endeavours to render life, even in the most vulgar acceptation, as cheerful, joyous, and easy as possible. Nay, could it mend the condition of existence in any the most trivial circumstance, even by adding to the amplest possessions the poorest meanest utensil, it would in no degree contemn an addition even so Far otherwise: it would consider, that to neglect the least acquisition, when fairly in its power, would be to fall short of that perfect and accurate conduct which it ever has in view, and on which alone all depends.

And yet, though thus exact in every the minutest circumstance, it gives us no solicitude as to what rank we maintain in life. Whether noble or ignoble, wealthy or poor; whether merged in business, or confined to inactivity, it is equally consistent with every condition, and equally capable of adorning them all. Could it indeed choose its own life, it would be always that where most social affections might extensively be exerted, and most done to contribute to the welfare of society." But if fate order otherwise, and this be denied; its intentions are the same, its endeavours are not wanting; nor are the social, rational powers forgotten, even in times and circumstances where they can least become conspicuous.

It teaches us to consider life as one great important drama, where we have each our part allotted us to act.' It tells us that

So likewise the Stoic Hecato, in his treatise of Offices, as quoted by Cicero. Sapientis esse, nihil contra mores, leges, instituta facientem, habere rationem rei familiaris. Neque enim solum nobis divites esse volumus, sed liberis, propinquis, amicis, maximeque reipublicæ. Singulorum enim facultates et copiæ, divitiæ sunt civitatis. De Offic. 1. iii. c. 15.

Etenim quod summum bonum a Stoicis dicitur, Convenienter naturæ vivere, id habet hanc (ut opinor) sententiam, Cum virtute congruere semper: cætera autem, quæ secundum naturam essent, ita legere, si ea virtuti non repugnarent. Cic. de Offic. 1. iii. c. 3.

Alexander Aphrodisiensis, speaking of the Stoic doctrine concerning the external conveniencies and common utilities of life, delivers their sentiment in the following words: ̓Αλλὰ καὶ δίχα κειμένων ἀρετῆς τε σὺν τούτοις καὶ ἀρετῆς μόνης, μηδέποτ' ἂν τὸν σοφὸν τὴν κεχωρισμένην ἑλέσθαι, εἰ εἴη αὐτῷ δυνατὸν τὴν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων λαβεῖν. Supposing there lay virtue on the one side, attended with these externals, and virtue on the other side, alone by herself, the wise man would never choose that virtue which was destitute and single, if it was in his power to obtain that other which was accompanied with these advantages." Пepi yux. p. 157.

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Si ad illam vitam, quæ cum virtute degatur, ampulla aut strigilis accedat, sumpturum sapientem eam vitam potius, cui hæc adjecta sint. De Fin. 1. iv. c. 12. p. 300.

Itemque magis est secundum naturam, pro omnibus gentibus (si fieri possit) conservandis aut juvandis maximos labores molestiasque suscipere, imitantem Herculem illum, quem hominum fama, beneficiorum memor, in concilio cœlestium conlocavit, quam vivere in solitudine, non modo sine ullis molestiis, sed etiam in maximis voluptatibus, abundantem omnibus copiis ; ut excellas etiam pulchritudine et viribus. Quocirca optimo quisque et splendidissimo ingenio longe illam vitam huic anteponit. Cic. de Offic. 1. iii. c. 5.

Thus Aristo the Chian: Elvai yàp ὅμοιον τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὑποκριτῇ τὸν σοφόν ὃς ἄντε Θερσίτου ἄντε Αγαμέμνονος πρόσωπον ἀναλάβῃ, ἑκάτερον ὑποκρίνεται προσηκόντως. "The wise man is like the good actor; who, whether he assume the character of Thersites or Agamemnon, acts either of the two parts with a becoming propriety." D. Laert. 1 vii. s. 160.

This comparison of life to a drama or stage-play, seems to have been a comparison much approved by authors of antiquity. See Epict. Enchirid. c. 17. and the notes of the late learned editor Mr. Upton. See

our happiness, as actors in this drama, consists not in the length of our part, nor in the state and dignity, but in the just, the decent, and the natural performance.

If its aims are successful, it is thankful to Providence. It accepts all the joys derived from their success, and feels them as fully as those who know no other happiness. The only dif ference is, that having a more excellent good in view, it fixes not, like the many, its happiness on success alone," well knowing that in such case, if endeavours fail, there can be nothing left behind but murmurings and misery. On the contrary, when this happens, it is then it retires into itself, and reflecting on what is fair, what is laudable and honest, (the truly beatific vision, not of mad enthusiasts, but of the calm, the temperate, the wise, and the good,) it becomes superior to all events; it acquiesces in the consciousness of its own rectitude; and, like that mansion founded not on the sands but on the rock, it defies all the terrors of tempest and inundation.

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VII. Here he paused, and I took the opportunity to observe, how his subject had warmed him into a degree of rapture; how greatly it had raised both his sentiments and his style.-No wonder, said he. Beauty of every kind excites our love and admiration; the beauties of art, whether energies or works; the beauties of nature, whether animal or inanimate. And shall we expect less from this supreme beauty; this moral, mental, and original beauty; of which all the rest are but as types or copies? Not however by high flights to lose sight of our subject, the whole of what we have argued, may be reduced to this.

All men pursue good, and would be happy, if they knew how; not happy for minutes, and miserable for hours, but happy, if possible, through every part of their existence. Either, therefore, there is a good of this steady durable kind, or there is none. If none, then all good must be transient and uncertain; and if so, an object of lowest value, which can little deserve either our attention or inquiry. But if there be a better good, such a good

also M. Anton. 1. xii. s. 36; and the notes of Gataker. Plat. Gorg. p. 512. vol. i. edit. Serr.

u One of the wisest rules that ever was, with respect to the enjoyment of external good fortune, is that delivered by Epictetus; to enjoy it, ὡς δέδοται, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον dédorai, "in such manner as it is given, and for such time as it is given;" remembering that neither of these conditions we have the power to command. See Arr. Epict. 1. iv. c. 1. p. 556. See also p. 573. of the same.

* See before, note m, p. 85; buws dè kai ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει, &c.

This is a principle adopted by all the Stoics, and inculcated through every part

of the dissertations of Epictetus. Take an example or two out of many. úois d' αὔτη παντὸς, τὸ διώκειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν, φεύγειν τὸ κακὸν—τοῦ γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ συγγενέστερον ovdév. "It is the nature of every one to pursue good, and fly evil-for nothing is more intimately allied to us than good." Arr. Epict. l. iv. c. 5. p. 606. Again, l. ii. c. 22. p. 313. Πᾶν Ζῶον οὐδενὶ οὕτως ὠκείωται, ὡς τῷ ἰδίῳ συμφέροντι. “Το nothing is every animal so intimately allied, as to its own peculiar welfare and interest."

So Cicero: Omnes enim expetimus utilitatem, ad eamque rapimur, nec facere aliter ullo modo possumus. De Offic. 1. iii. c. 28. Platon. Gorg. p. 468. vol. i. edit. Serr. ibid. p. 499. E.

as we are seeking; like every other thing, it must be derived from some cause; and that cause must be either external, internal, or mixed, inasmuch as except these three, there is no other possible. Now a steady, durable good, cannot be derived from an external cause, by reason all derived from externals must fluctuate, as they fluctuate. By the same rule, not from a mixture of the two: because the part which is external will proportionally destroy its essence. What, then, remains but the cause internal; the very cause which we have supposed, when we place the sovereign good in mind; in rectitude of conduct; in just selecting and rejecting?"-There seems, indeed, no other cause, said I, to which we can possibly assign it.

Forgive me, then, continued he, should I appear to boast. We have proved, or, at least, there is an appearance we have proved, that either there is no good except this of our own; or that, if there be any other, it is not worthy our regard.-It must be confessed, said I, you have said as much as the subject seems to admit.

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VIII. By means, then, said he, of our hypothesis, behold one of the fairest, and most amiable of objects; behold the true and perfect man that ornament of humanity, that god-like being, who, without regard either to pleasure or pain, uninfluenced equally by either prosperity or adversity, superior to the world and its best and worst events, can fairly rest his all upon the rectitude of his own conduct, can constantly, and uniformly, and manfully maintain it; thinking that, and that alone, wholly sufficient to make him happy.

And do you seriously believe, said I, there ever was such a character? And what, replied he, if I should admit there never was, is, or will be such a character? that we have been talking the whole time of a being not to be found?

A faultless monster, which the world ne'er saw?

Supposing, I say, we admit this, what then?-Would not your

2 See before, pages 51, 52, 53.

Dæmon, or genius, means every man's particular mind, and reasoning faculty. Δαίμων—οὗτος δέ ἐστιν ὁ ἑκάστου νοῦς kal Aoyos. M. Anton. 1. v. p. 27. Genium esse uniuscujusque animum rationalem; et ideo esse singulos singulorum. Varro in Fragm. It is from this interpretation of genius, that the word, which in Greek expresses happiness, is elegantly etymologized to mean "a goodness of genius or mind." Eδαιμονία ἐστὶ δαίμων ἀγαθός. M. Anton. 1. vii. s. 17. See Gataker on the place. The sentiment came originally from the old Academics. See before, page 85, note m.

Quam gravis vero, quam magnifica, quam constans conficitur persona sapientis? Qui, cum ratio docuerit, quod honestum

esset, id esse solum bonum, semper sit necesse est beatus, vereque omnia ista nomina possideat, quæ inrideri ab imperitis solent. Rectius enim appellabitur rex, quam Tarquinius, qui nec se nec suos regere potuit: rectius magister populi, etc. Cic. de Fin. 1. iii. c. 22. p. 269. Ergo hic, quisquis est, qui moderatione et constantia quietus animo est, sibique ipse placatus; ut nec tabescat molestiis, nec frangatur timore, nec sitienter quid expetens ardeat desiderio, nec alacritate futili gestiens deliquescat; is est sapiens, quem quærimus, is est beatus: cui nihil humanarum rerum aut intolerabile ad demittendum animum, aut nimis lætabile ad ecferendum videri potest. Quid enim videatur ei magnum, &c. Tusc. Disp. l. iv. c. 17. p. 298.

system in each a case, said I, a little border upon the chimerical? I only ask the question.-You need not be so tender, he replied, in expressing yourself. If it be false, if it will not endure the test, I am as ready to give it up as I have been to defend it. He must be a poor philosopher, indeed, who, when he sees truth and a system at variance, can ever be solicitous for the fate of a system.

But tell me, I pray, Do you object to mine, from its perfection, or from its imperfection? From its being too excellent for human nature, and above it; or from its being too base, and below it?It seems to require, said I, a perfection to which no individual ever arrived. That very transcendence, said he, is an argument on its behalf. Were it of a rank inferior, it would not be that perfection which we seek.-Would you have it, said I, beyond nature? If you mean, replied he, beyond any particular or individual nature, most undoubtedly I would. As you are a lover of painting, you shall hear a story on the subject.

"In ancient days, while Greece was flourishing in liberty and arts, a celebrated painter, having drawn many excellent pictures for a certain free state, and been generously and honourably rewarded for his labours, at last made an offer to paint them an Helen, as a model and exemplar of the most exquisite beauty. The proposal was readily accepted, when the artist informed them, that in order to draw one fair, it was necessary he should contemplate many. He demanded, therefore, a sight of all their finest women. The state, to assist the work, assented to his request. They were exhibited before him, he selected the most beautiful, and from these formed his Helen, more beautiful than them all."

You have heard the fact, and what are we to infer? Or can there be any other inference than this, that the standard of perfection, with respect to the beauty of bodies, was not (as this artist thought) to be discovered in any individual; but being dispersed by nature in portions through the many, was from thence, and thence only, to be collected and recognised?—It appears, said I, he thought so.-The picture, continued he, is lost, but we have statues still remaining. If there be truth in the testimony of the best and fairest judges, no woman ever equalled the delicacy of the Medicean Venus, nor man the strength and dignity of the Farnhesian Hercules. It is generally, said I, so believed.

Chrysippus seems to have been sensible of this, if we may judge from a passage of his preserved in Plutarch. Διὸ καὶ διὰ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦτε μεγέθους καὶ τοῦ κάλλους, πλάσμασι δοκοῦμεν ὅμοια λέγειν, καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν. "For this reason, through the excessive greatness and beauty of what we

assert, we appear to say things which look like fictions, and not such as are suitable to man and human nature.' Mor. 1041. F.

d See Cic. De Invent. l. ii. c. 1. See also Maximus Tyrius, Diss. xxiii. p. 277. of the late quarto edition, and Xenoph. Memor. 1. iii. c. 10.

And will you, said he, from this unparalleled and transcendent excellence, deny these works of art to be truly and strictly natural?—Their excellence, replied I, must be confessed by all; but how they can be called natural, I must own a little startles me. That the limbs and their proportions, said he, are selected from nature, you will hardly, I believe, doubt, after the story just related. I replied, it was admitted. The parts therefore of these works are natural.-They are.-And may not the same be asserted, as to the arrangement of these parts? Must not this, too, be natural, as it is analogous, we know, to nature?-It must. -If so, then is the whole natural.-So, indeed, said I, it should seem.-It cannot, replied he, be otherwise, if it be a fact beyond dispute, that the whole is nothing more than the parts under such arrangement.-Enough, said I, you have satisfied me.

If I have, said he, it is but to transfer what we have asserted of this subordinate beauty, to beauty of a higher order; it is but to pass from the external to the moral and internal. For here we say, by parity of reason, that nowhere, in any particular nature, is the perfect character to be seen entire. Yet one is brave, another is temperate, a third is liberal, and a fourth is prudent. So that in the multitude of mixed imperfect characters, as before in the multitude of imperfect bodies, is expressed that idea, that moral standard of perfection, by which all are tried and compared to one another, and at last upon the whole are either justified or condemned; that standard of perfection, which cannot be but most natural, as it is purely collected from individuals of nature, and is the test of all the merit to which they aspire. -I acknowledge, said I, your argument.

I might add, said he, if there were occasion, other arguments which would surprise you. I might inform you of the natural preeminence and high rank of specific ideas; that every indi

The Stoics themselves acknowledged, as we learn from Clemens of Alexandria, that their goods, or “perfect man," was difficult to be found to an exceeding great degree; dvorcuperos távv opódpa. Strom. p. 438. Sextus Empiricus gives it as their opinion, "that they had never as yet found him,” μέχρι τοῦ νῦν ἀνευρέτου ὄντος κατ' AUTOÙS TOû σopov. Adv. Phys. p. 582. edit. Lipsiens.

What Sextus says, seems to be confirmed by Cicero, who, speaking in his Offices the language of a Stoic, has the following expressions: Nec vero, cum duo Decii, aut duo Scipiones, fortes viri commemorantur, aut cum Fabricius Aristidesve justi nominantur; aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut ab his justitiæ, tanquam a sapientibus, petitur exemplum. Nemo enim horum sic sapiens est, ut sapientem volumus intelligi. Nec ii, qui sapientes habiti sunt, et nominati; M. Cato

f

et C. Lælius, sapientes fuerunt; ne illi quidem septem: sed ex mediorum officiorum frequentia similitudinem quandam gerebant, speciemque sapientum. De Offic. 1. iii. c. 4. Again, in his Lælius, speaking of the same consummate wisdom, he calls it, Sapientia quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus.

So, too, Quintilian: Quod si defuit his viris summa virtus, sic quærentibus, an oratores fuerint, respondebo, quo modo Stoici, si interrogentur, an sapiens Zeno, an Cleanthes, an Chrysippus, respondeant ; magnos quidem illos ac venerabiles; non tamen id, quod natura hominis summam habet, consecutos. Inst. Orat. 1. xii. c. 1.

p. 721, 722. edit. Caper.

So likewise Seneca: Scis, quem nunc bonum virum dicam? Hujus secundæ notæ. Nam ille alter fortasse, tanquam phoenix, semel anno quingentesimo nascitur. Epist. 42.

See Cicero in his Orator, near the be