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"from xavw, or xexaupa?) Can any one in "their fenfes fuppofe, that a word fignifying "heat can be derived from I have been made "bot? and that the caufe* was deduced from "the effect?”

It frequently happens, as may be fhewn by very many inftances, that what is prior in the order of nature, is pofterior in the conceptions of Man. For inftance, in the order of nature the abftract quality is prior to the quality joined with any fubftance. (See Vol. II. p. 14. of the Origin and Progress of Language.) Therefore Aristotle derives Auzos from λevxorns, and dix from dinasoovn. But this is contrary to the order of our perceptions. For we fee qualities only in concrete, and conjointly with the fubftances in which they are inherent. An object was feen to be white, one man was found to be just, and another brave, before the ideas were formed of whiteness, juftice, and fortitude. With greater appearance of probability he derives γραμματικος from γραμματικη, and ανδρειος from ανde. But here also he seems to be mistaken. For gaμμarixn, I apprehend, is the feminine of yeaupaтixos, and ardge, ανδρεια, the feminine of ανδρεια ; the former fignifying τεχνη γραμμα Tin, and the latter andere fors, or the like: and this according to the uniform progress of human conceptions. This reafoning is fo obvious, and the etymologies fo incontrovertible, that it might feem Aristotle did not mean to give the grammatical etymology of the words, but a philofophical deduction of Ideas; if yμμn and adpex had not been applied to a grammatical remark on derivative words, which he fays are diftinguished an wrwre, by the termination. Пapeνυμα δε λέγεται, όσο απο τινΘ, α[αφέροντα τη πτώσει, των κατα

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Etymology, it feems to be an confequence, to abftract, as far as our thoughts from modes of ordi

rrence, and the prejudices of acnd habitual knowledge. At first e seems to be much weight in Mr. obfervation, and as fuch he repeats, what I principally infift upon in to ancient Etymology, is, that the nuft preceed the effect, and cannot be from it for the caufe was firft and named." If this were true, entirely deftroy a leading principle, e contrary tendency, which the Au

Ασηγορίαν έχει οίον απο της γραμματικης ὁ γραμματικος, avoperas à avoper. In this however Ariftotle has more than Plato and Cicero have in many inftances logy; in which they give a philosophical definition tion of the thing, and not a grammatical etymology d: and often fo inconfiftently with the fimple prohich they really were formed, as not to admit of fefutation. But the ancients, it may be faid without g from their juft authority, were but little acquainted general analogy of words, and the theory and forf language.

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causes of things were denominated from their actions and effects, &c.

But with the permiffion of this learned writer (and I hope without offence to so refpectable a name,) experience as well as the authority of Mr. HARRIS* teaches us, that though the natural progrefs of things be from cause to effect, yet the course of human knowledge, (namely of knowledge derived through the fenfes,) must be from effect to caufe. And thus the first Men must neceffarily have formed their Ideas of the Caufes of things from their effects, which, through the fenfes, were the teftimonies of thofe causes. They must have felt themselves hot, (to apply the observation to the present inftance,) before they could have formed the abstract idea of heat. So that though in reality the effect be preceded by the caufe, the word by which they denoted the cause must have been derived from the effect.

*Harrifes Hermes, p. 9.

To

To mention an inftance or two. Defire is Obf. V. the cause which impels us to feek any object. The feeking is the effect of that impulse. Yet the cause is expreffed by the word which denotes that effect. Thus, it has been fhewn elfewhere, that peto and ποθεω ; volo and βουλω, βουλόμαι; ελθώ and εκδόμων ; are of the fame origin. Again, TREMO and rew, fignify to fear, from the effect of fear, viz. running away. That tremo and reeuw originally fignified to run, or run away, feems manifeft from two words ftill exifting in the Greek language, fignifying I ran, and the act of running, i.e. έδραμον, and δρομος (commonly derived from Tex,) which have the fame affinity to spea οι τρέμω, as ετραπον, τροπος, τo τρέπω ; λόγος το λεγω; τρεχω, τροχος, &c. From δρέω, τρεω, come δρέμω, τρέμω, τρέχω. Many other inftances might be brought to confirm this inverse expreffion of human Ideas, and to shew, that such is the regular formation and analogy of language.

It seems inaccurate, though confonant with vulgar ufe to say, that heat is the cause of being

Obf. V. being hot. The cause is rather the body from whence the influence proceeds: and heat is the abftract Idea which is formed from the sensation that we feel. In treating of the originals of a language, fuch distinctions seem neceffary to be attended to. Though at this time of day it is difficult for us, who have a language ready formed, which we receive from our nurfes, and retain by acquired habit, to trace the origin and progress of Ideas, and the relation which words have to the Ideas, that they exprefs *. But the first

* Greater difficulty has often been fuppofed in the forma. tion of language than feems to have really exifted, by not attending to this difference, and therefore by reafoning according to prefent notions: and thus imputing metaphyfical fubtlety to the communication of Ideas, which, by a different reafoning, may be fhewn to have been effected by the fimpleft energies of the mind. In conducting the theory of language, many mistakes appear to have been committed by accommodating language to Philofophy, instead of applying philosophy to language; or by reasoning from language in its most polished state; and thus determining on the origin of words according to their latest orthography, and most prevailing fignifications. In the courfe of fuch Inquiries, the reasoning is often manifeftly derived from modes of polifhed life, and maxims of refined philofophy. I will endeavour to illuftrate part of this obfervation, by explaining what I conceive to have been the original fignificátion of NUBO. It has been an opinion long received and almost as univerfally admitted,

that

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