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should be studied in this part of com- | two put together? In pleadings at the position as much as possible; and what bar, of narration, what is observed? may often be proper? Of explanatory What peculiar difficulty is there in introductions from the context, what is narrations at the bar? What, here. deremarked? When has a historical in-mand no small exertion of skill and troduction a happy effect? What comes dexterity? What must he always renext in order after the introduction? member? What does Quintilian very What only is to be said concerning it? properly direct? What qualities do To this, what generally succeeds? critics chiefly require in narration; and What does our author here not mean? of each of these, what is observed? Of How is this remark illustrated? What distinctness, what is remarked? How is essential to every good discourse? is this illustrated? In order to produce How may this be accomplished? What distinctness, what does narration reis division in discourse? In what dis- quire? What is material, in order to be course does this sort of division most probable in narration? In order to be commonly take place; and what ques-as concise as the subject will admit, tion has been moved? What is the what is necessary? Who is remarkable opinion of the Archbishop of Cambray? for his talent of narration? What inOf it, what does he observe? What stance is given? What does he here effect, in his opinion, has it? Notwith- wish to show? How are all the cirstanding his authority and arguments, cumstances, for rendering this probable, what does our author think; and why? painted? What does he give, in relaWhat reason has the practice itself, on ting the manner in which Milo set out its side? What advantages result to from Rome? Repeat the passage. In the hearers, from the division of a ser- sermons, what comes in the place of mon into heads? On this subject, what narration at the bar; and in what says Quintilian? With regard to break-manner must it be taken up? What is, ing the unity of a discourse, what does properly, the didactic part of preachour author observe? On the contrary, ing; and on the right execution of it, if the heads be well chosen, what is what depends? What is the great art their effect? In any discourse, where of succeeding with it? How is this fully division is proper, what is the first rule illustrated? Of what should the preachto be observed? How is this rule illus-er be persuaded? trated? Secondly, in division, what order must we follow? Into what parts

ANALYSIS.

must we divide the subject? Thirdly, 1. The introduction.
what should the several members of a
division do; and why? In the fourth

A. The ends of an introduction.

B. The introductions of the ancients.

place, of the terms in which our parti-Rules for the composition of an in

troduction.

tions are expressed, what is observed;
and what remarks follow? What is it
which chiefly makes the divisions of a
discourse appear neat and elegant?
What is the effect of this? In the fifth
place, what must be avoided? What
has always a bad effect in speaking?
Where may it be proper; but what
effect has it on an oration? To what
member should the heads of a sermon 2.
be limited? Why should the division 3.
of a sermon, or of a pleading at the
bar, be studied with much accuracy
and care? What effect will this have?
What do the French writers of ser-
mons study much more than we do?
Among the French, however, what
sometimes appears in their divisions?
What examples, from two eminent
French writers, are here introduced?
What was the next constituent part of
a discourse mentioned? Why are these 4. Narration or explication.

a. It should be easy and natural.
b. Correctness of expression should
be observed.

c. Modesty should be one of its principal characteristics. d. It should be calmly conducted. e. It should not anticipate any part of the subject. The enunciation of the subject. The divisions of the discourse. A. The parts should be distinct from each other.

B. The natural order should be fol

lowed.

c. The members should exhaust the subject.

D. The division should be expressed with precision.

E. The heads should not be unnecessarily extended.

LECTURE XXXII.

CONDUCT OF A DISCOURSE....THE ARGUMENTATIVE PART....THE PATHETIC PART....THE PERORATION.

In treating of the constituent parts of a regular discourse or oration, I have already considered the introduction, the division, and the narration or explication. I proceed next to treat of the argumentative or reasoning part of a discourse. In whatever place, or on whatever subject one speaks, this, beyond doubt, is of the greatest consequence. For the great end for which men speak on any serious occasion, is to convince their hearers of something being either true, or right, or good; and, by means of this conviction, to influence their practice. Reason and argument make the foundation, as I have often inculcated, of all manly and persuasive eloquence.

Now, with respect to arguments, three things are requisite. First, the invention of them; secondly, the proper disposition and arrangement of them; and thirdly, the expressing of them in such a style and manner, as to give them their full force.

The first of these, invention, is, without doubt, the most material, and the ground-work of the rest. But, with respect to this, I am afraid it is beyond the power of art to give any real assistance. Art cannot go so far as to supply a speaker with arguments on every cause, and every subject; though it may be of considerable use in assisting him to arrange and express those, which his knowledge of the subject has discovered. For it is one thing to discover the reasons that are most proper to convince men, and another to manage these reasons with the most advantage. The latter is all that rhetoric can pretend to.

The ancient rhetoricians did indeed attempt to go much farther than this. They attempted to form rhetoric into a more complete system; and professed not only to assist public speakers in setting off their arguments to most advantage; but to supply the defect of their invention, and to teach them where to find arguments on every subject and cause. Hence their doctrine of topics, or 'Loci Communes,' and 'Sedes Argumentorum,' which makes so great a figure in the writings of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. These topics, or loci, were no other than general ideas applicable to a great many different subjects, which the orator was directed to consult, in order to find out materials for his speech. They had their intrinsic and extrinsic loci; some loci, that were common to all the different kinds of public speaking, and some that were peculiar to each. The common or general loci, were such as genus and species, cause and effect, antecedents and consequents, likeness and contrariety,

definition, circumstances of time and place; and a great many more of the same kinds. For each of the different kinds of public speaking, they had their Loci Personarum,' and 'Loci Rerum.' As in demonstrative orations, for instance, the heads from which any one could be decried or praised; his birth, his country, his education, his kindred, the qualities of his body, the qualities of his mind, the fortune he enjoyed, the stations he had filled, &c.; and in deliberative orations, the topics that might be used in recommending any public measure, or dissuading from it; such as, honesty, justice, facility, profit, pleasure, glory, assistance from friends, mortification to enemies, and the like.

The Grecian sophists were the first inventors of this artificial system of oratory; and they showed a prodigious subtilty and fertility. in the contrivance of these loci. Succeeding rhetoricians, dazzled by the plan, wrought them up into so regular a system, that one would think they meant to teach how a person might mechanically become an orator, without any genius at all. They gave him receipts for making speeches on all manner of subjects. At the same time, it is evident, that though this study of common places might produce very showy academical declamations, it could never produce discourses on real business. The loci indeed supplied a most exuberant fecundity of matter. One who had no other aim, but to talk copiously and plausibly, by consulting them on every subject, and laying hold of all that they suggested, might discourse without end; and that, too, though he had none but the most superficial knowledge of his subject. But such discourse could be no other than trivial. What is truly solid and persuasive, must be drawn 'ex visceribus causæ,' from a thorough knowledge of the subject, and profound meditation on it. They who would direct students of oratory to any other sources of argumentation, only delude them; and by attempting to render rhetoric too perfect an art, they render it, in truth, a trifling and childish study.

On this doctrine, therefore, of the rhetorical loci, or topics, I think it superfluous to insist. If any think that the knowledge of them may contribute to improve their invention, and extend their views, they may consult Aristotle and Quintilian, or what Cicero has written on this head, in his Treatise De Inventione, his Topica, and second book De Oratore. But when they are to prepare a discourse, by which they purpose to convince a judge, or to produce any considerable effect upon an assembly, I would advise them to lay aside their common places, and to think closely of their subject. Demosthenes, I dare say, consulted none of the loci, when he was inciting the Athenians to take arms against Philip; and where Cicero has had recourse to them, his orations are so much the worse on that account.

I proceed to what is of more real use, to point out the assistance that can be given, not with respect to the invention, but with respect to the disposition and conduct of arguments.

Two different methods may be used by orators, in the conduct

of their reasoning; the terms of art for which are, the analytic, and the synthetic method. The analytic is, when the orator conceals his intention concerning the point he is to prove, till he has gradually brought his hearers to the designed conclusion. They are led on step by step, from one known truth to another, till the conclusion be stolen upon them, as the natural consequence of a chain of propositions. As, for instance, when one intending to prove the being of a God, sets out with observing, that every thing which we see in the world has had a beginning; that whatever has had a beginning, must have a prior cause; that in human productions, art shown in the effect, necessarily infers design in the cause: and proceeds leading you on from one cause to another, till you arrive at one supreme first cause, from whom is derived all the order and design visible in his works. This is much the same with the Socratic method, by which that philosopher silenced the sophists of his age. It is a very artful method of reasoning; may be carried on with much beauty, and is proper to be used when the hearers are much prejudiced against any truth, and by imperceptible steps must be led to conviction.

But there are few subjects that will admit this method, and not many occasions on which it is proper to be employed. The mode of reasoning more generally used, and most suited to the train of popular speaking, is what is called the synthetic; when the point to be proved is fairly laid down, and one argument upon another is made to bear upon it, till the hearers be fully convinced.

Now, in all arguing, one of the first things to be attended to is, among the various arguments which may occur upon a cause, to make a proper selection of such as appear to one's self the most solid; and to employ these as the chief means of persuasion. Every speaker should place himself in the situation of a hearer, and think how he would be affected by those reasons which he purposes to employ for persuading others. For he must not expect to impose on mankind by mere arts of speech. They are not so easily imposed on, as public speakers are sometimes apt to think. Shrewdness and sagacity are found among all ranks; and the speaker may be praised for his fine discourse, while yet the hearers are not persuaded of the truth of any one thing he has uttered.

Supposing the arguments properly chosen, it is evident that their effect will, in some measure, depend on the right arrangement of them; so as they shall not justle and embarrass one another, but give mutual aid; and bear with the fairest and fullest direction on the point in view. Concerning this, the following rules may be taken: In the first place, avoid blending arguments confusedly together, that are of a separate nature. All arguments whatever are directed to prove one or other of these three things; that something is true; that it is morally right or fit; or that it is profitable and good. These make the three great subjects of discussion among mankind; truth, duty, and interest. But the arguments directed towards any one of them are generically distinct; and he who blends them all under one

topic, which he calls his argument, as in sermons, especially, is too often done, will render his reasoning indistinct and inelegant. Suppose, for instance, that I am recommending to an audience benevolence or the love of our neighbour, and that I take my first argument, from the inward satisfaction which a benevolent temper affords; my second, from the obligation which the example of Christ lays upon us to this duty; and my third, from its tendency to procure us the good will of all around us: my arguments are good, but I have arranged them wrong; for, my first and third arguments are taken from considerations of interest, internal peace, and external advantages; and between these, I have introduced one which rests wholly upon duty. I should have kept those classes of arguments which are addressed to different principles in human nature, separate and distinct.

In the second place, with regard to the different degrees of strength in arguments, the general rule is to advance in the way of climax, ut augeatur semper, et increscat oratio.' This especially is to be the course, when the speaker has a clear cause, and is confident that he can prove it fully. He may then adventure to begin with feeble arguments; rising gradually, and not putting forth his whole strength till the last, when he can trust to his making a successful impression on the minds of hearers, prepared by what has gone before. But this rule is not to be always followed. For, if he distrusts his cause, and has but one material argument on which to lay the stress, putting less confidence in the rest, in this case, it is often proper for him to place this material argument in the front; to pre-occupy the hearers early, and make the strongest effort at first; that, having removed prejudices, and disposed them to be favourable, the rest of his reasoning may be listened to with more candour. When it happens, that amidst a variety of arguments, there are one or two which we are sensible are more inconclusive than the rest, and yet proper to be used, Cicero advises to place these in the middle, as a station less conspicuous than either the beginning or the end of the train of reasoning

In the third place, when our arguments are strong and satisfactory, the more they are distinguished and treated apart from each other, the better. Each can then bear to be brought out by itself, placed in its full light, amplified and rested upon. But when our arguments are doubtful, and only of the presumptive kind, it is safer to throw them together in a crowd, and to run them into one another: 'ut quæ sunt naturâ imbecilla,' as Quintilian speaks,' mutuo auxilio sustineantur;' that though infirm of themselves, they may serve mutually to prop each other. He gives a good example, in the case of one who had been accused of murdering a relation, to whom he was heir. Direct proof was wanting; but, 'you expected a succession, and a great succession; you were in distrest circumstances; you were pushed to the utmost by your creditors; you had offended your relation, who had made you his heir; you knew that he was just then intending to alter his will; no time was to be lost. Each of these

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