work, have fallen; and were we competent to the task, there is no way in which we should judge ourselves so likely to promote our present design, as to separate opinions founded on the authority of man, from those which have the clear decisions of God for their basis. Here, as in most other departments of polemic theology, he would render an essential service to the cause of truth, who should trace with accuracy the boundaries between those regions on which the light of heaven clearly shines, and those which are covered with utter darkness, save the scattered rays, which human reason may have diffused over them.Even an imperfect attempt to accomplish this object, may not prove wholly useless. We therefore may be justified in examining some of the opinions to which we have alluded, with their bearing on the doctrine of the

atonement.

1. Some have maintained, that reward is essential to law, that obedience gives a claim to reward on the principle of merit, and hence have inferred, that an atonement gives to those for whom it is made, the same claim to reward, which their own obedience would have done. Others deny that a promise of reward pertains to the law, either as an essential part of law, or by public enactment; and hence infer that forgiveness is the only blessing conferred on sinful men for Christ's sake.

If by a reward, we understand that measure of happiness which constitutes a proper and necessary motive to produce obedience in moral beings, then reward seems to be essential to the obligation of the law, and of course to the law itself. As it is impossible that a benevolent ruler should give a law which should disregard the good of the subject, so it is equally impossible that voluntary subjects, placed under such a law, should find motives to obedience. The equity of a law for moral beings, therefore, requires that the good of the subject be so far consulted, as to make it reasonable that he should obey the law,

whether that reason consist in the inherent happiness of obedience, in other positive good, in exemption from positive evil, or in all these things united. But if by a reward, be intended any degree of good beyond that which is necessary to create an adequate motive to obedience, then a reward seems not to be essential to the rectitude of the law. Obligation would exist without such a reward. The fulfilment of obligation would merely satisfy a reasonable demand on the subject. It could impose no obligation on the Lawgiver to impart, and furnish no ground to the subject to claim any reward beyond the sufficient reason already existing for rendering obedience. In this sense of extra reward, none could be claimed on the principle of right or merit, by sinless men or sinless angels.

At the same time we see no decisive evidence, that such a reward is not annexed to the law in the public enactment. Though it be not essential to the obligation of the law, yet it might be dictated by the wise and benevolent regard of the Lawgiver to the general good of his kingdom, and as an expression of his complacency in moral excellence. The law would be righteous without, but it would also be righteous with such an enforcement. It can violate no principle of distributive justice, to present motives to obedience, beyond what are necessary to create obligation. This addition would be an act dictated by the wisdom and benevolence of the Lawgiver, intent on promoting the public good.

It would afford little satisfaction to ourselves, and probably less to our readers, were we to attempt to penetrate farther into the field of speculation on these points. It will better accord with our design to appeal to the law and the testimony, and thus aim to discover, how far any decis ion of these questions docs, or does not rest on solid ground. In the law of God, as revealed to Adam, notwithstanding the concisenesss of the

record, was clearly implied the promise of reward to continued obedience. The counter part of the prohibition was, if thou eatest not thou shalt live, a promise at least of that happy state of existence in which he was created. Otherwise the penalty itself would be little more than a mere nullity; the law leaving it a matter of entire uncertainty, whether he should not die, though he should be obedient. It will not be doubted that a high degree of happiness was enjoyed by our first parents, in their state of innocence. The whole visible creation was an act of kindness to them, and pronounced by its Maker to be "very good." And it may be difficult to prove, had a far inferior measure of good been assigned to them in the divine promise, that any injustice would have been done them by their Creator.

From the more explicit promulga. tion of the divine law, we learn that the man "that doeth these things shall live by them." "To him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt." The divine law then promised a reward to perfect obedience. Our Lord, however, in Luke xvii. 9, 10, has been supposed to deny this conclusion. "Doth he thank that servant because he did that which was commanded him? I trow not. So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all that was commanded you, say, we are unprofitable servants, we have done that which was our duty to do." The question is, whether our Lord simply denied a claim to reward to future perfect obedience, on the ground of past transgression, or whether he laid down the general principle that the performance of duty is only the payment of a just debt, for which no reward can be claimed on principle of right or merit. The latter interpretation of the passage seems to us, to possess at least such a degree of evidence in support of its correctness, that we cannot affirm it to be false. Should it therefore be admitted that the atonement places the believing sinner preVol. 2-No. 1.

cisely in the same relation to law, which perfect obedience would have done, we cannot allow the inference that he has a claim to a reward on the principle of merit.

On the supposition that our Lord denied a claim to a reward on the condition of perfect obedience, still his language necessarily implies only a denial of the claim on the principle of merit; and therefore a claim by promise might exist. A promise creates a debt; nor can we conceive how "the reward is reckoned of debt," except on the ground either of merit or of promise. They therefore who deny that a claim to reward is created by perfect obedience on the principle of merit, it would seem, must admit a claim by promise. We should therefore refuse our assent to the opinion, that forgiveness is the only blessing granted to sinners for Christ's sake. It appears to be undeniable that a promise of reward was annexed to the law.

But if the law promised a reward to obedience, and threatened punishment to disobedience, then reward cannot be given consistently with the honour of the law, without obedience, or without something that shall honour the law as truly as the obedience of the subject would have done. As the reward according to law, is confined to obedience, there is an insurmountable obstacle to bestowing the reward on the subject of law, until obedience, or an equivalent, so far as the honour of the law is concerned, is found as the ground of such reward. Otherwise the reward would be given, and the principle of law, to reward nothing but obedience, would be wholly disregarded. Whatever be the reason for annexing the promise of reward to the law, whether it be the merit of obedience that deserves it, or the fitness of obedience to receive it, the fact that the law refuses a reward to any thing but obedience, renders it indispensable to the honour of the law, that no subject of law be rewarded without obedience, or without an equivalent, so far as the honour of the law is concerned. At least,

"And now is it too much to say of the scheme against which these arguments are arrayed, that it takes away one half of a Saviour and one half of his praise? Nor is it the least important part that it filches from us, so far as our comfort and gratitude to Christ are concerned. To fill the eye with him as the Heir of all things,' the First-born among many brethren,” who has taken possession of the inheritance in our name, to manage it as our Guardian, and to reserve it for us against our arrival; to view every comfort, every morsel of daily food, as purchased by him, and as belonging to the mediatorial estate; is one of the sweetest and sublimest contemplations that ever occupied the Christian mind. To know that we are indebted to him for all things, is the richest ingredient in prosperity, and the brightest gem in the immortal crown. Do you tell me that it is no matter whether blessings come through Christ or directly from the Father, as upon either plan they are equally secure? This is precisely the Socinian plea. The worst evil in the Unitarian heresy is its tendency to lower down the influence of Christ in the business of man's salvation, and to send a fallen race immediately to God. Exactly in proportion as Christ is excluded, our faith, dependance, gratitude, and all our religion is changed. If Socinianism changes it entirely, this errour changes it in part. Give me a religion which yields to Christ all his influance and all his honours, which in every part of salvation makes him our ALL IN ALL."-pp. 442, 443.

2. Dr. G. maintains an important distinction between the influence of the atonement and that of the obedience of Christ. He supposes that the influence of his atonement was simply to procure pardon, and that the influence of his obedience was to procure reward. This distinction he rests on two principles, which as he supposes appertain to the divine law. The

one is, that the promises of the law respect a temporary probation; the other, that there is a distinction between the absence of sin, and a positive righteousness.

"It was the principle of Eden, as will appear in another place, not to grant the Spirit, after man had had an opportunity to act, but in approbation of a righteousness perfect for the time the subject had been in existence, and not to grant it as a finished righteousness.”—p. 19. covenanted reward but out of respect to a

"It was as much a principle of the first covenant not to bestow a cup of cold wa ter out of respect to any other than a righteousness perfect for the time the subject had been in existence, as it was that Adam should not be confirmed in happiness without an obedience entire through the period of his probation."-p. 410.

"In the two great instances of a government by law which have come to our knowledge, it was a principle to require creatures to obey before they were confirmed in holiness and happiness, and not to confer a covenant claim to immortality but as the reward of a finished righteousness. The inhabitants of heaven were not confirmed at first, for some of them fell; and it was long before we heard of "elect angels." Man was not confirmed at first, and the issue is known to us all. This requisition of obedience as an antecedent to the gift of eternal life, was not indeed so absolutely necessary as the punishment of sin without an atonement; but it answered the important purpose of honouring the law. It held this language in the ears of the universe: no creature shall receive eternal life till he has first done homage to my law. There was indeed no other way of conferring immortality in a governmental form. In any other way it must have been a sovereign gift."—p. 410.

Though we shall not deny the position that man is placed by the divine law on a limited probation, we shall venture to question the soundness of the argument by which it is here supported. And first, Dr. G. has not satisfied us that the holy angels are confirmed in holiness and happiness as a reward for "a finished righteousness." Their character as "elect angels," seems rather to designate their perseverance in holiness, as "a sovereign gift," and to prove no more than that their perseverance was according to the eternal

purpose of God, while others fell. It certainly marks no specific time when their confirmation in holiness and happiness took place. Nor do we see that their perseverance in holiness according to the sovereign purpose of God, and their consequent reward of eternal happiness, would be inconsistent with "conferring immortality in a governmental form."

Secondly, as it respects Adam, it need only be asked, why might not God in perfect consistency with the terms and import of the law, have confirmed Adam in holiness before his temptation and fall, as well as at any subsequent period? The fact that he "was not confirmed at first," is no proof that he would have been confirmed, had he not sinned within any given period.

Here a difficulty may arise in some minds, from the supposed relation of Adam to his posterity, viz. how could the posterity of Adam be affected by his conduct, unless his probation was limited to a given period, and its results were actually known before the existence of his posterity? That Adam was the public head of his posterity, is indeed asserted by the apostle, but that this relation was recognized in the law, and was not a distinct and sovereign constitution of God, by which he established a connexion between Adam's sin and the subsequent character of his posterity, we frankly confess that we find no warrant to assert. We can by no means deem it proper to assume that Adam's posterity were recognized in the law of Eden, and to reason from the assumption as an established truth. We do not by these remarks intend to deny that a limited probation pertain ed to the law given to Adam. But we were a little surprised to find Dr. G. deriving conclusions so important from premises so doubtful.

That a limited probation pertains to the law as it respects Adam's posterity, the author has not undertaken to prove as a distinct proposition. The law being "added because of transgression," and not as the rule of

our justification, it would not be strange should much concerning it as a rule of justification be left in doubtful obscurity, and we be wholly unable to solve many questions which curiosity might suggest, on the supposition that some of our fallen race should perfectly obey the law. It would seem to answer every useful purpose for us to know merely some general principles without being able to unfold them in their particular application, to certain supposable but impossible cases. Whether we are authorised to assert any thing more than that perfect obedience to the law would justify so long as it should be rendered, whether the apostle by constantly exhibiting the antithesis between justification by works and justification by faith, and by urging the necessity of justification by faith simply on the ground of past transgression of law, does not warrant the inference, that had men perfectly obeyed the law, they would have been, while obeying, in a state of justification by law, and not needed justification through Christ; whether obedience to the law through life, or for a shorter period, would be necessary to secure confirmation in holiness and happiness; whether the reward of perfect holiness and happiness would be an act of sovereignty on the part of God, or the fulfilment of a promise pertaining to law, are points which we deem necessary to settle before we may confidently affirm that man is placed by the law on the limited probation which Dr. G. describes. We shall not be understood to assert, that the subject of law, on condition of perfect obedience for a given period, would not according to law be confirmed in holiness and happiness forever. We only put in our harmless complaint, that Dr. G. should so

far have founded conclusions concerning the nature of the atonement, on a principle of law, which apparently needs to be farther illustrated and confirmed.

Another opinion which the author has advanced, is that the promise of

the Spirit pertained to the law. Of any decisive proof of this fact, we are obliged to confess ourselves wholly ignorant. Our author has not even pretended to substantiate it by evidence. But however confidently this opinion may be embraced, or whatever conviction the analogical arguments which have been used to support it may carry to other minds, they bring none to our own. "The promise of the Spirit," seems to be exclusively a promise of the new covenant: Vid. Gal. iii. 14, and Heb. viii. 10. All speculations concerning the specific nature and degree of the happiness promised to Adam, whether it was a happy immortality on earth or in heaven, whether any of his posterity, should they be perfectly holy on earth, would be made completely happy here below,or be translated as was Enoch, to a higher state of being, we shall leave to those who can find in then more pleasure and profit than we can. All that we feel authorised to affirm is, that the law promised life, that perfect state of existence, which consists in unmixed happiness; that more was implied in the reward annexed to the law we do not deny, but find no war

rant to assert.

Closely connected with this part of the subject is the import of the penalty of the law. This we suppose involved the loss of all good, with unmixed and endless suffering. We shall not examine the various interpretations which have been given of the penalty of the law. We would remark, however, that we agree with our author, that "to punish sin with sin, or judicially to doom agents to act, is a thing unknown." Nor can we readily encounter the apparent absurdity, in believing that one part of the punishment of sin is inflicted for that which is itself a punishment. We are however far from denying that Adam's continuance in sin was the certain consequence of his first sin. We doubt not that he who once prefers the world to God as his portion, will certainly (not by physical necessity) continue that prefer

ence, unless grace prevent. But this grace could not be given to the sinner, provided the penalty implies the loss of all good from the hand of God. Indeed if the law contained no promise of the Spirit to "a finished righteousness," then not the want of such righteousness, but the penalty of the law, is the real and only obstacle to the gift of the Spirit. This the author denies. But we think that he must at least concede us the privilege of our scepticism, until he shall attempt to prove that the promise of the Spirit, as a part of the reward, pertained to the law.

Some divines of acknowledged eminence, have maintained that the penalty of the law was no obstacle to sanctifying influence, and that God might in perfect consistency with his law have sanctified Adam after his transgression, without an atonement, although they suppose that the penalty included absolute and unmingled suffering. But how the sanctification of a sinner, with its appropriate and inseparable fruits of delight and joy in God, can be conferred on one who, without an atonement, is doomed to unmingled suffering, we have not seen explained.

We have not however expressed all our doubts and difficulties respecting the point under examination. We have a strong suspicion that the conclusions of our author do not follow from his premises. Let it then be assumed that Adam by the original law, was placed on a limited probation, and that he was not justified, but merely innocent, until he had obeyed through the assigned period of trial. The question is, does it follow from this principle, that the sinner may be exempted from punishment, and still possess no title to a reward? The reason that Adam was not justified, i. e. entitled to the promised reward at any point of time during his obedience, was not that he was not rightcous for the time being, but that he has not continued righteous through the assigned period. The influence, therefore, which is necessary to his