parts; another, that which accedes; and a third, that which remains. Take an example or two from man. The healthful departs; the morbid accedes; the body remains. The morbid departs; the healthful accedes; the body remains. It is thus we change reciprocally as well to better as to worse.

It may be observed of these three principles, that two of them, being contraries, maintain a perpetual warfare;

Haud bene conveniunt, nec in una sede morantur:

the third, like a neutral power, preserves an intercourse with both, and sometimes associates with one, and sometimes with the other. It may be observed also of the two hostile or contrary principles, that one of them appertains, for the most part, to the better co-arrangement of things, and one to the baser:

to the better appertains figure; to the baser, deformity to the better, order; to the baser, confusion: to the better, health; to the baser, disease. Now if we call those of the better tribe by the common name of form, and those of the other tribe by the common name of privation," distinguishing the neutral principle withal by the name of subject, we shall then find the three principles of mutation, or change, to be form, privation, and a subject.

Of these three, if we compare form to privation, we shall find form to be definite and simple; privation to be infinite and vague. Thus there are infinite ways of being diseased, though but one of being healthy; infinite ways of being vicious, though but one of being virtuous."

Should it be asked, how privation is one, having this infinite and vague character; we may answer, because as privation, it is nothing more than the simple absence of that form to which it is opposed. Thus to be diseased, (though the ways are infinite,) is nothing more than the absence of health; to be vicious, (though the ways are infinite,) nothing more than the absence of virtue.

And hence, perhaps, it may be possible to reject privation for a principle, and supply its place, when wanted, by its opposite, that is to say, form; not however by the specific form then actually tending to existence, but by every other congenial form, of which this specific form is the privation. Thus in the producing of the sphere, its privation may be found in the presence of the pyramid, or of any figure, besides the sphere, whether regular or irregular. Thus in the producing of that harmony called the diapason, its privation may be found in the presence of the diapente, or of any other tensions, besides those of the octave, be they consonant or dissonant. It is certain that by such a reciprocal acceding and receding of all possible forms, by such an absence and presence, by such a continued revolution

must have been motion, (of which time, indeed, is but the interval;) nor motion, but where there must have been place and body; (one of which is the thing moved; the other, that where it is moved;) nor agitation, but where there must have been action.

And hence it follows, that place and body, time and action, form, as it were, a joint quaternion of principles. Varr. de Ling. Lat. 1. iv. p. 7. edit. Amstel.

We have given this passage at length, not only as it explains co-arrangement, but as it exhibits to us four of those predicaments, or arrangements, which make parts of this treatise, viz. substance, when, where,

action.

* Τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία, σTÉρηTIS: "The other co-arrangement of

contraries is privation." Aristot. Metaph. 1. iii. c. 2. p. 52. edit. Sylb.

By the word other, he means the baser and subordinate class, to which class he gives the common name of privation, as including all the genera therein enumerated, strife, evil, &c. And hence it is, that privation is in this treatise soon after called infinite and vague; for rò &πεрov, “infinite," made one in this baser arrangement. See Blemmidæ Epitom. Physic. p. 60. Philop. in Arist. Phys. 1. i. sub. fin.

η Εσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς de Kaкоí. Theognis.

ο ἱκανὸν γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναν Tiwv Toleiv тỷ άnovσíą kai napovolα Thν μεταβολήν : One of the two contraries (that is to say, form) will be sufficiently able, by its absence and its presence, to

and periodical succession, supposing a proper subject withal to receive and give them up, we may conceive how changes may be performed, and new substances produced, though (as we have said already) the principle of privation were to be withdrawn. No harm accrues to the doctrine from a supposition like this; only, if we admit it, we again reduce the principles from three to two; not however the former two, those that exist in contrariety, for now we adopt the more amicable ones, those of a form and a subject," or (if we take matter in its proper meaning) those of form and matter.

It is in these we behold the elements of those composite beings, natural substances. The disquisition makes it expedient to consider each of the two apart, and this we shall therefore do by beginning with matter.

effect mutation." Aristot. Phys. 1. i. c. 7. p. 20. edit. Sylb.

On this passage, Themistius thus comments. Having inserted the words above quoted, he subjoins—ὥστε τὸ εἶδος τὴν χώραν ἀποπληροῖ καὶ τῆς στερήσεως ἡ γὰρ στέρησις οὐ φύσις τις καὶ εἶδος ἐστὶν, ἀλλ ̓ ἀπουσία τοῦ εἴδους : “ So that the form supplies also the place of the privation ; for the privation is itself no particular nature or form, but rather the absence of the form' [which is then passing into existence.] Themist. in Arist. Phys. p. 21. B. edit. Ald. Simplicius on this occasion explains himself as follows: Οὐ μέντοι ἠξίωσεν ἐν τοῖς στοιχείοις θεῖναι τὴν στέρησιν καὶ τὸ κατ' αὐτὴν μὴ ὂν, διότι ἀπουσία μόνον ἐστὶ τοῦ πεφυκότος, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἑαυτῇ συνεισάγουσα· ἠρκέσθη δὲ τῷ εἴδει μόνῳ καὶ αὐτὸς, τῇ παρουσίᾳ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ δυναμένῳ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν φθορὰν ἀποδιδόναι: "Aristotle has not deigned to place among the elements [of natural productions] privation, and that mode of non-being which is consonant to it; because privation is no more than the absence of the thing produced, introducing along with itself no other particular attribute. He himself also has been satisfied with the form alone, as being able by its presence and its absence to effect both generation and dissolution.” Simplic. in Aristot. Phys. lib. i. p. 54. edit. Ald. fol.

1526.

Perhaps Simplicius alludes to what Ari stotle says in the following passage: 'H dé γε μόρφη καὶ ἡ φύσις διχῶς λέγεται· καὶ γὰρ ἡ στέρησις εἶδός πως ἐστίν: “ the terms form and nature have a double meaning for in one sense even privation is form." Physic. Aristot. l. ii. c. 1.

Philoponns gives a pertinent instance to explain how privation may be form. He tells us, Ἡ γὰρ Λύδιος ἁρμονία γίγνεται ἐκ τῆς ἀναρμοστίας τῆς Λυδίου. ἀλλ ̓ ἡ Λύδιος ἀναρμοστία δύναται εἶναι Φρύγιος ἁρμονία, ἢ ἑτέρα τις· δύναται δὲ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἀναρμοστία εἶναι τῶν χορδῶν ὁπωσοῦν ἐχουσῶν, καὶ τοῦτο ποικίλως ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐπιτετα μένων μᾶλλον, ἢ ἀνειμένων: “The Lydian mode or harmony is made out of Lydian dissonance, [that is, before the strings of a lyre were tuned to that mode, they were tuned after another manner, which manner he calls properly, Lydian dissonance.] Now Lydian dissonance may be the Phrygian mode or harmony, or it may be any other of the modes, [Doric, Ionic, &c. ;] it may also be simply the dissonance of the strings under any casual tension, and that in various and different ways, either as they are more stretched, or more relaxed," [that is, either sharper or flatter.] Philop. in Physic. 1. i. p. 45.

This shews that the Phrygian mode in this example, though clearly a form of harmony, is nevertheless, when referred to the Lydian mode, as much a privation as any casual tension of the strings, totally void of all concord.

P This is implied in the words-br γίγνεται ἅπαν ἔκ τε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ s μoppis: " that every thing is made or produced out of a subject and a figure." Arist. Physic. l. i. c. 7. p. 19.

Figure," opon, means the same with εἶδος, form, υποκείμενον, “ subject, means the same with ύλη, " matter. See the treatise just quoted, particularly to wards the conclusion of the first book.

CHAPTER IV.

CONCERNING MATTER—AN IMPERFECT DESCRIPTION OF IT-ITS NATURE, AND THE NECESSITY OF ITS EXISTENCE, TRACED OUT AND PROVED— FIRST BY ABSTRACTION-THEN BY ANALOGY—ILLUSTRATIONS FROM MYTHOLOGY.

MATTER is that elementary constituent in composite substances, which appertains in common to them all, without distinguishing them from one another. But it is fitting to be more explicit.

Every thing generated or made, whether by nature or art, is generated or made out of something else; and this something else is called its subject or matter. Such is iron to the saw; such is timber to the boat.

Now this subject or matter of a thing, being necessarily previous to that thing's existence, is necessarily different from it, and not the same. Thus iron, as iron, is not a saw; and timber, as timber, is not a boat. Hence then one character of every subject or matter, that is, the character of negation or prication.

Again, though the subject or matter of a thing be not that thing, yet were it incapable of becoming so, it could not be called its subject or matter. Thus iron is the subject or matter of a saw, because, though not a saw, it may still become a saw. On the contrary, timber is not the subject or matter of a saw, because it not only (as timber) is no saw, but can never be made one, from its very nature and properties. Hence, then, besides privation, another character of every subject or matter, and that is the character of aptitude or capacity.

Again, when one thing is the subject or matter of many things, it implies a privation of them all, and a capacity to them all. Thus iron, being the subject or matter of the saw,

If we compare the beginning of this chapter with the beginning of the following, it will appear that, though matter and form are the elements, or inherent parts of every composite substance, yet they essentially differ, inasmuch as matter being common, form peculiar, form gives every such substance its character, while matter gives it

none.

Thus Philoponus: Kar' aurd yàp [Td εἶδος scil.] χαρακτηρίζονται τὰ πράγματα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ὕλην οὐδὲν ἀλλήλων διαφέ povo: "By form, things are characterized; by matter, they differ not one from another." Com. in Physic. Arist. p. 55. D. And soon after, Διότι αὐτὸ χαρακτηριστικόν ἐστι τῆς ἑκάστου ουσίας· ἡ γὰρ ὕλη, κοινή:

"This [that is, the form] is characteristic of every being's essence; for as to the matter, it is common" [and runs through all.]

Ammonius says expressly, 'H μèv yàp ὕλη κοινωνίας ἐστὶν αἰτία τοῖς πράγμασι, Tò de eldos diapopas: "Matter, with regard to things, is the cause of their general community, or common nature; form, the cause of their peculiar difference." Ammon. in Cat. p. 25. Β.

Privation and capacity are essential to every thing which bears the name of matter; and this is the meaning of the following passage: ἐστὶ δὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἓν, εἴδει δὲ δύο : “ the subject or matter is one numerically, but in cha

the axe, and the chisel, implies privation and capacity with respect to all three.

Again, we can change a saw into a chisel, but not into a boat; we can change a boat into a box, but not into a saw. The reason is, there can be no change or mutation of one thing into another, where the two changing beings do not participate the same matter. But even here, were the boat to moulder and turn to earth, and that earth by natural process to metallize and become iron, through such progression as this we might suppose even the boat to become a saw. Hence therefore it is, that all change is by immediate or mediate participation of the same matter.

Having advanced thus far, we must be careful to remember, first, that every subject or matter implies, as such, privation and capacity; and next, that all change or mutation of beings into one another, is by means of their participating the same common matter. This we have chosen to illustrate from works of art, as falling more easily under human cognizance and observation. It is however no less certain as to the productions of nature, though the superior subtlety in these renders examples more difficult.

The question then is, whether in the world which we inhabit, it be not admitted from experience, as well as from the confession of all philosophers, that substances of every kind, whether natural or artificial, either immediately or mediately pass one into another; that we suppose at present no realizings of nonentity, but that reciprocal deaths, dissolutions, and diges

racter it is two;" that is to say, two, as it has a capacity to become a thing, and yet is under a privation, till it actually become so. Aristot. Physic. 1. i. p. 17. And soon after, he says: étepov yàp тd åvoрúñο кαl τῷ ἀμούσῳ εἶναι, καὶ τῷ ἀσχηματίστω καὶ Xaλk: “it is a different thing to be a man, and to be void of the musical art; it is a different thing to be void of figure, and to be brass." As much as if he had said, that the man, before he became a musical artist, had both a capacity for that character, and a privation of it; the brass a similar capacity and privation, before it

was cast into a statue.

Thus too Themistius: Kal To Aéyouev τῆς ὕλης τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ δυνάμει· ἡ δὲ δύναμις δηλονότι μετὰ στερήσεως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔτι δύναμις εἴη, μὴ σὺν αὐτῇ πάντως καὶ τῆς στερήσεως νοουμένης: “We say the essence of matter is in capacity; and capacity is evidently connected with privation; since it would no longer be capacity, could privation in no sense be understood, as existing with it." Themist. in Aristot. Physic. p. 21. edit. Ald.

See p. 263, note i, and note t, p. 269.

This reasoning has reference to what the ancients called "λn «poσexùs, “the immediate matter," in opposition to An прúτn, "the remote or primary matter," of which more will be said in the course of this speculation.

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It is of the immediate matter we must understand the following passage: 'Erdé χεται δὲ, μιᾶς τῆς ὕλης οὔσης ἕτερα γίγνεσθαι διὰ τὴν κινοῦσαν αἰτίαν· οἷον ἐκ ξύλου καὶ κιβωτὸς καὶ κλινή· ἐνίων δὲ ἑτέρα ἡ ὕλη ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἑτέρων ὄντων. οἷον πρίων οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἐκ ξύλου, οὐδ ̓ ἐπὶ τῇ κινούσῃ αἰτίᾳ τοῦτο : “ It is possible, that, the matter being one and the same, different things by the efficient cause should be formed out of it; as, for example, that out of wood should be formed a box and a bed. But then with regard to some things, which are different, the matter is of necessity different also. It is thus, for example, that a saw cannot be made out of wood; nor is this a work in the power of the efficient cause." Arist. Metaph. H. кep. d'. p. 138. edit. Sylb.