangential force being, in fact, as imaginary as the eccentrics and epicycles of Hipparchus and Ptolemy. In regard to the latter, the phenomena of life, they were shown to be inexplicable and inconceivable as effects of mechanism, such effects being necessarily uniform and perfectly similar to each other, or changing only by a regular law of deterioration or improvement; while the numberless aspects, and infinite variations of the activity, of living things, point for their cause to the free volitions of a conscious agent - This form of argument for the being of a God, it was observed, though not so familiar to common minds as the proof from design, for indeed, it is not fully stated in any work on Natural Theology with which I am acquainted, is still legiti mate and conclusive; and it has this great advantage, that from it we infer immediately his present existence, instead of estab lishing this point by a subsequent process of reasoning. The conclusion to which it leads harmonizes with the natural turn of religious sentiment, or devotion, by referring all events to Divine agency; and thus we avoid the common objection to the doctrine of an overruling and ever-watchful Providence. Hume's objection to the argument from effect to cause.-A further advantage of this reasoning is, that it is not exposed to the objection urged by Hume, on the ground that the universe is a singular effect. The way is paved for this sophism by putting into the mouth of Cleanthes, the character in the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion who plays the part of a rational and consistent theist, a distinct avowal of the mechanical theory of nature. "Look round the world," says Cleanthes; "contemplate the whole and every part of it. You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain." These words, though uttered by an imaginary speaker, convey, I have no doubt, Hume's own opinion; and they certainly leave the door open for the objection that is instantly made by Philo, who supports the character and cause of the atheist. "When two species of objects," says Philo, "have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other; and this I call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have a place, where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me, with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must arise from some thought and art like the human, because we have experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient, surely, that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance. Can you pretend to show any similarity between the fabric of a house and the generation of a universe? Have you ever seen nature in any such situation as resembles the first arrangement of the elements? Have worlds ever been formed under your eye? and have you had leisure to observe the whole progress of the phenomenon, from the first appearance of order to its final consummation? If you have, then cite your experience, and deliver your theory." This objection confuted. Now I might answer this sophistry at once, by saying, that although I have not witnessed the fabrication of a universe, I have watched the growth of a plant, from the first germination of the seed to the perfection of the blossom; and though I have had no personal experience of the origin of worlds, I yet know, whether from reason or the testimony of others, a fact that Philo himself will not deny, that this my body, the material apparatus of limbs and organs in which I live and move, did begin to be; and of all its subsequent changes, its growth up to its present state, I have had the most intimate experience. But the admission or assertion of Cleanthes, that the universe is one great machine, seemingly bars out this reply, by leading us to infer that the preëxisting machinery in the parent plant or blossom produced the seed, the future development and growth of which are but the subsequent action of the same machinery; so that all which I have actually witnessed or experienced, is not the origin or beginning, but the continuance, of things. How obvious is the rejoinder, that this phrase, the universe, is a mere general expression for the totality of things, having only an ideal and fictitious unity, and being, in truth, nothing but an abstract conception! To recur to a former illustration, there is no such thing as an audience, apart from the individual men and women who compose it. Let us not be blinded by mere words. Individual things are the only objects which really exist; as we profess here to argue only from facts, let us not confuse these with mere abstractions and generalities. To talk about explaining the origin of a universe, except this be understood to mean the accounting in succession for each of the real existences which make up a universe, is to deal in nonsense; it is as if, after explaining in due order the motives which brought each of the hearers together, I should still be required to account for the general fact, that there was an audience assembled. And this remark applies, be it observed, not only to the different individuals who at any one moment make up a sum total, or class, but to the other individuals who occupied the same spot before these began to be, and to others still, who shall fill their places after these cease to exist. The unity which is attributed by the mind, for the mere convenience of conception and speech, both to successive and contemporaneous individuals, is alike ideal and fictitious. Individual things cannot have been created by machinery.— Let us see, then, whether this hypothesis of machinery, as the secret of the creation, net of a universe, but of individual things or real existences, is any thing more than a blank assumption. Suppose that two grains of sand, looking just alike, were placed on the floor before us, and, while we were watching them, they should begin to expand, shoot up, alter their forms, take all the aspects and qualities of life, and finally become distinct and recognizable, the one as a giant oak tree, and the other as a living and moving creature. On witnessing so strange a phenomenon, we could not help concluding that some personal agency had produced it, some power transcending that of man; after satisfying ourselves that there was no deception or mystification in the matter, we should at once refer it to a supernatural or miraculous cause. Nor would this conclusion be at all less logical, if the phenomenon were a frequent one,—if there were a mountain of such sand, from which particular grains being taken at |