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Here we see her countenance and complexion perpetually changing, her hair dishevelled, her breast panting, and a transition too in her manners from sobriety to distraction. How different is all this from the appearance of that sibyl, who first so courteously received Æneas at Cumæ, and afterwards so prudently attended him to the shades? Yet, amidst all these contrarieties, was she still the same sibyl; she was susceptible of them all, without becoming another woman.

This last character of substance appears to be the most essential for what is the support of contraries, or indeed of every attribute, but substance? Motion and rest, heat and cold, health and sickness, vigour and decay, are all to be found at times in each individual of the human race. Most of the same contraries are to be found among brutes, and some of them descend even to the race of vegetables.

If we descend from these minuter substances to our terraqueous globe, here tempest and calm, frost and thaw, rain and drought, light and darkness, have each their turn; yet leave it, when they depart, after all their seeming contest, the same individual globe, and not another. Thus the poet, we have already quoted, still considering substance as a person :

Yet he shall live in strife, and at his door
Devouring war shall never cease to roar:
Yea, it shall be his nat'ral property,
To harbour those that are at enmity.

Milt. Poems, No. ii.

If we extend our views beyond the spot which we inhabit, what is the whole visible universe but the comprehensive receptacle of every contrary conceivable? Within this immense whole they all distributively exist, while each of them by succession fulfils its allotted period, without disturbing the general order, or impairing the general beauty.

But if we ascend from passive and material substances up to such as are active and immaterial, here we shall find no distribution, no succession of contraries; but motion and rest, equality and inequality, similarity and dissimilarity, identity and diversity, will appear, each pair co-existing with the same being in the same instant, and that by an amazing connexion of both together under one.

It is by virtue only of this combining, this unifying comprehension, (and which for that reason can only belong to a being unextended and indivisible,) that the mind or intellect pronounces that A is not B, that C is unequal to D, that E is unlike to F. Were such propositions, instead of being comprehended at once by something indivisible and one, to be comprehended in portions by the different parts of something divisible; or were they to be comprehended by a power indivisible, yet not at once, but in a succession; it would be as impossible either way to comprehend the real propositions, as it would if they were to

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be recognised in part by a man in England, in part by one in China; or else in part by a man in the present century, in part by one of the succeeding. It may be asked, in such instances, who is it that comprehends the whole?

Lastly, much more in the Supreme Mind may we find such coincidence, since here, not only contraries, but all things whatever co-exist, and that, too, after a manner peculiarly transcendent; not by a knowledge which is partial, but by one which is universal; not with occasional remissions, but in one uniform unremitting energy; P not by subsequent impressions from things already pre-existing, but by that original causality, through which it makes all things to exist.

A noble field for speculating opens upon this occasion; which, though arising out of our subject, yet naturally leading us beyond it, we shall omit, and return to our logical inquiries, concluding here what we have to advance in our theory concerning substance."

We are now to consider the remaining genera, predicaments, or arrangements; that is to say, quality, quantity, relation, site, &c.

Some of these are at all times no higher than accidents; such, for example, as site or position, the time when, and the place where. Others, upon occasion, characterize and essentiate; such, for example, as magnitude, figure, colour, and many qualities. Thus a triply extended magnitude is essential to body, angularity to a cube, heat to fire, and colour to every superficies not transparent. In all such instances they make a part of the characteristic form, and in that sense are to be considered rather as substances than as accidents. However, as this holds not always, and that they are sometimes as merely and as strictly accidents

• This reasoning, and that in Hermes, p. 221, noted, abundantly shew the supremacy of the mind among the faculties of the human soul. It is mind that sees the difference, not only between black and white, bitter and sweet, but (which no sense is equal to) the difference between black and bitter, white and sweet, and the various tribes of heterogeneous attributes. Nor does it shew this supremacy in these recognitions only, but likewise when under one and the same view it recognises objects of sense and of intellect united, as in case of syllogisms made of propositions particular and universal; such as (if I may be permitted to speak after so scholastic a manner) the syllogisms Darii and Ferio in the first figure.

To this may be added, that this joint recognition of things multiform, contrary, and heterogeneous, and that by the same faculty, and in the same undivided instant,

seems to prove in the strongest manner that such faculty (by this faculty I mean the mind or intellect) must be incorporeal; for body, being infinitely divisible, is by no means susceptible of such a simple and perfect unity, as this recognition must necessarily be. See Hermes, l. iii. c. 4. note d. See also Aristot, de Anima, l. iii. c. 2. p. 52. edit. Sylb. Themist. Paraph. p. 85. a, b.

P See the chapter on Quality, where the verses of Empedocles are quoted.

The author, in the representing of ancient opinions, has endeavoured, as far as he was able, to make all his treatises consistent and explanatory one of another. Those who would see what he has already written on the two great elements of substance, discussed in this and the three pre ceding chapters, may search the index of Hermes for the words Matter and Form; and the index of Dialogue Concerning Art for the word Cause.

as any of those which are so always, we choose under that common denomination to speculate upon them all, beginning, according to order, first from the first.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONCERNING QUALITIES-CORPOREAL

AND

INCORPOREAL-NATURAL

AND ACQUIRED OF CAPACITY AND COMPLETION-TRANSITIONS IMMEDIATE, AND THROUGH A MEDIUM-DISPOSITIONS, HABITS-GENIUS -PRIMARY AND IMPERFECT CAPACITY-SECONDARY AND PERFECT-WHERE IT IS THAT NO CAPACITIES EXIST-QUALITIES, PENETRATING AND SUPERFICIAL-ESSENTIAL FORM-FIGURE AN IMPORTANT QUALITY—FIGURES INTELLECTUAL, NATURAL, ARTIFICIAL, FANTASTIC―― COLOUR, ROUGHNESS, SMOOTHNESS, ETC. PERSONS OF QUALITY PROPERTIES OF QUALITY-SOME REJECTED, ONE ADMITTED, AND

WHY.

As substance justly holds the first rank among these predicaments, or universal arrangements, by being the single one among them that exists of itself, so the next in order, as some have asserted, is quality, because quality is said to be an attribute from which no substance is exempt.

There may be substances, they tell us, devoid of quantity; such, for example, if we admit them, as the intellective, or inmaterial; but that there should be substances devoid of quality is a thing hardly credible, because they could not then be characterized and distinguished one from another.

On this reasoning it is maintained, that although we have no idea of quantity suggested to us in that animating principle, the soul, yet can we discern that this principle has many different qualities, and that animals from these qualities derive their distinct and specific characters. There is, for example, a social sympathy in the soul of man, which prompts the individuals of our species to congregate, and form themselves into tribes.

Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto.

Terent. Heauton. act. i.

We can trace the same congregating quality in the bee, in the beaver, and even in the ferocious wolf. It is, however, less fre

This was the opinion of Archytas: πρῶτα μὲν τέτακται οὐσία—δευτέρα δὲ ἁ Tolóras: "the first in order is substance, the second quality." Simplic. in Præd. Quantitat. p. 31. edit. Basil. Simplicius adds, ὥσπερ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ ποσοῦ προϋπάρχει, διότι τὸ εἶναι τῷ ποσῷ ἀπὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἐνδίδοται. οὕτως καὶ μετὰ τὸ ποιὸν ἂν εἴη τὸ ποσόν, ἐπειδὴ τὸν χαρακτῆρα αὐτὸν, καὶ τὴν ἰδιότητα ἀπὸ τῆς ποιότητος ἔχει : “ as substance precedes quantity, because being

is imparted to quantity from substance, so also must quantity succeed and come after quality, inasmuch as it derives from quality its very character and distinctive peculiarity." Ibid. To rotov λéyetai ý diapopà τῆς οὐσίας: “The difference which attends each substance is called quality.” Arist. Me taph. Δ. c. 14. He explains it immediately: “ man is a biped animal; horse, a quadruped.”

quent in those of ferocious character; the greater part of whom, if we except those seasons while they breed and nurture their young, seem to feel no other instincts but such as lead them to be solitary. It was under this unfeeling and gloomy character that Homer describes Polypheme and his giant-brethren:

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It is no less obvious, on the other hand, that there are qualities which may be considered as peculiar to body. If we admit figures, colours, and odours for qualities, and such undoubtedly they are, we must admit, of course, that among animal bodies there is one figure to the serpent, another to the horse; one colour to the swan, another to the parrot. Even in the vegetable race, the rose has one odour, the jessamine another; there is one figure to the orange, another to the fig.

It follows, therefore, that as qualities help to distinguish not only one soul from another soul, and one body from another body, but (in a more general view) every soul from every body, it follows (I say) that qualities, by having this common reference to both, are naturally divided into corporeal and incorporeal.

It was the judgment of Shakspeare to unite them in the character of Richard the Third, when he makes Buckingham relate in what manner he recommended him to the citizens of London: Withal I did infer your lineaments,

Being the right idea of your father,

Both in your form, and nobleness of mind.

Virgil does the same with respect to Æneas, when he makes his heroic virtue and his graceful person have so powerful an effect upon the unfortunate Dido:

Quis novus hic nostris successit sedibus hospes?

Quam sese ore ferens, quam forti pectore et armis?

Æn. iv. 10, 11.

The qualities above mentioned admit of another division, and that is into natural and acquired. Thus, in the mind, docility may be called a natural quality; science, an acquired one in the human body, beauty may be called a natural quality; gentility, an acquired one. This distinction descends even to bodies inanimate. To transmit objects of vision is a quality natural to crystal; but to enlarge them, while transmitted, is a character adventitious. Even the same quality may be natural in one substance, as attraction in the magnet; and acquired in another, as the same attraction in the magnetic bar.

All the above qualities have not only their completion, but their capacity. Thus not only the grape when complete, (that μὲν δυνάμει, τὰ δὲ ἐνεργεία. Δύναμις, "power," is seen in An, "matter;"

• Thus we translate the words ἐντελέχεια and δύναμις: sometimes we read τὰ

is to say, when mature,) possesses a delicious flavour; but there is a capacity also to produce it, residing in a simple grape-stone. Even in artificial substances there are in like manner capacities. A grain of gunpowder has the capacity of explosion; a musical instrument, that of rendering harmony. If, leaving these artificial and vegetative substances, we go still higher, we shall in animals find capacities, commonly known by the name of instincts; to which the frame of every species is peculiarly accommodated, and which frame such instincts internally actuate. Dente lupus, cornu taurus petit; unde nisi intus Monstratum?

Horat. Sat. ii. 1. 52.

In man there is a capacity to science and virtue; and well would it be for him, if not also to their contraries. Yet such is our nature, such the peculiar character of the reasoning faculty, belonging to us as men; it is capable of either direction, and may be employed, like the same weapon, as well to evil as to good.

Nor are there such qualities only as capacities, but there is a contrary and negative sort, which may be called incapacities; " and these also of different kinds, some for better, some for worse; so that where the capacities do honour, there the incapacities debase; where the capacities debase, there their opposites do honour. Thus to the power of being taught, an honourable capacity, is opposed the incapacity of being taught, a debasing one; and hence is man distinguished from an insect, and the one called docile, the other indocile. Again, to the power of dying, a debasing capacity, is opposed the inability of dying, a superior one; and thus are superior beings called immortal in the way of excellence, whilst man is called mortal, with a view to subordination.

The transition from qualities of capacity to those of completion, is sometimes immediate, sometimes through a medium. Thus in a grain of gunpowder, the transition from the power of exploding, to actual explosion, is immediate; so from the power

Teλéxeia, "completion," in eldos, "form." The division above mentioned into corporeal and incorporeal is taken from Plotinus, as we learn from Simplicius, in Præd. p. 69. B.

• Ἐπαμφοτερίζει πᾶσα ἡ λογοειδής [δύvaus:] "Every power of the rational kind has a capacity either way, that is, a double capacity." Ammon. in Præd. p. 127. Ai μὲν οὖν μετὰ λόγου δυνάμεις, αἱ αὐταὶ πλειόνων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων: “The powers that are connected with the reasoning faculty, are the same with respect to various and contrary operations." Aristot. de Interpr. p. 75. edit. Sylb.

It is thus medicine, as an art, can cause sickness as well as health; music, as an art, can cause discord as well as harmony.

And why this ?-because they are both founded in reason; and it is the same reason, in all instances, which shews us the thing, and shews us also its privation: & dè Aoyos ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὴν στέρη σιν. Arist. Metaph. ix. 2. p. 143. edit. Sylb. See also pages 147, 153, of the same work.

" Δυνάμεις, ἀδυναμίαι. Arist. Præd. p. 41. edit. Sylb.

Sappho, the celebrated poetess, has a singular sentiment upon this subject: Tò ἀποθνήσκειν κακόν· οἱ θεοὶ γὰρ οὕτω κεκρί κασιν· ἀπεθνήσκον γὰρ ἄν: “ Τo die, is an evil; the gods have so determined it, or else they would die themselves." Arist, Rhet. 1. ii. c. 22. s. 27.

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