internal evidence in language to lead us to fuch a fuppofition. On this fide then of the question, we have nothing but uncertainty. But on a subject, the causes of which are fo remote, nothing is more convenient than to refer them to Infpiration, and to recur to that eafy and comprehenfive argument, Διος δε τελειετο βουλη

that is, man enjoyed the great privilege of fpeech, which distinguished him at first, and ftill continues to distinguish him, as a rational creature, fo eminently from the brute creation, without exerting those reasoning faculties, by which he was in other respects enabled to raise himself so much above their level. Inspiration then seems to have been an argument adopted and made neceffary by the difficulty of accounting for it otherwise. And the name of Inspiration carries with it an awfulness, which forbids the unhallowed approach of inquifitive difcuffion.

But

But as was observed we are not warranted Obf. VI. from Scripture to affirm, that Man received his language by Inspiration. We are therefore free to fearch for another origin. Now if we suppose that it was derived from natural and external objects, there are in language numberless internal proofs to justify fuch a fuppofition; and we shall further have the pleasure of obferving, that in this cafe alfo Man's reason was not given him in vain.

The fame all-wife and benificent Creator, who gave the mind to will, and the band to execute gave alfo the mind to form and compare ideas, and the organs of speech to utter them. As the first Man came not into the world with the debility and imperfections of infancy, it is probable that the inftruments of will, mechanical and organic, were moved by a like inftantaneous, and as it were involuntary impulfe. His language, it is likewife probable, was fimple, monotonous, and, in great measure, monofyllabic*:

* Certum eft linguas omnes, quæ monofyllabis conftant, cæteris effe antiquiores. SALMASIUS de re Hellenistica, p. 390.

He

tions of language, which at the fame time ferve the purposes of convenience and ornament, by distinction in variety as well as volubility in found, were, it should feem, introduced by fucceeding generations, and became expedient by the multiplied pursuits and neceffities of Man. The love of imitation, and custom, in length of time, introduced a number of fimilar forms, and an uniformity even in the irregularities of speech; and thus eftablished without fcience and without art, the principles of what, in later Ages, was to become a very refined art, which Philofophers and Grammarians were afterwards to develope and arrange, and to call the Art and ANALOGY of Language.

From this period we behold language under its established forms, and arranged ac

-

He confirms his obfervation by many inftances exifting in the more antient Greek. -In the Analyfis below mentioned, the elements of the Greek Language are fhewn to have been monofyllables.

cording

cording to the different parts of speech. But Obf. VI. here another question immediately occurs, Which were prior nouns, or verbs? It is obvious to fuppofe, that the things which were neareft, and were moft neceffary to Man, were first denominated. And it may therefore feem, that the names of things were prior to verbs. But there is another queftion, which as neceffarily obtrudes itself : Why were these things thus denominated? It seems natural to suppose, that they were denominated from their actions, uses, appearances, &c. And thus of animals, which it is probable were named as early as any of the objects, with which he was familiar, fome might have been from their rapacity; fome from their fwiftnefs, &c. But in expreffing the actions of things, the use of the verb, which is the fymbol of action, is neceffarily implied. So that the verbs †, which

In analyfing the Greek and Latin languages it is remarkable that the latin Verbs are more eafily reduced to the ancient Greek forms, to their fimple origins, than the latin Nouns. And, as it seems, for this reafon, because the expreffion of internal feelings is general and permanent; the denotation of external

M

Obf. VI.

were used to exprefs every kind of action, must have been prior to the names of things, which were denominated from their actions. Not that all verbs were prior to all nouns, or that a particular class of verbs was prior to a particular clafs of nouns, but that every individual noun, which expreffed the name of a thing from its action, was derived from a verb expreffive of that action, which was ultimately referable to one general Idea, which is the principle of every action.

I venture to speak with lefs hesitation on

this subject, as I have had reason to perfuade myself of the probability, (I think, the truth) of what has been obferved in the course of an Inquiry into the Origin and formation of the Greek Language, in which this fubject will be spoken to more fully and profeffedly; and the principal purpose of which

external objects, particular and tranfitory, as being denominated according to particular appearances, &c. which may vary at different times and occafions, under the influence of various circumstances by which means the names of things muft have become more subject than verbs to the innovations of caprice and accident.

is