those places are already filled; the nominative by the substance sun; the accusative by the substance earth. Not as attributes to these last, or to any other thing; for attributes by nature they neither are, nor can be made. Here then we perceive the rise and use of prepositions. By these we connect those substantives to sentences, which at the time are unable to coalesce of themselves. Let us assume, for instance, a pair of these connectives, through and with, and mark their effect upon the substances here mentioned. "The splendid sun with his beams genially warmeth through the air the fertile earth." The sentence, as before, remains entire and one; the substantives required are both introduced; and not a word, which was there before, is detruded from its proper place.

It must here be observed, that most, if not all prepositions seem originally formed to denote the relations of place. The reason is, this is that grand relation which bodies or natural substances maintain at all times one to another, whether they are contiguous or remote, whether in motion or at rest.

It may be said, indeed, that in the continuity of place they form this universe, or visible whole, and are made as much one by that general comprehension, as is consistent with their several natures and specific distinctions. Thus it is we have prepositions to denote the contiguous relation of body, as when we say, "Caius walketh with a staff; the statue stood upon a pedestal; the river ran over a sand:" others for the detached relation, as when we say, "he is going to Italy; the sun is risen above the hills; these figs came from Turkey." So as to motion and rest, only with this difference, that here the preposition varies its character with the verb. Thus if we say, "that lamp hangs from the ceiling," the preposition from assumes a character of quiBut if we say, "that lamp is falling from the ceiling," the preposition in such case assumes a character of motion. in Milton,

escence.

So

But though the original use of prepositions was to denote the relations of place, they could not be confined to this office only. They, by degrees, extended themselves to subjects incorporeal, and came to denote relations, as well intellectual as local. Thus,

1 Omne corpus aut movetur aut quiescit: quare opus fuit aliqua nota, quæ TO TOû significaret, sive esset inter duo extrema, inter quæ motus fit, sive esset in altero ex

tremorum, in quibus fit quies. Hinc eliciemus præpositionis essentialem definitio Scal. de Caus. Ling. Lat. c. 152.

nem.

because, in place, he who is above, has commonly the advantage over him who is below, hence we transfer over and under to dominion and obedience; of a king we say, "he ruled over his people;" of a common soldier, "he served under such a general." So, too, we say, "with thought, without attention, thinking over a subject, under anxiety, from fear, out of love, through jealousy," &c. All which instances, with many others of like kind, shew that the first words of men, like their first ideas, had an immediate reference to sensible objects, and that in after-days, when they began to discern with their intellect, they took those words which they found already made, and transferred them by metaphor to intellectual conceptions. There is indeed no method to express new ideas, but either this of metaphor, or that of coining new words; both which have been practised by philosophers and wise men, according to the nature and exigence of the occasion."

In the foregoing use of prepositions, we have seen how they are applied, κатà πapáleσw, "by way of juxta-position," that is to say, where they are prefixed to a word without becoming a part of it but they may be used also, Kaтà σúvoεow, "by way of composition," that is, they may be prefixed to a word, so as to become a real part of it." Thus in Greek we have éπíoτaodai, in Latin, intelligere, in English, "to understand;" so also, to foretell, to overact, to undervalue, to outgo, &c., and in Greek and Latin, other instances innumerable. In this case, the prepositions commonly transfuse something of their own meaning into the word with which they are compounded; and this imparted meaning, in most instances, will be found ultimately resolvable into some of the relations of place, as used either in its proper or metaphorical acceptation.

m Among the words new coined we may and his sect; the whole philosophy of such ascribe to Anaxagoras, duoioμépeia: to sect, together with the connections and Plato, oirns: to Cicero, qualitas to dependencies of its several parts, whether Aristotle, évreλéxea: to the Stoics, obris, logical, ethical, or physical; he, I say, that, REPÁTIS, and many others. Among the without this previous preparation, attempts words transferred by metaphor from com- what I have said, will shoot in the dark; mon to special meanings, to the Platonics will be liable to perpetual blunders; will we may ascribe idéa: to the Pythagoreans explain, and praise, and censure merely by and Peripatetics, Kaтnyopía and KaтEYO- chance; and though he may possibly to per to the Stoics, karáλnis, úñóλnyis, fools appear as a wise man, will certainly Kathкov: to the Pyrrhonists, EσTi, èv among the wise, ever pass for a fool. Such δέχεται, ἐπέχω, δε. a man's intellect comprehends ancient philosophy, as his eye comprehends a distant prospect. He may see, perhaps, enough to know mountains from plains, and seas from woods; but from an accurate discernment of particulars, and their character, this, without further helps, it is impossible he should attain.

And here I cannot but observe, that he who pretends to discuss the sentiments of any one of these philosophers, or even to cite and translate him, (except in trite and obvious sentences,) without accurately knowing the Greek tongue in general; the nice differences of many words apparently synonymous; the peculiar style of the author whom he presumes to handle; the new coined words, and new significations given to old words, used by such author

n See Gaz. Gram. 1. iv. cap. de Præposit. • For example, let us suppose some given space; e and ex signify "out of that space;" per, “through it," from beginning to end;

Lastly, there are times when prepositions totally lose their connective nature, being converted into adverbs, and used in syntax accordingly. Thus Homer:

Γέλασσε δὲ πᾶσα περὶ χθών.

"And earth smiled all around."

Iliad. T. 362.

But of this we have spoken in a preceding chapter. One thing we must, however, observe, before we finish this chapter, which is, that whatever we may be told of cases in modern languages, there are, in fact, no such things; but their force and power is expressed by two methods, either by situation, or by prepositions; the nominative and accusative cases, by situation; the rest, by prepositions. But this we shall make the subject of a chapter by itself, concluding here our inquiry concerning prepositions.

CHAPTER IV.

CONCERNING CASES.

As cases, or at least their various powers, depend on the knowledge, partly of nouns, partly of verbs, and partly of prepositions, they have been reserved till those parts of speech had been examined and discussed, and are for that reason made the subject of so late a chapter as the present.

There are no cases in the modern languages, except a few among the primitive pronouns, such as I and me, je and moy; and the English genitive, formed by the addition of s, as when from lion, we form lion's; from ship, ship's. From this defect,

in, "within it ;" sub, “under it." Hence, then, e and per, in composition, "augment;" enormis, "something, not simply big, but big in excess;" something got out of the rule, and beyond the measure; dico, "to speak;" edico, to speak out;" whence edictum, "an edict," something so effectually spoken, as all are supposed to hear, and all to obey. So Terence:

Eun. v. 5, 20.

Dico, edico vobis. which (as Donatus tells us in his Comment) is an aunois. Fari, “to speak;" effari, "to speak out." Hence effatum, “an axiom," or self-evident proposition; something addressed, as it were, to all men, and calling for universal assent. Cic. Acad. ii. 29. Permagnus, perutilis, “great throughout, useful through every part."

On the contrary, in and sub diminish and lessen. Injustus, iniquus, “unjust, inequitable," that lies within justice and equity, that reaches not so far, that falls

short of them; subniger, “blackish ;" subrubicundus, “reddish;" tending to black, and tending to red, but yet under the standard, and below perfection.

Emo originally signified, "to take away;" hence it came to signify to buy, because he, who buys, takes away his purchase. Inter, "between," implies discontinuance; for in things continuous there can nothing lie between. From these two comes interimo, "to kill;" that is to say, to take a man away in the midst of life, by making a discontinuance of his vital energy. So also perimo, "to kill" a man; that is to say, to take him away thoroughly; for, indeed, what more thorough taking away can well be supposed? The Greek verb, avaipeîv, and the English verb, "to take off," seem both to carry the same allusion. And thus it is that prepositions become parts of other words.

P See before, p. 177.

however, we may be enabled to discover, in some instances, what a case is; the periphrasis, which supplies its place, being the case (as it were) unfolded. Thus equi is analysed into du cheval, "of the horse;" equo into au cheval, "to the horse." And hence we see that the genitive and dative cases imply the joint power of a noun and preposition; the genitive's preposition being a, de, or ex; the dative's preposition being ad, or versus.

We have not this assistance as to the accusative, which, in modern languages, (a few instances excepted.) is only known from its position, that is to say, by being subsequent to its verb in the collocation of the words.

The vocative we pass over, from its little use, being not only unknown to the modern languages, but often in the ancient being supplied by the nominative.

The ablative, likewise, was used by the Romans only; a case they seem to have adopted to associate with their prepositions, as they had deprived their genitive and dative of that privilege; a case certainly not necessary, because the Greeks do as well without it, and because with the Romans themselves it is frequently undistinguished.

There remains the nominative, which, whether it were a case or no, was much disputed by the ancients. The Peripatetics held it to be no case, and likened the noun, in this its primary and original form, to a perpendicular line, such, for example, as the line A B.

B C

D

σεις,

The variations from the nominative they considered as if A B were to fall from its perpendicular; as, for example, to A C, or A D. Hence, then, they only called these variations, πσeis, casus, "cases," or "fallings. cases," or "fallings." The Stoics, on the contrary, and the grammarians with them, made the nominative a case also words they considered (as it were) to fall from the mind, or discursive faculty. Now when a noun fell thence in its primary form, they then called it πтŵσis open, casus rectus, "an erect, or upright case or falling;" such as A B, and by this name they distinguished the nominative. When it fell from the mind under any of its variations, as, for example, in the form of a genitive, a dative, or the like, such variations they called TTWσeis Tλayiai, casus obliqui, "oblique cases, or sidelong fallings," (such as A C, or A D,) in opposition to the other, (that is, A B,) which was erect and perpendicular. Hence, too, grammarians called the method of enumerating the various cases of a noun, 4 See Ammon. in Libr. de Interpr. p. 35.

xxíois, declinatio, "a declension;" it being a sort of progressive descent from the noun's upright form through its various declining forms; that is, a descent from A B to A C, A D, &c.

Of these cases we shall treat but of four, that is to say, nominative, the accusative, the genitive, and the dative.

the

It has been said already, in the preceding chapter, that the great objects of natural union are substance and attribute. Now from this natural concord arises the logical concord of subject and predicate, and the grammatical concord of substantive and attributive. These concords in speech produce propositions and sentences, as that previous concord in nature produces natural beings. This being admitted, we proceed by observing, that when a sentence is regular and orderly, nature's substance, the logician's subject, and the grammarian's substantive, are all denoted by that case which we call the nominative. For example: Cæsar pugnat, as fingitur, domus ædificatur. We may remark, too, by the way, that the character of this nominative may be learnt from its attributive. The action implied in pugnat shews its nominative Cæsar to be an active efficient cause; the passion implied in fingitur shews its nominative as to be a passive subject, as does the passion in ædificatur prove domus to be an effect.

As therefore every attributive would, as far as possible, conform itself to its substantive, so for this reason, when it has cases, it imitates its substantive, and appears as a nominative also. So we find it in such instances as Cicero est eloquens; vitium est turpe; homo est animal, &c. When it has no cases, (as happens with verbs,) it is forced to content itself with such assimilations as it has, those of number and person; as when we say, Cicero loquitur; nos loquimur; homines loquuntur.

From what has been said, we may make the following observations that as there can be no sentence without a substantive, so that substantive, if the sentence be regular, is always denoted by a nominative; that on this occasion all the attributives, that have cases, appear as nominatives also; that there may be a regular and perfect sentence without any of the other cases, but that without one nominative, at least, this is utterly impossible. Hence, therefore, we form its character and description: the nominative is that case, without which there can be no regular and perfect sentence. We are now to search after another case. When the attributive in any sentence is some verb denoting action, we may be assured the principal substantive is some active efficient cause; so we may call Achilles and Lysippus in

See before, p. 193,

• What sort of number and person verbs have, see before, p. 170, 1.

We have added regular, as well as perfect, because there may be irregular sentences, which may be perfect without a

nominative. Of this kind are all sentences, made out of those verbs called by the Stoics παρασυμβάματα, οι παρακατηγορήματα : such as Σωκράτει μεταμέλει, Socratem pœnitet, &c. See before, p. 169.